TAOIST IMPACT ON HUA-YEN BUDDHISM: A STUDY OF THE FORMATION OF HUA-YEN WORLDVIEW

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

ON THE CRITICISM OF CHINESE BUDDHISM

It is one of the age-old controversies among modern Buddhologists whether or not Mahāyāna Buddhist traditions in general represent the authentic teaching of the Buddha. Of them, particularly Chinese Buddhism has often been criticized by modern Buddhologists for its doctrinal aberration - aberration from the teaching of the Buddha, Śakyamuni, that are preserved in the Palī Nikāya as well as the Chinese Āgama (阿含).[1] This accusation, however, is not totally groundless, especially in case of the so-called domesticated Chinese Buddhism, such as T'ien-t'ai, Hua-yen, and Ch'an, in spite of the fact that the patriarchs of these schools repeatedly emphasized their legitimacy as spiritual descendents of the Buddha referring to passages found in the early sources of Tripitaka.

David J. Kalupahana, a serious critic towards the Absolutist trends

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1) Here it should be pointed out in passing that the Chinese Buddhist thinkers were prone to obscurity in distinguishing the Buddha's own discourse from the tenets of the Sprinter schools. This constitutes, it is claimed by Professor Kalupahana, one of the reasons that they escaped from the authentic teaching of the Buddha. See David J. Kalupahana, *Buddhist Philosophy: A historical Analysis*, p. 171.

of Mahāyānist interpretation of reality, is in favour of the Empirical spirit of the Buddha's teaching based on the Palī Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas. To see clearly the divergency of the Chinese 'Neo-Buddhism' from early Buddhism, it would be enough to juxtapose the typical delineation concerning the question of nirvāṇa:

> A) There is, monks, that plane where there is neither extension nor.......motion nor the plane of infinite ether.....nor that of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, neither this world nor another, neither the moon nor the sun. Here, monks, I say that there is no coming or going or remaining or deceasing or uprising, for this is itself without support, without continuance, without mental object - this is itself the end of suffering.
>
> There is, monks, an unborn, not become, not made, uncompounded, and were it not, monks, for this unborn, not become, not made, uncompounded, no escape could be shown here for what is born, has become, is made, is compounded. But because there is, monks, an unborn, not become, not made, uncompounded, therefore an escape can be shown for what is born, has become, is made, is compounded.[2]
>
> A') Accordingly, O Priests, as respects all form whatsoever, past, future, or present, be it subjective or existing outside, gross or subtle, mean or exalted, far or near, the correct view in the light of the highest knowledge is as follows: 'This is not mine; this am I not; this is not my Ego.' As respects all

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2) *Udāna*, 80-81, E. Conze (tr.), *Buddhist Thought in India*, p. 95.

> sensation whatsoever.....as respects all perception whatsoever.....as respects all predispositions whatsoever.....as respects all consciousness whatsoever, past, future, or present, be it subjective or existing outside, gross or subtle, mean or exalted, far or near, the correct view in the light of the highest knowledge is as follows: 'This is not mine; this am I not; this is not my Ego.'[3]

> B) .....when he came to the sentence, 'One should use one's mind in such a way that it will be free from any attachment,' I at once became fully enlightened, and realized that all things in the universe are the self-nature (自性) of mind itself.
> Who would have ever known," I said to the patriarch, "that the self-nature of mind is inherently pure! Who would have ever known that the self-nature of mind is inherently beyond neither creation nor annihilation! Who would have ever known that the self-nature of mind is inherently self-sufficient! Who would have ever known that the self-nature of mind is inherently beyond transformation! Who would have ever known that all things are the manifestation of the self-nature of mind![4]

Just as the former perspective as to self is consistently reiterated in the Buddha's other discourses throughout the Palī Nikaya, so the latter one is shared by Chinese Buddhist figures regardless their redundant

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3) *Mahā-Vagga* (i. 638). Henry Clarke Warren (tr.), *Buddhism in Translations*, p. 147.

4) Hui-neng, *The Platform Sūtra*, p. 73.

standpoints. This alleged discrepancy on the interpretation of self between the two traditions must be the most problematic issue because the pivotal doctrine of Buddhism is the concept of non-self against which no Buddhist tradition can properly claim its authenticity. The question of self is closely related to that of nirvāṇa. The reasons responsible for these abyss lying between the different interpretations of this pivotal term are too multifaced to enumerate.

David J. Kalupahana, as mentioned before, through a series of recent publications,[5] severely criticized Mahāyāna Buddhism for its Absolutist trends implied in the notions of Ultimate Reality, Transcendental Entity, Metaphysical Substance, and so forth, emphasizing empirical and pragmatic spirits of the Buddha's discourse.[6] By the word 'empirical', he means that everybody, irrespective of being an enlightened one or an ordinary person, can 'experience' the Truth taught by the Buddha. Criticizing T. R. V. Murti's view on the Mādhymika philosophy, he definitely declares that the Buddha never acknowledged 'ineffable,

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5) *Buddhist Philosophy; A Historical Analysis, Buddhist Psychology, Nagarjuna; The Philosophy of the Middleway*, and so on.

6) David J. Kalupahana, *Buddhist Philosophy-A Historical Analysis*, pp. 133-36. 'Apart from sense data, no diverse and eternal truths exist in this world. Having organized one's reasoning with regard to metaphysical assumptions, [the sophist] spoke of two things, truth and falsehood.'

supersensuous, or extraempirical reality.' At least in early Buddhism, he adds, 'belief in a transcendental reality or an Absolute has no place:

> The perception of arising and ceasing of phenomena conditioned by various factor is available even to ordinary people who have not been able to completely free themselves from prejudices. Thus, there is a common denominator between the perceptions of an ordinary person and those of the enlightened one. However, the ordinary person continues to worry about a permanent and eternal substance behind phenomena or about a supreme being who is the author of all that happens in the world. He is assailed by doubts about what he perceives. One way of overcoming such doubts is to confine oneself to what is given, that is the causal dependence of phenomena, without trying to look for something mysterious. The Buddha realized that 'When phenomena (dhammā) appear before the brahman who is ardent and contemplative, his doubts disappear, as he sees their causal nature.'[7]

Kalupahana claims that endorsing a metaphysically posited entity beyond the sphere of fence or experience is a distortion of the teaching of the Buddha.[8] It is true that the naiive empiricism advocating the

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7) Ibid.

8) Ibid., p. 133. 'According to our analysis of early Buddhism as embodied in the Palī Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas, the Buddha did not accept a supersensuous or extraempirical reality which is inexpressible.'

dictum, 'there is nothing but sense data' is found here and there in early Buddhist scriptures. The Buddha himself is believed to have said that senses and their objects are what exist in the world.[9] If so then, do the so-called Absolutistic notions characterizing the ontology or epistemology of Mahāyāna Buddhism indicate the realm which is beyond the twelve bases?

Kalupahana's view is partly correct in that a survey on early Buddhist literature more or less seems to endorse his claims. However, Ultimate Reality is not a non-empirical theory, because it is not a mere concept but an experiential realm to which Buddhist practitioners aim through practice. It is true that the Buddha resorted to an empirical way of teaching in order to have his disciples get rid of futile speculations on metaphysical issues. The metaphor of the 'poisoned arrow' is the well known example for this matter. This alone, however, may not be enough evidence to demonstrate the fact that the Buddha did not pay attention to the Absolute or Ultimate Reality. No doubt, we hardly find, in the early Buddhist literature ascribed to the Buddha, verbal expressions such as Ultimate Reality and so on that were employed to describe what is transcendent beyond

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9) "....a Brahman asked the Buddha, "Gotama, what is so-called 'everything (一切)'?" To this replied the Buddha, "By everything, I mean the twelve bases, that is, eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mental function, color, sound, odor, taste, touch and ideation." (雜阿含經 卷13).

experiences of common people. Nonetheless, it does not follow that he denied such a realm, rather it may be rightly said that the ultimate goal of the Buddha's teaching is to lead sentient beings from the world of suffering (*saṃsāra*) to the realm of the transcendental (*nirvāṇa*). Ultimate Reality is nothing other than the state of *nirvāṇa*. No matter what terms are applied, it is the state of enlightenment from which the teaching of the Buddha derived. As an expedient, or for the sake of convenience of communication, dualism of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, the conditioned and unconditioned, and of the conventional and supreme, etc. has been used through out the Buddhist tradition. It is a question of 'language', and is not the transformation of tenets. As T. R. V. Murti states:

> The absolute can not even be identical with Being or Consciousness, as this would be to compromise its nature as the unconditioned ground of phenomena. The Tattva, however, is accepted by the Madhyamika as the Reality of all things (*dharmāṇām dharmatā*), their essential nature (*prakṛtir dharmāṇām*). It is uniform and universal, neither decreasing, nor increasing, neither originating nor decaying. The Absolute alone is in itself (*akṛtrima svabhāva*). The Absolute is that intrinsic form in which things would appear to the clear vision of an Ārya (realized saint) free from ignorance.[10]

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10) T. R. V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, p. 235.

As it has been mentioned above, Buddhism is not a mere speculative or descriptive philosophical system but, even more, a soteriological one, concerned with providing a means to liberation or salvation for sentient beings. It is a tacit assumption that if the soteriological teaching is understood and realized, an unconditioned state, or Absolute freedom from suffering could be achieved. Thus it may be said that Indian philosophy in general and Madhyamika in particular have a fundamentally soteriological orientation. If this fact is overlooked, the real significance of Indian and Buddhist philosophy will be missed. The soteriological philosophers admit the possibility of an unconditioned state (that is, *nirvāṇa*, liberation or salvation) devoid of the suffering in the world of *saṃsāra*.

What, then, is the cause of the suffering? For the Buddhist, ignorance (*avidyā*) or craving (*tṛṣṇā*) is the cause of suffering. Between these two ignorance is the more fundamental because it conditions craving, as well as other causes of suffering. This is direct indication of the importance of the subjective element in Buddhist and some other soteriological philosophies in India. For these philosophical systems, the transition from conditioned existence to the unconditioned is a subjective change involving the epistemological perspective. This conception of the subjective nature of liberation is most evident in

those philosophical systems which have been termed absolutist, like the Madhyamika and Śaṅkara's *Advaitavedānta*.

For absolutist philosophical systems, conditioned existence characterized by the experience of suffering is a mere appearance, or illusion. This illusion owes its existence to the ignorance of the epistemological subject. For these systems, liberation and the unconditioned are a reality which is beyond conceptual thought and language, and is unoriginated and unextinguished. The suffering of conditioned existence is an illusion which only appears as real to the epistemological subject so long as he or she remains under the influence of delusion. In other words, the transition from conditioned existence to the unconditioned is subjective and is made effective by the annihilation of ignorance. Conditioned existence and unconditioned existence are in reality identical. The appearance of conditioned existence is only subjective delusion.

We have now come to the point where we need to delineate the characteristics of Buddhist ontology: first, it has a noetic feature, which represents epistemological dualism; second, it is based on practice, not on doctrines alone; third, it is based on some sort of dualism, which represents expediential, or verbal dualism. Let us examine each, one-by-one.

NOETIC QUALITY (Epistemological Dualism)

It is controversial whether Buddhism in general can be categorized as mysticism. Nonetheless, there seems to be a consensus to the effect that Buddhism is concerned with some extraordinary experiences. According to the definition of mysticism presented by James Williams, there are four marks: 1) Ineffability, 2) Noetic quality, 3) Transiency, 4) Passivity. Of these the latter two are, as he pointed out, not only 'less sharply marked qualities,' but have nothing to do with the notion of Buddhist enlightenment. In consideration to the first two marks:

> 1) Ineffability - The handiest of the marks by which I classify a state of mind as mystical can be given in words. It follows from this that its quality must be directly experienced; it cannot be imparted or transferred to others. In this peculiarity mystical states are more like states of feeling than like states of intellect. No one can make clear to another who has never had a certain feeling, in what the quality or worth of it consists. One must have musical ears to know the value of a symphony; one must have been in love one's self to understand a lover's state of mind. Lacking the heart or ear, we cannot interpret the musician or the lover justly, and are even likely to consider him or her weak-minded or absurd. The mystic finds that most of us accord to our experiences an equally incompetent treatment.
>
> 2) Noetic quality - Although so similar to states of

> feeling, mystical states seem to those who experience them to be also states of knowledge. They are states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. They are illuminations, revelations, full of significance and importance, all inarticulate though they remain; and as a rule they carry with them a curious fence of authority for after-time.[11]

1) and 2) are, though separatedly explained, closely related to each other, because, even though mystical experiences defy conceptual approaches (ineffability), it is not totally nothing. Rather it is a certain kind of cognition. If it is a psychological state or some sort of feeling, is what contains such a state a human mind? The answer is either so or not so. Why? The ultimate Buddhist truth has nothing to do with ordinary cognitive subjects insofar as it is a counterpart to external objects. Furthermore, the mind is even more ephemeral than the physical body as discoursed by the Buddha. Thus it is not human mind that mystical experiences are dwelt in. Still we can not find anything other than mind when we try to seek after what undergoes such mystical experience. Thus it is within human mind that ultimate truth is realized. Only if we discard ego-centric attitude, it is claimed by many Mahāyānists, will we realize the truth of non-duality (不二). It is called an amalgamation of subject and object. As the dichotomy

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11) James Williams, *The Varieties of Religious Experiences*, pp. 292-293.

of subject and object vanishes away, in this realization, subject itself is everything, and, at the same time, object itself is everything. It is called 'things-as-they-are' (諸法實相), or 'tathatā' (眞如). There is nothing that is not the manifestation of the ultimate truth.

What prevents sentient beings from realizing the truth is deluded mind discriminating right and wrong, good and evil, etc.. Once the discriminative mind ceases to function, then the 'things-as-they-are' reveal themselves. On this regard, there is no difference between early Buddhism and Chinese Zen Buddhism:

> Herein, monks, a monk is a worthy one who has destroyed the defiling impulses, lived [the higher] life, done what has to be done, laid aside the burden, achieved the noble goal, destroyed the fetters of existence, and is freed through insight. He retains his five senses, through which, as they are not yet destroyed, he experiences pleasant and unpleasant sensations and feels pleasure and pain [or happiness and suffering]. This cessation of craving, hate, and confusion [which are the Three Poisons] is called the nibbāna with the substrate left.[12]

> The ultimate Tao is not difficult to obtain;
> It refuses discriminations.
> Only if one defies aversion and attachment,
> One would thoroughly understand the truth.[13]

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12) *Itivuttaka*. T 2, p. 579a.

13) Seng-ts'an, *Hsin-hsin ming* (信心銘), '至道無難 唯嫌揀擇 但莫憎愛 洞然明白.'

It is now evident that Buddhist soteriology and psychology is based on mental dualism. Even though it is said that nirvāṇa is basically identical with samsāra, they are in fact different. Nirvāṇa is not a substance but a mental transformation through which deluded views are disappeared.[14] Hence the so called 'dualistic' demarcation bases itself on the noetic distinction, not on the ontic one. From the perspective of conventional truth, cognition and its object are distinguished, while in the realm of supreme truth, as the ordinary cognitive subject fades out, the division of cognition and what is cognized is also not relevant. Nevertheless, the disintegration of the subject does not refer to total annihilation of the cognitive subject, rather it refers to the disappearance of discriminative mental function.[15] There still remains a kind of cognition - a cognition in a different dimension. Since this extraordinary perception is devoid of discriminative consciousness, it perceives things as they are without distorting them. Within this cognition, the cognizer conforms with the

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14) Murti, p. 233.

15) Rhys Davids C. A. F., *Buddhist Psychology*, p. 8, 'Buddhism has always held that, by dint of sedulous practice in prescribed forms of contemplative exercise, mundane consciousness might be temporarily transformed into the consciousness experienced in either the less material, or the quite immaterial worlds.'

object of cognition. This is called 'non-duality.' Such a extraordinary cognition may be called 'the absolute' or 'the absolute cognition.' To see things as they are is to see things devoid of their own being, or inherent existence. What is being devoid of their own existence is śūnyatā (空性, being empty) of the things.

The disintegration of the discriminative function is called nirvāṇa. And the notion of anātman is a subjectified expression for the state of nirvāṇa. Stcherbatsky writes:

> The Absolute and the Empirical, the Noumenon and the Phenomenon, Nirvāṇa and Saṁsāra are not two sets of separate realities set over against each other. The Absolute or Nirvāṇa viewed through thought-constructions (*vikalpa*) is saṁsāra, the world or saṁsāra viewed sub specie aeternitatis is the Absolute or Nirvāṇa itself.'[16]

This seeming dualism, however, does not have an ontological basis; it is solely epistemological. In conclusion, in order to give more detailed connotations to the so called 'dualism' discussed so far, we may borrow the dualistic notions of Mircea Eliade, namely the Sacred and Profane. When we speak of freedom and nirvāṇa, we presuppose bondage and transmigration. Also, buddhist doctrines which often resort to the adverbs, 'ultimately' or 'inherently', is none other than the

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16) Stcherbatsky, *The Concept of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, p. 30.

confession that conventionally, or virtually not so. Therefore, what the Buddha taught is 'the way and the means of dying to the profane human condition-that is, to slavery and ignorance-in order to be reborn to the freedom, bliss, and nonconditionality of *nirvāṇa.*' Because 'access to spiritual life always entails death to the profane condition, followed by a new birth.'[17]

The teachings of almost all religions are based on the dualism between what is desirable and what is not desirable, and what is truthful and what is false, etc. So are the Two Truths of Indian Mādhyamika philosophy. However we do not have any persuasive logical explanation as to which one of the two cognitions is more 'right', nor do we have any objective, and absolute criterion to determine which one of the two is which. These questions are beyond the borderline of religion, from which we can have only one answer: 'you will have virtual benefits from practice and, finally, from realization of the highest truth, such as happiness, emancipation from the bondage of transmigration, highest bliss, and so forth.' That is the sphere of religion where faith plays an important role.

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17) Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*, pp. 199-201.

PRACTICE

In the discussion of Buddhist thought, practice often evades our attention. It is also astonishing to see the practice itself discussed in the context of a theory for the sake of the theory itself. All Buddhist terminology, however, comes into light in terms only of practice because they were invented to explain the transcendental experiential realm attained by devotional practice. Buddhist Truth, which is experiential reality, requires to be verified by practice. As mentioned above, there are two levels of cognition, the exalted and the ordinary one. By the exalted cognition, we mean purified consciousness that is free from all kinds of mental defilements, such as the Three Poisons, generated by discriminative mental functions. Therefore, practice should be devised to clear up the discriminative mind. In turn, the discriminative mind can be extinguished by seeing the reality expounded in the Seal of the Three Truths (三法印):[18]

> All conditioned things are impermanent (*Sabbe saṃkhārā aniccā)*
> All conditioned things are suffering (*Sabbe saṃkhārā dukkhā)*
> All dammas are without self *(Sabbe dhammā anattā)*[19]

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18) As to the practice of meditation, see Nyanaponika, *The Heart of Buddhist Meditation*, p. 8, 117, 244.

19) *Dhammapada*, 1, 277-279.

EXPEDIENTIAL DUALISM

The most problematic issue of Buddhist ontology is concerned with the notion of nirvāṇa, a concept often misunderstood as a realm the enlightened one dwells in or as metaphysical substance by the Chinese. Stcherbatsky clearly points out the reason that the notion of nirvāṇna brings about disputes, unfortunately without any comment of his own:

> It may be said in passing that much of the confusion regarding Nirvāṇa is due to the fact that the same word Nirvāṇa is used for the psychological change consequent on the extinction of craving and the sense of ego, and also for the ontological Reality or the Absolute.[20]

As mentioned in the discussion of the noetic quality of Buddhist doctrine, this confusion brought about the question of the legitimacy or orthodoxy of Chinese Buddhism, and also, of the Two Truths being based on two levels of cognition, not on ontological dualism. How then can we understand that ontologically oriented notions are so frequently resorted to by Mahāyānists? To answer this question, it is necessary to summarize the conclusions derived from the discussion of epistemological dualism: 1) *there are two different realms within human experiences; 2) the experience of ultimate truth does not mean total*

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20) Stcherbatsky, p. 30.

extinction of the cognitive subject; and 3) ultimate truth is an experiential reality.

When one experiences ultimate truth, sense organs and mental functions are still working. He sees what is perceived by the sense organ; and thinks what is conceived by the mental function. If anyone sees and thinks, there must exist *objects* of those cognitions. Even if subject and object are amalgamated in the experience of ultimate truth, there is, still the duality of subject and object. This dualism may be called 'expedient, or verbal dualism.' They are expressive 'subject' and 'object'. The discussion of the Absolute by E. Conze throws light on this issue:

> As 'Suchness' it (i.e., the Absolute) is unalterable, without modification, unaffected by anything, and a mark common to all dharmas. 'Emptiness is the absence of all imagination. The 'Reality-limit' (i.e., 實際) is that which reaches up to the summit of truth, to the utmost limit of what can be cognized, and is quite free from error or perversion. The 'Signless' is further 'ultimately true', or the 'supreme object' (*parama-artha*), because it is reached by the supreme (*agra*) cognition of the saints.[21]

Kalupahana, in his interpretation of *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* ch. 24/8

21) E. Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India*, p. 227.

of Nāgārjuna, translates *paramārtha,* which E. Conze translated as 'supreme object' here, as 'ultimate fruit' saying:

> Having defined the good as the fruitful, the Buddha characterized the ultimate good as the ultimate fruitful. The term *paramattha* (Sk. *paramārtha*) was thus used to refer to the "ultimate fruitful" rather than "ultimate reality." ....Paramattha thus becomes the moral ideal as reflected in the Buddha's own attainment of freedom and happiness.[22] (italics added)

No matter how it is translated, i.e., 'ultimate fruit' or 'ultimate reality', it is what is experienced by the Buddha, one who obtained 'complete eradication of lust, hatred, and confusion.' Furthermore, what is the difference between moral ideal and ontological ideal? It seems to be a matter of perspective, not of the difference of the experience. This confusion is caused by verbal expression. E. Conze goes on to enumerate the synonyms of the Absolute:

> ....'non-duality', 'the realm of non-discrimination', 'non-production', 'the true nature of Dharma', 'the inexpressible', 'the unconditioned', 'the unimpeded' (nihṣprapañca), 'the actual fact' (tattva), 'that which really is' (yathābhūta), 'the truth' (satya), 'the true

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22) David J. Kalupahana, *Nāgārjuna - The Philosophy of the Middle Way,* pp. 331-332.

> reality' (bhūtatā), 'Nirvāṇa', 'cessation', 'Buddhahood', and also 'wisdom', 'enlightenment', 'the cognition which one must realize within oneself', 'the Dharmabody', 'the Buddha', etc.

Here we can see that the synonyms of the Absolute consist of both ontological and epistemological concepts. However, it should be pointed out again that these are not 'virtually' ontological or epistemological, but 'expediently', 'verbally' so. No matter what expressions are attributed to the Absolute, they do not designate a metaphysical realm or anything in the external world. Thus, the Absolute is called so not because it is outside of the sphere of sensory perception, but because it cannot be described otherwise through verbal expression which is not for the supreme truth. As far as verbal expression is concerned, the use of ontologically oriented notions are inevitable. Nonetheless, no Mahāyāna Buddhists ever explicitly asserted that a certain reified substance called 'own-being', 'suchness', or 'emptiness' actually exist in the outside of cognizer.

The Absolute, as E. Conze points out, can be described either ontologically or epistemologically, according to the point of view. Accordingly, the notions of 'the true nature of one's mind' (自性) or 'things as they are (諸法實相)', even though they assume ontologically tinted expressions, in fact should be understood as epistemological concepts - more specifically, ontological notions within the

epistemological domain. As the Absolute is experienced within the twelve bases (十二處), those notions do not necessarily contradict the Buddha's own discourses cited above. In other words, even though the Absolute is qualified by some modifiers, 'transcendental', 'extraordinary', 'inexplicable' and so on because the experience of the Absolute consists of extraordinary perceptions distinguished from those of ordinary daily life, these modifiers do not necessarily prescribe the assumption that the Absolute exists outside of the twelve bases. A stanza in the Dhammapada shows this to us:

> Health is the great gain
> Contentment is the greatest wealth
> A trustworthy friend is the best kinsman
> And Nibbāṇa is the highest happiness.[23]

It is the highest happiness what the Buddha wanted sentient being to obtain. Buddhism, at least in its early stage is not concerned with objective reality beyond the reach of cognition whatever it may be. In this respect, Chinese Buddhism is different from Indian Buddhism as the former was more interested in 'things-as-they-are.' Yet the objective reality always have to be explained solely in terms of

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23) *Dammapada*, 204. Someone asked Sariputta; "How can one who is devoid of self be happy?" The latter replied, "Being devoid of self, one is happy."

subjective reality which is experiential truth. Without the latter, the former would be entirely meaningless just like a hare's horn. Still there seems to have been some Chinese Buddhists who committed such a fallacy. And it should be those who misunderstood the implication of the notion of the Absolute that the criticism as the above falls on. As the conclusion for what has been discussed so far, a single diagram will be sufficient.

- the Two Truths
  - supreme truth
    - subjective truth (epistemological)
    - objective truth (ontological)
  - conventional truth

CHAPTER TWO: *CH'ING-T'AN* CULTURE OF WEI-CHIN NAN-Pei DYNASTIES

1. INTRODUCTION

1-1) HISTORICAL SETTING

After the decline of the great Han dynasty (A. D. 220)[24], until the reunification of China by the Sui dynasty (A. D. 589), the Chinese were confronted with incessant warfare among the "barbarians" themselves or between the Chinese and the "barbarians" for nearly four centuries. This chaotic predicament characterized by warfare and socio-political corruption, however, was not totally new to the Chinese, since the period of the Spring and Autumn Annals (B. C. 722~B. C. 481) and of the Warring States (B. C. 403~B. C. 221) saw even more critical disintegration of the society in terms of the length of time as well as the frequency of conflicts between states.

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24) Joseph Needham's innovation of dating that substitutes '-' and '+' for B. C. and A. D. According to Alan Watts (*Tao, the Watercourse Way*, xiv Note 1.), the latter two are 'inelegantly inconsistent and not internationally comprehensible, since the first stands for the English "Before Christ" and the second for the Latin *Anno Domini*, "In the year of our Lord."'

Nevertheless, the fall of the Western Chin dynasty (A. D. 265~316), followed by the occupation of their heartland by "barbarians" which in turn caused the split of China into two parts, i. e., the "barbarian" North and the Chinese South, gave rise to a entirely different environment in which the Chinese tried to find their way into the establishment of a new culture. Let us examine some hypotheses that a couple of factors, as some sinologists have it, dominated this scene of new surroundings in terms of the spread of Buddhism. The first of these factors is the diminution of the sense of self-esteem of the Chinese. It is reasonable to imagine that after the loss of the center of Chinese civilization (中原), their self-esteem as the members of 'Glorious Center (中華)' may have been diminished and this crisis of identity may have paved the way for Buddhism to penetrate the Chinese mind.[25] At face value this hypothesis seems to be

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25) Many Sinic Buddhologists maintain that the diminution of self-esteem of the Chinese caused by the "barbarian's" occupation of the heartland of china triggered the rapid dissemination of Buddhism in China since the Wei-Chin dynasties. This assumption, however, is rather doubtful because, as we shall see in the following pages, the spread of Buddhism on Chinese soil, at least in the Wei-Chin dynasty, is indebted in a large amount to the effort of Buddhist monks who tried to assimilate Buddhism with indigenous thought. It is also doubtful whether the Chinese have ever diminished their self-esteem in their vicissitudes of history.

plausible because it was not until the Wei-Chin dynasty that Buddhism, introduced into China as early as the first century in the Christian Era, began to plant its root in the Chinese society. On account of its alien (that is, "barbarian") origin, for over three hundred years Buddhism was a religion of foreigners in China and was almost completely ignored by the Chinese literati.[26] Even if it is true that the nationalism of the Chinese was the main obstruction to Buddhism, still we do not find any decisive evidence for their desertion of nationalistic pride from this period up to the present time. In view of the Profound Learning (*hsuan hsueh*, 玄學) that flourished in the Wei-Chin dynasty, it seems safe to conclude that the Chinese never lost their sense of dignity passed down from the glorious past. The reason for the dissemination of Buddhism in the period of disunity, therefore, is not so much the decline of Chinese nationalism as the absence of a powerful central government motivated by Confucian or Taoist concepts of "the Empire."[27]

The second factor characterizing this era of turmoil is, contrary

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26) There are, of course, some exceptions. A few Chinese nobles and literati, as historians recorded, must have been interested in Buddhism. However they were no more than the 'exceptions' in the sense that no historians treated them in the serious manner.

27) Kenneth Ch'en, *Buddhism in China*, p. 204.

to the first assumption, faithful devotion to past tradition.[28] This hypothesis also is partly true in that the Chinese way of thought handed down from the past was in effect never discarded in the following ages. As Western philosophy is nothing but a variation of Greek philosophy, so too is the Chinese philosophy, no matter what face it may assume, nothing other than, new interpretations of the classical philosophy which thrived in the period of the Warring States. As cultural evolution implies both unchanging and changing factors, emphasis on one point at the cost of the other inevitably entails a lack of balance in the study of human history. It goes without saying that the members who fled to the uncultured southern area were subject to nostalgia for the glory of the lost dynasties. Yet the nostalgia itself secures nothing. Only when the nostalgia is supported by practical causes can it be turned into a creative force able to cope with a new set of surroundings. The members of the Wei-Chin dynasty, an

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28) Arthur F. wright, *Buddhism in Chinese History*, p. 43. 'After the catastrophic loss of the north, members of the Chinese elite fled in large numbers to the area south of the *Yangtze*, and for nearly three hundred years thereafter the country was politically divided between unstable Chinese dynasties with their capital at *Nanking* and a succession of non-Chinese states controlling all or part of the north. In the south the Chinese developed new culture. They clung tenaciously and defensively to every strand of tradition that linked them with the past glory of the Han.'

especially cultured group by and large, was not provided with such chances. In general, the most distinctive feature of this period may be defined as aesthetics in literature and art, and reclusiveness in philosophical and religious lives. The Confucian ideal that ventured to build a socially and politically harmonious world in the Han dynasty gradually faded away. If there were any legacies left by previous dynasties, they were total corrupt in the field of socio-political activities, or at least indifferent to mundane affairs. It is within this circumstance that Taoism began to appeal to people in an age of utter despair. The Taoist movement of this period, comparable with the classical Taoism of the period of Warring States, is called Neo-Taoism.

1-2) *CH'ING-T'AN* CULTURE

The origin of Neo-Taoism can be traced back to the late Han dynasty[29] when the government almost lost control of the aristocracy and local landlords, one of whom, Ch'ao ch'ao, later

29) According to Kenneth Ch'en, the tradition of *Hsuan-hsueh* (玄學) originated under the leadership of Kuo Lin-tsung (郭林宗 128-169) during the Late Han dynasty. He continues: 'A result of the struggle between the literary party versus the eunuchs and members of the Empresses' families the scholars suffered severe persecution, so they turned away from practical politics and human events to seek refuge in philosophical and metaphysical speculation.' JCP p. 38.

founded the Wei dynasty in A. D. 220. Intellectual history in this period is closely connected with the fate of Buddhism in China. 'Lost Generation' is the epithet referring to the generation who experienced world-wars. Wars give rise to drastic transformation, not only in the ecological, social environment but also the in human environment, meaning the psychological sphere. In the case of the Wei-Chin dynasty, after incessant warfare ended with the "barbarian's" conquest of China, the dominant moods that appealed to Chinese people were not different from those of the other part of the world in similar times.

We can extract two kinds of major reactions from the sentiment of the people in this society: One aspect of the stream of the thought that dominated this society was an extreme form of individualism. In the age of anxiety, people were easily attracted by nihilistic views of the world. They would laugh at worldly value and distrust any kind of organization. What they needed was just a jug of wine or a flute to please themselves: The other aspect in this stream was meant as a variation of individualism, that is, a philosophical inquiry about the position of humanity in the universe. Having experienced the wholesale collapse of every part of the society, they made strenuous efforts

to establish something eternal and stable within humanity's own nature.[30]

Those two distinctive reactions of the intellectuals of the time were explicitly reflected in the *Ch'ing-t'an* tradition. The different implications of the terms, Neo-Taoism (新道家), the Profound Learning (*Hsuan hsueh* 玄學), and the Pure Discourse (*Ch'ing-t'an* 淸談) seems to require some explanations. The term Neo-Taoism means the scholarly achievement of the reinterpretation on the *Lao-tzu* and *Chuang-tzu*. The precursors of this tradition are Wang Pi (A. D. 226~249) of the Wei dynasty and Kuo Hsiang (A. D. 252~312) of the Eastern Chin dynasty. The former is credited with the foundation of the Profound Learning which implies the study of the Three Classics, i. e., the *Lao-tzu*, *Chuang-tzu*, and the *I-ch'ing*. Thus it is also called the Three Profound Learning (三玄學). As the *I-ch'ing* is, properly speaking, not belonging to the sphere of Taoist literature, Neo-Taoism is not necessarily equivalent to the Profound Learning. Wang Pi, who is the founder of both Neo-Taoism and

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30) A philosophical idea of an age is required to meet the need of contemporaries. In other words, any idea or thought that fails to correspond with the expectation of the mass in a certain period cannot survive. The reason why Neo-Taoist tradition could play a main role in mediaeval China for over four hundred years is, therefore, that the philosophy of Neo-Taoism managed to satisfy the need of the age.

the Profound Learning, also wrote the commentary on the *Lun-yu* (論語) that is the main text of the Confucianism. The question whether he was a Confucianist or a Taoist is still in question. We may conclude that this vagueness of Neo-Taoism (or the Profound Learning) itself constitutes the important characteristics of the philosophy. In a word, Neo-Taoism (or the Profound Learning) seems to represent the trend of the identity between Confucianism and Taoism, which later developed into that of the identity among Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism.

Ch'ing-t'an culture may as well be regarded as methodology rather than be called any branch of philosophical or religious ideas. It is a well organized way of discussion in which a topic, even outside the Three Classics, could have been selected as the subject of their discussion. It was within this tradition that Buddhists introduced themselves to the Chinese intellectuals.

There were two types of Neo-Taoist reactions against the age of upheaval: one is sentimentalist and the other rationalistic aspect.[31] The former lead to a way of life tinged with romanticism and is represented by the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove (竹林七賢). Revolting against Confucian formalism and the comtemporary turmoil, they all revered and exalted the

31) See Kenneth Ch'en, JCP.

void and non-action, and disregarded rites and laws. They drank to excess and disdained the affairs of the world.[32] Even though they showed some of the distinctive features of the intellectuals in this period, their direct relationship with Buddhists are not traceable. One of the reasons is that the Eastern Chin did not have the counterpart of the Seven Sages, a group who exerted remarkable influence on the literati society in the Western Chin dynasty.

In the Eastern Chin period, when Buddhism gradually encroached on the domain of the native thoughts, however, the sentimentalist trend of *Ch'ing-t'an* gave way to the rationalistic trend. As a matter of course, the Chinese literati who went into disgraceful exile in the South investigated the reason of their tragic failure. Their self-criticism was focused on among other things, the 'nihilistic and debauched' disposition (浮虛放達) of Taoism, which means that their criticism was directed solely towards the sentimentalist Taoists. This is the reason that the stream of rationalistic Taoism survived in the Southern dynasties.[33] What made the Chinese high class cling to the

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32) Ibid., JCP p. 38.

33) Still it is noteworthy that the demarcation between the sentimentalist and rationalistic trend is not always clear. It seems to be a matter of proportion. That is, those two aspects constituting

rationalistic Taoism? First of all, we may attribute their attachment to intellectual discussion to the self-complacence of an intelligentsia in despair. Secondly, as mentioned before, the crisis of identity compelled them to be engaged in the ontological issues: that is to say, the metaphysical inquiry for a permanent substrate underlying the phenomenal world, the world of change and ephemerality. What we are mainly concerned with in the present work is this tradition, which is supposed to have exerted considerable impact on the subsequent Chinese history of thought of which Hua-yen philosophy is a part.[34]

This trend was initiated by Wang Pi and Kuo Hsiang whose commentaries on the *Lao-tzu* and the *Chuang-tzu* became neo-classics in the Chinese intellectual history of the following

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Neo-Taoists' sentiments were intermingled in a wide variety of proportion within a certain individual according to his disposition.

34) Emerging in the end of the Late Han dynasty, the movement of *Ch'ing-t'an* continued throughout the Wei-Chin Nan-Fei dynasties (A. D. 220~589) until the establishment of the Sui dynasty, from which various Chinese Buddhist schools sprang out. Then, *Ch'ing-t'an* culture penetrated the Buddhist milieu and faded away.
Fumimasa-Bunga Fukui (福井文雅), *"Buddhism and the Structure of Ch'ing-t'an 清談 ('Pure Discourse') -- A Note on Sino-Indian Intercourse, Chinese Culture*; X-2, June 1969, p. 27. Also see Lao ssu-kuang, p. 178.

ages.[35] As mentioned above, Wang Pi and Kuo Hsiang, consciously or unconsciously, tried to harmonize two great Chinese traditions, Confucianism and Taoism, for the first time in the Chinese history of philosophy.[36] When they were active, Buddhism, introduced into China around the 1st century A. D., was already there, so, even if not accurately, they must have known about Buddhism. It is, therefore, quite questionable whether or not they were influenced by Buddhism in formulating their metaphysics. Unfortunately, due to the lack of reliable material, we are obliged to conjecture on this question through

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35) As we shall see in the following pages, Neo-Taoist philosophy founded by Wang Pi and Kuo Hsiang provided subsequent ages with an everlasting source of inspirations. No matter how many various systems they may have created, Chinese philosophers in a large amount owe their basic ideas to these two philosophers. Given this presupposition, it will not be an over-simplification to say that there is only 'one Chinese philosophy'. The common feature of the Chinese philosophies is so conspicuous that differences between them are rather insignificant. Just a glance at the striking resemblance in the world-views among the Neo-Taoism, the Hua-yen Buddhism, Neo-Confucianism and Zen Buddhism is enough to confirm the homogeneous feature of the Chinese philosophy.

36) Wang Pi is often criticized for his far-fetched interpretation of the Lun-yu and the I-ch'ing through appropriation of the Taoist standpoint. See Lao ssu-kuang, p. 179. On the other hand, Kuo Hsiang, in his commentary on the Chuang-tzu, attempted to harmonize Confucianist realism and Taoist transcendentalism. See Meng p'ei-yuan, p. 405.

the help of few available records. A few lines of Huan Hsuan's 'Answer to Wang Mi' found in the *Hung-ming chi* (弘明集) provide us with some clues on this issue:

> .....formerly, there were among the people of Chin (here indicating China in general) hardly any Buddhists. The monks and laymen were mostly barbarians, and, moreover, the rulers did not have contacts with them.......but nowadays the ruler venerate the Buddha and personally take part in religious affairs: the situation has become different from former generations...[37]

Again, the passages of a letter of Hsi ts'o-ch'ih (習鑿齒, ?-384, Eastern Chin) sent to Tao-an (道安) give us similar informations:

> ...Nearly four hundred years after Buddhism was transmitted into China, except for a few princes or laymen who took refuge in this religion, there has been no one who has showed interest in Buddhism because the traditional teachings of China were handed down ever since......[38]

The former letter was written in A. D. 402, and the latter in the late 4th Century A. D. Wang Pi and Kuo Hsiang, therefore,

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37) HMC, XII, T 52, p. 81b. '曩者. 晉人略無奉佛. 沙門徒衆皆是諸胡. 且王者與之不接......今. 主上奉佛親接法事. 事異於昔...'

38) KSC, The autobiography of Tao-an (道安).

belong to 'former generations.' In those days, it may be safe to say that Buddhism was disregarded at least by cultured people.[39] In other words, it is evident that, until the opening of the Southern dynasty, the tradition of *Ch'ing-t'an* continued without interaction with Buddhism. It was not until early 4th century A. D. that outstanding Buddhist monks who versed in the Taoist philosophy attempted to introduce Buddhism to the high class of the Eastern Chin dynasty.

As was mentioned before, the tradition of *Ch'ing-t'an* flourished throughout the Wei-Chin Nan-Pei dynasties (魏晉南北朝 A. D. 317~589), forming the dominant culture of the period. However, after the fall of the Eastern Chin, with the advent of the Nan-Pei dynasties, the *Ch'ing-t'an* culture gradually began to lose its vitality because, under the military regimes, the political as well as social power of the aristocracy was notably mitigated. Yet we cannot find any evidence that *Ch'ing-t'an* culture was

39) In fact, we can find only one article that is connected with Buddhism in the historical record from the period of the Three States to the end of Western Chin, a period of approximately one hundred years. Moreover, this single line is not that of Northern dynasties where Wang Pi and Kuo Hsiang were active but that of Wu in a southern province. The Document of Wu of the Record of the Three States (三國誌 吳書) describes; "the prime minister, Sun Lin (孫綝, 231-258) destroyed the shrine of the Buddha and killed monks."

replaced by any other movement. On the contrary, it seemed to have occupied a part of the everyday lives of the nobility and royal families.[40] Records of the time shows that this *Ch'ing-t'an* culture became popular to the extent that there was the peril of mannerism.[41]

There were several factors that facilitated the entry of Buddhism into Chinese high society. On the part of Buddhism itself, at least during the incipient stage when Buddhism and Neo-Taoism interacted in the Pure Discourse, Buddhist monks, as often called Buddho-Taoists, had no choice but to disguise their philosophy to appeal to the Chinese literati at the time. The intellectual environment of the Wei-Chin dynasty, on the other hand, encouraged Buddhists who exerted to implant Buddhism in the Chinese society. As the period was in a state of ideological

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40) 'During the Yang dynasty, the *Lao-chuang* tradition became more popular than ever. The *Chuang-tzu*, *Lao-tzu* and the *I-ching*, which were collectively called *San-hsuan Hsueh* (三玄學) were mainly studied in this period. Emperor *Wu* (reign: A. D. 502~549) and Kan-wen (A. D. 503~551) lectured (these texts)....Emperor *Wen* also taught students......' 顔之推, 顔氏家訓.

41) In a letter of admonition for his sons, Wang seng-k'en (王僧虔, A. D. 426~485) writes as follows; "With merely a few lines reading of the Lao-tzu, you discuss, pretending seniors, the theories of Wang Pi and Ho Yen, which is the most deplorable thing......" (南齊書).

anarchy, there was no dominant stream of philosophy. Thus, the Chinese intellectuals entertained, without any restriction, whatever they pleased in the expression of their thoughts. As a result, the idea that Confucianism and Taoism have more common features than differences began to emerge. Buddhism, taking advantage of this liberal circumstance, gradually infiltrated this scene until they implicitly accepted that the three philosophies are fundamentally the same teachings. It is, therefore, no wonder that the subject of *Ch'ing-t'an* was not restricted to specific philosophical thoughts.[42]

The other factor that made it easy for Buddhism to take root in this period was the fully matured tradition of *Ch'ing-t'an*. E. Zurcher points out:

> 'In the realm of thought, Dark Learning reigned supreme: with Hsiang Hsiu and Kuo Hsiang, who were active during this period, it had entered on its last creative phrase. In gentry circles there was a most vivid interest in philosophical and metaphysical problems and discussions. Just as second century Taoists discovered in the Buddhist practices of trance and meditation a new and more effective road to immortality, so some late third century literati found in the foreign doctrine of the Void a new yet strangely familiar way of thought.'[43]

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42) Ibid.

43) E. Zurcher, *The Buddhist Conquest of China*, p. 73.

This observation, discussing the domain of practice, is also true within the speculative Taoist circle. The metaphysical inquiry into the true nature of man and universe, which Wang Pi triggered, allowed the Chinese to gain easy access to Buddhist philosophy, in which they finally began to focus their attention on this similar idea. As will be examined in the following pages, the key concepts of Taoism, such as Tao (道), *wu* (無), *Li* (理), etc., began to be associated with Buddhist technical terms so that the chasm lying between the two cultures was ignored. Culture is undoubtedly an organic entity. Any organism changes, so does the religion of Buddhism. It is not the transformation of Indian Buddhism itself that is to blame, what we are concerned with is the question of how and to what extent.

For all those advantages, not available in more stable periods, but for the effort of Buddhist missionaries, Buddhism would have been absorbed at the early stages. It will be enough at this moment to point out that during the Wei-Chin dynasty, Buddhism, in order to overcome its weak point as an alien origin, had to transform itself. Paradoxically enough, if there had been no drastic transformation (or distortion) of Buddhism, the

identity of the religion as we now see it might not have been preserved.

This chapter will be concerned with solely the *Ch'ing-tan* movement of the Wei-Chin dynasties because:

First, the *Ch'ing-t'an* of this period was the initial stage of the interaction between Neo-Taoism and Buddhism: and

Second, the *Ch'ing-t'an*, though it lasted up until the end of the 6th Century A. D., its backbone was established in this period.

Third, both the Taoist and Buddhist tradition can be dealt with in a consistent manner.

2. NEO-TAOISTS

2-1) GENERAL FEATURES OF TAOISM

Hsu fu-kuan, in his outstanding work, 「中國人性論史 (*Chung-kuo jen-hsing lun shih, 'The History of Discussion on the Issue of Human Nature'*」, explicitly maintains that Chinese thought is nothing more than the history of thought of human nature. This is especially true with the three major ways of thought, Confucianism, Taoism and even Buddhism in China. In the case of Taoism, however, the inquiry of human nature, it is claimed,

has been undertaken by a rather circuitous manner, since Taoists did not prescribe keen border line between humankind and nature. It was through the exploration of the nature of the universe that they could grasp the nature of humankind. They thought that humans and their environment share the same essence or principle, which is termed Tao, Non-being, and Li. Only when humans embody their essence, can they realize eternal freedom. The unity of humanity with Tao is the ultimate goal of Taoist idealism and the core of its metaphysics.

Tao is the principle of the unity of subject and object. When Tao is embodied by subjectivity, it is called *Te* (德).[44] When it is manifested through the world of objects, it is called the Nature (自然). Because Tao and *Li* are revealed through the cognition of a person (至人 or 聖人) who realizes it, it is not a question of Nature but of the person that Taoists are finally concerned with.[45] Therefore, it is clear that both the starting and encing

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44) Han Fei-tzu (韓非子; 解老編), 'Virtue is the cause for the establishment of human life' ('德也者 人之所以建生也.') Lao-tzu distinguished Profound Virtue (玄德), Eternal Virtue (常德), Void virtue (孔德), Supreme Virtue (上德), which are different names for Tao, from the general term of Virtue.

45) According to the *Chuang-tzu*: Tao has reality and evidence but no action or physical form. It may be transmitted but cannot be received. It may be obtained but cannot be seen. It is based in itself, rooted in itself. Before heaven and earth came into being, Tao existed by itself

point of Taoism is humankind itself. That is, ontology and epistemology are united in the Taoist tradition. This is the reason that Lao-tzu, Chuang-tzu and commentaries on them use Tao (道), *Li* (理) and *t'i* (體), which have on ontological tone, together with *te* (德), *hsing* (性), *hsin* (心), and *ching* (情), which reflect an epistemological leaning.[46)]

In short, the distinctive trait of Taoist philosophy is the proclivity of harmonization between two contrasting factors, that is, the universe and humanity, the transcendental and worldliness, soul and body, etc. This is the mentality of 'threading diversity with a principle (一以貫之).'

The metaphysics of Wang Pi, who belongs to the tradition of 'honoring *wu* (貴無)' and even the refusal of the metaphysical world-view of Kuo Hsiang, who belongs to the tradition of 'valuing *yu* (崇有)', invariably focused on the importance of the phenomenal world. Even if they appeared to have dug into the cosmology in their face value, it was the dilemma of the human existence that they were troubled during this era of disaster. In

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from all time...(夫道, 有情有信, 無爲無形. 可傳而不可受, 可得而不可見. 自本自根, 未有天地, 自古而固存.....) 莊子, 大宗師.

46) The *Lao-tzu*: 天道와 人道, 天理, 自然之理, 自然之性, 是非之理, 物之情, 天德, 人德. The *Chuang-tzu*: 天道, 人道, 天理, 物理, 人理, 萬物之情, 天之性, 物性, 人性.

turn, the transcendental domain or the Absolute and the phenomenal world are synthesized within the nature of human existence.[47] But for consideration on this point, we would not properly evaluate their thoughts.

2-2) THE METAPHYSICS OF WANG PI

Wang Pi is one of the most important figures in the history of Chinese thought. He is credited to be the founder of the *Hsuan-hsueh* (玄學), the methodology of which is *Ch'ing-t'an*.[48] Through his commentaries on the *Lao-tzu*, *I-ching*, and the *Lun-yu*, he introduced a systematic metaphysical way of thought into the Chinese intellectual milieu.[49] Arthur Waley rightly said:

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47) This is nothing but *Li-shih Wu-ai* (Non-obstruction between the Principle and phenomena) of Hua-yen thought. *Shih-shih Wu-ai* (Non-obstruction among phenomena) is no more the innovation of the Hua-yen Buddhists than an elaborate dilatation of *Li-shih Wu-ai*.

48) It was not until T'ai-hua (太化) period (A. D. 227～233) of Wei dynasty by Shun Chan (荀粲) and Fu He (傅嘏) that philosophical debates centered on *Hsuan hsueh* (玄學) became the dominant fashion of the *Ch'ing-t'an*. This tradition came to be unswervingly established by Wang Pi and Ho Yen in the period of Cheng-shih (正始) period (A. D. 240～249) of the same dynasty. The latter is called 'the Voice of Cheng-shih (正始之音).'

49) This does not mean that he originated metaphysical speculation in Chinese intellectual history, but that he systematized and sophisticated what was found in the classical canon.

> 'All the commentaries, from Wang Pi's onwards down to the 18th century are "scriptural"; that is to say that each commentator reinterprets the text according to his own particular tenets, without any intention or desire to discover what it meant originally. From my point of view they are therefore useless.'[50]

Most modern Sinologists agree that Wang Pi, along with his contemporary colleague Ho Yen, is the most important figure in the history of Chinese intellectual history, especially in the realm of metaphysical thought. This is why he is selected in this work to show the Taoist impact on Hua-yen philosophy. The core of his thought is often depicted as 'Valuing Non-being (貴無),' which is not without foundation. As Fung *yu*-lan clearly pointed out, the ontological supremacy of the concept *mu* over *yu*:

'Though Heaven and Earth, in their greatness, are richly endowed with the myriad things: though their thunder moves and their winds circulate: though through their revolving operations the myriad transformations come to be-yet it is the silent and supreme non-being that is their origin...... In this regard, I take Wang Pi's comments to mean that Tao can be

50) Arthur Waley, The Way and Its Power, p. 129.

expressed as *wu* in the sense that it does not have an objective referent. Tao as *wu*, in other words, transcends the phenomenal world that is always mediated by language, in the broadest sense of the term.[51]

Yet it went too far to say that he 'glorifies the original substance while neglecting its expression as Being.'[52] As mentioned above, since the primary concern of Chinese thinkers has been human nature and its relationship with the Universe, discussions on cosmic metaphysics should be understood as a means to seize the essence that is shared by both the universe and humanity, thereby fulfilling the harmonization of the two. It is not a exaggeration to say that there was no scientific inquiry or speculative philosophy which was not aimed at understanding

51) Fung Yu-lan, *The History of Chinese Philosophy*, p. 49.

52) JCP, Tang Yi-jie, The Relationship between Traditional and Imported Thought and Culture in China: From the Standpoint of the Importation of Buddhism, JCP vol. XV-4, Dec. 1988, pp. 418-9. The epithet of 'Valuing Non-being (貴無)' has been, since the 3th century onward, used to represent the philosophical feature of the early Neo-Taoists, Wang Pi, Ho Yen, and so on. This statement, however, should be understood in a restricted manner because, since Wu and yu are interdependent fair like both sides of a coin, valuing *wu* inevitably entails elevation of yu. Still, it should not be overlooked that, though they are mutually connected, *wu* proceeds logically as well as generative.

the nature of human beings in Chinese culture as a whole.

The time of Wang Pi, characterized by disintegration in every respect, saw bottomless desperation rampant among people who found no hope in this world. Those who had no education were easily inclined to religious propaganda promising eternal happiness in paradise. Cultured groups, on the other hand, indulged in either self-complacence in this world or philosophical inquiry to find an answer for a whole-sale calamity. A precursor of the latter circle was Wang Pi. His speculation, starting from the exploration of man and his environment, the Nature, traced back to the primal source or essence of the universe, which constitutes the gist of his metaphysical cosmology. Humankind's place in this universe was, as humanity was also the manifestation of the essence that was Tao, identical with universe itself. Only if humanity could embody the Tao, would they be not different from Nature, just as a leaf of a tree is not a 'part' of tree but tree itself. In this way Neo-Taoism initiated by Wang Pi, which stemmed from the problem of human beings, finally returned to the starting point.[53]

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53) Hsu fu-kuan, *Chung-kuo jen-hsing lun shih* (中國人性論史; 先秦編), p. 339.

METAPHYSICAL SUBSTANCE AND PHENOMENAL WORLD

The concepts that Wang Pi employed to interpretate the Tao of Lao-tzu were Non-being (無), Principle (理), substance (體), Oneness (一者) and so forth. These, along with their counterparts, Being (有), phenomena (事), function (用), diversity (多) and so on, constitute the paradigm of dualistic world-view. He must have used such a variety of terms in order to clarify the relationship of non-being and being, the One and many, the ruler and people.....[54] This category not only forms Wang Pi's philosophical basis, but penetrates the whole history of Chinese thought. He served as the architect of the framework for the Chinese way of thought in the following ages. His influence on the generations to come, no matter what traditions they assumed, can not be underestimated.[55]

THE GENERATIVE POINT OF VIEW (*wu* and *yu*)

The contribution of Wang Pi in the Taoist tradition is

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54) Livia Kohn, *Early Chinese Mysticism*, p. 61.

55) See Ch'ien Mu, He demonstrates in this article that the concept of Li employed by the Neo-Taoists has striking similarities with that of Neo-Confucianism in the Sung dynasty and, moreover, with that of Hua-yen Buddhism.

undoubtedly the innovation of the concept of the 'original non-being (本無)' and the meaning he gave it.[56] What is meant by 'the original non-being' is close to 'non-being as the basis of all beings.' It is called non-being not because it is not-existent but because it is nameless and formless. This does not mean, however, that it exists just like phenomenal beings exist. What then is the way of existence in which the Tao may be conceived? According to Lao-tzu, it seems to exist of not existence (若存若亡),[57] which means that it is beyond the sphere of sensory experience. It cannot be seen, heard or touched. Furthermore, it is beyond conceptual or logical reasoning. Nonetheless, it is still the creative source of myriad things of the universe. It seems to be contradictory. Borrowing from the expression of Lao ssu-kuang, it is the Reality, though not an existence. In other words, non-being is the metaphysical Reality, which implies that it gains superiority, ontologically and generatively, over

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56) However, the concept *pen-wu* (本無) itself is not his invention since Chi Ch'an (支識) and Chih Ch'ien (支謙) already used it in the Late Han dynasty. The translation of the *Ta-ming-tu ching* (大明度經, *Astasāhastikā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*) by the latter goes as follows: 'Everything was original non-being. All the dharmas were original non-being, there was no past, present, or future. The Tathāgata was likewise so, he was the genuine original non-being.' See Ch'an, JCP.

57) *Lao-tzu*, ch. 41.

phenomenal beings. By ontological superiority we mean that, though non-being transcends the phenomenal world, it develops and completes beings of the universe including humanity.[58] By generative superiority we mean that all being is originated or produced from non-being (or Tao). In this sense, it is called the Mother of myriad of things (有名萬物之母), and also called the spirit of the Valley (谷神), or subtle and profound female (玄牝) because it begets, nurtures, the rules things in the universe.[59] One of the most important features of Tao as non-being is that it is the creative and sustaining power of the universe. Commenting on the first chapter, Wang Pi observes:

> All being (有名) originated from nonbeing (無名). The time before physical forms and names appeared was the beginning of the myriad things. After forms and names appear, "Tao develops them, nourishes them, provides their formal shape and completes their formal substance,"

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58) Repudiating the metaphysical characteristic of the concept, *wu*, Alan K. L. Chan draws our attentions to the the *Lao-tzu* ch. 2 which includes the line, '....*yu* and *wu* give rise to each other...(.....有無相生.....)' This passage can be interpretated into two ways: 1) *wu* and *yu* refers to the existence of something; 2) *yu* and *wu* is relatively established. Therefore it may be still valid that '*yu* comes from *wu* (in ch. 40)' or 'all being originated from non-being (ch. 1).'

59) *Lao-tzu*, ch. 1.

> that is, becomes their Mother. This means that Tao produces and completes things with the formless and nameless. Thus they are produced and completed but do not know why. Indeed it is the mystery of mysteries.[60]

Lao ssu-kuang observes that, in regard to the relationship between the Absolute and phenomena, Lao-tzu's notion of the Tao is of three sorts: First, Tao eternal, an immutable entity that has no beginning or ending in terms of time, whereas the world of things and events is characterized by ever changing, and ephemeral finitude. Second is Tao which is spatially infinite, transcending the phenomenal world. And thirdly, the Tao is, though transcendental, at the same time, immanent in each thing of the universe. Being both transcendental and immanent, the Tao regulates the world of phenomena. Wang Pi, in his interpretation of the Tao, faithfully followed those three points.

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60) Ibid., '凡有皆始於無. 故未形無名之時. 則爲萬物之始. 及其有形有名之時. 則長之. 育之. 亭之. 毒之. 爲其母也. 言道以無形無名. 始成萬物. 以始以成. 而不知其所以. 玄之又玄也.'

THE SUBSTANTIAL POINT OF VIEW (The Root and Branch, *pen-wu* 本末, or the Substance and the Function, *t'i-yung* 體用)[61]

wu, which is a synonym of the Tao in Wang Pi's system, signifies not only the creative, sustaining power of the universe, but also the mystery behind all mysteries, as well as the ultimate truth that is behind the phenomenal world.' Neo-Taoists of the Wei-Chin dynasties were engrossed in the issues of the ultimate truth and its relationship with the world of things. As Kenneth Ch'en points out:

> Since both the Neo-Taoists and the Buddhists were interested in the problem of ontology, their discussions were mainly concerned with *pen-t'i* or the essence of things in the abstract. Non-being or emptiness was considered to be the pen, the base or foundation of all things, the ultimate reality or the transcendental truth, while *t'i*[62] or outward manifestations of this ultimate reality in the phenomenal world was taken as the relative truth.[63]

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61) *T'i-yung* (體用) paradigm is connected with the *ching-tung* (靜動) dichotomy from the Book of Changes (易經).

62) *T'i* (體) should be replaced with *mo* (末) which is an antonym of *pen* (本). It must be an erratum.

63) Kenneth Ch'en, p. 63.

As the Tao that was termed *wu* by the Neo-Taoists was regarded as metaphysical Reality, the pair of notions, *t'i-yung* (體用, substance and function) and *pen-mo* (本末, root and branch), which signals the blooming of metaphysical speculation in the history of Chinese thoughts, became popularized ever after. Even if the category of *t'i-yung* was used in the first place as a pair concept by Wang Pi,[64] the idea itself can be found in the *Lao-tzu*.[65] At any rate, it is true that Wang Pi opened a new era of Chinese philosophy by giving the terms a new overtones. Also the fact that he gave *t'i-yung* a new meaning shows his leaning towards metaphysical speculation.[66] It is problematic, however, whether or not the term *t'i* in Wang Pi's system indicates the

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64) Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, p. 323 T'ang yung-t'ung (湯用彤), in his work *Han-wei liang-chin nan-fei ch'ao fo-chiao shih* (漢魏兩晉南北朝佛敎史, The Buddhist History of Han, Wei, Two Chins, and Southern and Northern dynasties p. 333) asserts that Seng-chao invented the category of *t'i-yung*, which is doubtful. Ariane Rump also endorses Wang Pi's innovation of the 'pair of *T'i Yung*'; 'whereas Lao Tzu speaks about the function of Tao and the universe, Wang goes a step further to discuss the substance which underlies their operation, thereby originating the concepts of substance and function (*t'i-yung*, 體用).' See Ariane Rump and Wing-tsit Chan, *Commentary on the Lao Tzu by Wang Pi*, x.

65) Walter Liebenthal, *Chao Lun - The Treatise of Seng-chao,* pp. 17-8.

66) Ariane Rump and Wing-tsit Chan, x

original non-being (本無) which suggests an ontological entity.

Alan K. L. Chan, however, emphatically refuses any possibility to grant Wang Pi as an advocate of metaphysical substance. He maintains in his conclusive remarks, as follows:

> Throughout the entire chapter, and in chapter 1 also, Tao is described essentially in terms of its namelessness and its generative force. There is no clear ground to extend the concept of wu to mean "Non-being" in the sense of "substance." Although the concept of wu is central, for Wang Pi the important point is precisely to eliminate any idea of "thingness" or "substance" from one's contemplation of the meaning of the Way.[67]

"The notion of *wu*, when applied to Tao, cannot be regarded as "substance" for essentially two reasons. First, it is important to see Wang Pi's own philosophical horizon in his interpretation of the Lao-tzu. I contend that what may be called a metaphysics of substance remains quite foreign to Wang Pi's thought. If *wu* is ontologically prior to *yu*, and if *wu* is identical to "substance," then "substance" should be on a higher level than "function." This is clearly not the case in Wang Pi's thought, where "substance" and "function" are viewed as equal.

Secondly, the reading proposed here enables us to assess better

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67) Alan K. L., Chan, p. 50.

the practical import of Wang Pi's thought. The identification of *wu* with "substance" tends to undermine Wang Pi's contribution to the world of ethics and politics, for it subsumes other aspects of his interpretation of the Lao-tzu to the "ontological" level. Wang Pi's recognition of the transcendence of Tao signals a dual emphasis on the nature of Tao and its concrete applications.[68]

In general, ontology deals with the theory of being, that is, the theory of what really exists in contrast with what only seems to exist, or what permanently exists in contrast with what only temporarily exists, and of what exists independently and unconditionally in contrast with what exists dependently and conditionally. All sorts of thought, including ethics and politics, implicitly or explicitly, are constructed on the basis of certain kinds of ontology. In other words, ontology always goes with what is professed as 'thought.' It is impossible to even imagine that without an ontological presupposition, one could set forth ethics or politics, especially when one writes a commentary on such a text as the *Lao-tzu*. Thus the second claim made by Ch'an is no longer plausible.

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68) Alan K. L. Chan, *Two Visions of the Way*, p. 50, 68.

In the case of the first claim, there two sorts of questions may be raised. First, if as he pointed out, *yung* is not different from *t'i*, what is the use of two different notions? When we refer to function, it is always the function of something. It seems to be illogical to presume a function without a body that gives rise to the function. Secondly, if non-being is not the substance, what else, if any thing, is the substance of the function? To answer this question, it is necessary to examine Wang Pi's commentary on the Lao-tzu. First of all, the relationship between Tao and non-being has to be clarified. In *Lao-tzu chu*, or Commentary on the *Lao-tzu*, ch. 38, Wang pi observes:

> How is virtue to be obtained? It is to be obtained through Tao. How is virtue to be completely fulfilled? It is through non-being as its function. As non-being is its function, all things will be embraced...........Although it is valuable to have non-being as its function, nevertheless there can not be substance without non-being..........'[69]

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69) 何以得德? 由乎道也. 何以盡德? 以無爲用. 以無爲用, 則莫不載也.........雖貴以無爲用, 不能捨無以爲體也.......The last sentence, however, arouses controversies among Chinese sinologists. It is caused by different interpretation of the character '*shih*' (捨). Though the popular meaning of shih is 'to discard', Mou Tsung-san interpretes it being 'to dwell in.' So he interpretes as follows; 'one should not dwell in non-being as substance....' On the other hand, Ch'ien Mu interprets it in this way; 'non-being as function should be discarded, for

Wang Pi is supposed to understand that the Tao is not exactly identical with the notion of *wu* because, according to the commentary cited above, *wu* is the function of the Tao. However, since the *wu* in this context refers to non-action (無爲), it should not be taken as the *wu* found in the other context.[70] Function is pertinent to *yu* and te. Thus Paul J. Lin concludes as a result of the analysis of the Lao-tzu chu for ch. 1: 'Metaphysically the principles of substance and function are separate but also one. Practically, substance or non-being should be the principle in the use of all things. Being is the function of substance: applied to all things, it will benefit everything that exists.'[71] In other

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non-being is substance.....' See Rump and Chan, p.117 note. To take another reading, Paul Lin, taking T'i as a verb, to embody, translates the passage as 'cannot cease to embody non-being', which is supported by Alan K. L. Chan who confirms that 'Wang Pi is not discussing the abstract nature of "substance," but rather what one must do in the quest for the way.' However the word *t'i* of the passage in question should be safely translated as abstract noun, 'substance'.

70) The difference between *wu* (無, non-being) and *pen-wu* (本無, original non-being) is not always clear in the Wang Pi's system. Wu is sometimes used as non-action (無爲) or the antonym of being (有). In the other case, it is used as the same meaning as 'original non-being' which is the Tao.

71) Paul J. Lin, *A Translation of Lao Tzu's Tao Te Ching and Wang Pi's Commentary,* xx.

words, for Wang Pi, the substance refers to Tao or non-being, whereas the function signifies evolution of things in the universe. This function, however, is not intentional activity but spontaneous, self-so of the nature. Because Tao functions without any deliberate function, it can be also called non-being. On this ground, the substance and function are not different from each other.

Thus Lao-tzu deals with both the substance and function of eternal Tao. Then he teaches the method of practice for realizing the Tao, saying: 'In practice, I always look into the immaterial aspect of the Tao to contemplate its profundity and wonderfulness(妙), and into phenomena to contemplate their boundaries or manifestations.(徼)' In other words, I also look into both the substance and function of eternal Tao. Since the immaterial substance of the Tao creates all phenomena which are material and can be called by names, they are all contained in its substance.' Consequently, he who looks into its activities can trace them back to their source, or substance: hence, the Tao is all embracing and prevails everywhere. For this reason, Chuang-tzu says:... The Tao is in grass... in excrement... in

urine.'... 'Both the immaterial and the material are one and same... In other words, a simultaneous contemplation of both... which are of one substance.'

In conclusion, the relationship of the substance and the function, which are two faces of the Tao, is summarized as this: 1) The substance of the Tao is the primary source and regulator of both the form (形) and function (用) of myriad things. In this sense the former transcends the latter two. 2) However, the substance and function (or form) are not separable. They are different aspects of the same Tao. As the *Lao-tzu* ch. 4 says: 'Although the form (of myriad things) is big, it will not be trouble for the body.......It softens the light (of myriad things) but does not soil its body (or substance 體).'[72]

The concept of substance interpreted by Wang Pi, however, is nothing more than a general form of the ancient metaphysics. That is, the substance is not a concrete entity as a table or a pen is but a 'metaphysical', or 'abstractive' notion that was adopted by 'skill-in-means.'

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72) *Lao-tzu*, ch. 4, '形雖大, 不能累其體.........和光, 而不汙其體.'

THE ORGANIC POINT OF VIEW (Unity and diversity, 一多)

In order to discuss the question of 'the unity and diversity', it is necessary to pay attention to the *Lao-tzu* ch. 42 which has given and still is giving rise to heated disputes. It runs as thus:

> Tao produced the One. The One produced the two. The two produced the three. And the three produced the ten thousand things. The ten thousand things carry the yin and embrace the yang, and through the blending of the material force they achieve harmony (道生一. 一生二. 二生三. 三生萬物. 萬物負陰而抱陽. 沖氣以爲和.)

Wang Pi interprets this chapter as follows:

> The ten thousand things have ten thousand different forms, but in the final analysis they are one. How did they become one? Because of non-being. Through non-being, one reaches oneness. This one may be called non-being. Since it is already called One, how can there be no speech? If there is speech and there is the One, is that not two? If there is One, there are two, and consequently three is produced. From non-being to being, numbers come to an end here. Beyond this, it does not belong to the affinity of Tao.[73] Therefore in the production of the myriad things, I know its master. Although things exist in ten thousand different forms, their material forces are blended as one (萬物萬形, 其貴一也. 何由致一? 由於無也. 由無乃一. 一可謂無. 已謂之一, 豈得無言乎? 有言有一, 非二[74] 如何有一有二遂生乎三? 從無之有, 數盡乎斯.

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73) This passage precisely follows the logic of the *Chuang-tzu*.

過此以往, 非道之流, 故萬物之生, 吾知其主. 雖有萬形, 沖氣一焉.)

For Wang Pi, the Tao is identical with non-being or the One. It is identical with non-being in the sense that ontologically it is beyond sensual perception. It is also called the One in the sense that it is generatively the primordial source or fundamental entity of all beings in the world. Another implication the concept of the One represents is a 'totality', i. e., the One as a whole universe. Chinese often use the letter I (一) when they express all-embracing one. For instance, the I (一) in 一切 (everything) or in 一家 (the whole family) indicates a totality. Therefore the One, which refers to the primordial source as well as a totality, is another name of the Tao. As Wang Pi comments, 'the One is the beginning of number and the ultimate of things. All things are produced by the one and this is why it is the master of all. And all things achieve their completion because of the one.'[75]

What is then the relationship between unity and diversity? The *Lao-tzu* ch. 1 provides us with some clue on this question: 'The two are the same, but after they are produced, they have

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74) Probably in the end of the sentence the letter *hu* 乎 must have missed, or, the letter *wei* 爲 should relace the letter *fei* 非.

75) *Wang Pi's commentary on the Lao-tzu*, ch. 39, Chan's translation p. 323.

different names.' (此兩者同, 出而異名.) As in the context of the text, 'the two' means non-being (無) and being (有): it shows the relationship between the unity and diversity. Being and non-being, before they are differentiated, were one and the same. This is analogous to the Western cosmological point of view that the cosmos is derived from the chaos. However, unlike the Western way of thought in which the cosmos and the chaos are assigned to somewhat different realms, in the Chinese counterpart, the relationship between the two are so closely connected that they constitute an organic entity. Frederick W. Mote observes:

> the genuine Chinese cosmology is that of organistic process, meaning that all of the parts of the entire cosmos belong to one organic whole and that they all interact as participants in one spontaneously self-generating life process.'[76]

As we shall see in the subsequent chapter, this organic view of the universe in every respect permeates throughout Chinese thought, a portion of which is Hua-yen Buddhist philosophy. This organic view of the universe of the Chinese, however, is not only

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76) Frederick W. Mote, *Intellectual Foundation of China,* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), p. 19.

explained in terms of the part and whole but described as a real organism where all parts represent the whole and vice versa. It is a most unique understanding of the universe. The nature or the universe as the whole is not different from a particle of dust, and at the same time a single particle of dust is in itself the whole universe. On this ground, the diction of 'returning (to the origin, or the One) is the activity of the Tao (反者道之動)' can be properly understood because 'all things in the world came from being, and the origin of being is based on non-being. In order to have being in total, it is necessary to return to non-being.'[77] And 'non-being is inherent in the One. But when we look for it in the multiplicity of things, it is like Tao which can be looked for but not seen, listened to but not heard, reached for but not touched.....'

NOUMENAL POINT OF VIEW (*Li* and *shih* 理事)

Wang Pi's other unique understanding of the Tao is found in his conception of *Li* (理) which represents the order or law of the phenomenal world. *Li* is, in other words, a functional principle regulating things as what they are. Every uniqueness of concrete

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77) From Wang Pi's commentary of Lao-tzu, ch. 40, translated by Chan in *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, p. 323.

objects is controlled by the universal principle so that they form the universe harmoniously. Each things has its own principle, and myriad principles (萬理) representing myriad things and events share the universal Principle which is again Tao. As *Li* is the governing rule of things, universal principle, or law, we acquire by that right understanding or wisdom as to things and events which are so numerous and varying that we are liable to be confused. Therefore it is through *Li* that we understand human beings and the universe as well as the relationship between them:

> If we know the general principle of things (物之致), we can know through thinking even if we do not travel. If we know the basis of things, even if we do not see them, we can understand the principle of right and wrong (which governs them).[78]

It was in the Neo-Confucian movement of the Sung dynasty that the notion of *Li* came to be the central theme of Chinese philosophy. However, the concept of *Li* had assumed a significant role throughout Chinese philosophical history from the pre-Chin

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78) Ibid., pp. 137-8, The text on which this commentary is written runs; 'Therefore the sage knows without going about, understands without seeing, and accomplishes without any action (是而聖人不行而知, 不見而名, 不爲而成).

dynasty to the Ch'ing dynasty of Neo-confucianists.[79] Nevertheless, according to Ch'ien Mu, the term *Li* entertained by Wang Pi and Kuo Hsiang already had the overtone which the Neo-Confucianists of the Sung dynasty had developed.[80] Even if Lao-tzu himself never used the term *Li* in his *Tao Te Ching*, in the commentary of the Lao-tzu, it is found as many as eight times. In most cases (chap. 5, 36, 38 and 79) *Li* means 'to manage' or 'to put things order,' while in chapter 38, it was applied to mean 'the moral principle.' What is more important point to note is that, in the same chapter, *Li* is the principle of causation in the sense that events and things have their causes which can be traced ultimately to Tao (and a principle of unity. In this sense, the word "principle" used here means "pattern" or "paradigm."[81]

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79) See Tang chun-yi (唐君毅), *Lun chung-kuo che-hsueh ssu-hsiang shih chung li-chih liu-i* (論中國哲學思想史中「理」之六義, Discussion on the Six Meanings of the Word of Li in the History of Chinese Philosophical Thoughts) in *Hsin-ya hsueh-pao*, 1, 1 (1955).

80) See Ch'ien Mu, "*Wang Pi Kuo Hsiang chu I Lao Chuang yung li-tzu t'iao-lu*" (王弼郭象周易老莊用理字條錄, *The List of Wang Pi's and Kuo Hsiang's Uses of the Word Li in their Commentaries on the I-ching, Lao-tzu, and Chuang-tzu*), in *Hsin-ya hsueh-pao*, 1, 1 (1955).

81) Alan K. L. Chan, p.54. The original meaning of the Li (理) is the organic pattern of a concrete object found in the natural world such as wood or stone.

Thus *Li* is the principle of formation, and of transformation, as well as that of harmonization of things. The wisdom of a sage is, apart from sheer appearances of things, the insight into structure or the universal principle of nature as a whole. The Lao-tzu, Chap 47 reads:

> Events (事) have a source (宗) and things (物) have a master (主). There may be many roads but their destination is the same, and there may be a hundred deliberations but the result is the same. There is a great constancy (大常) in Tao, and there is a great generality (大致) in principle (理). By holding on to the Tao of old, we can master the present. Although we live in the present age, we can know the primeval beginning. This is why one may know [the world] without going out of doors or looking through the windows.[82]

So far, for the sake of explanatory conveniences, the relationship between the metaphysical substance and phenomenal world has been explained in the four categories:

1) The Generative Point of View (*wu* and *yu*, 無有)

2) The Substantial Point of View (Root and Branch, 本末, or the

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82) Rump and Chan, 137. This is the commentary of the Lao-tzu ch. 47. which runs: 'one may know the world without going out of doors. One may see the way of Heaven without looking through the windows (不出戶, 知天下. 不闚牖, 見天道).

Substance and the Function, 體用)

3) The Organic Point of View (Unity and diversity, 一多)

4) The Noumenal Point of View (*Li* and *shih*, 理事)

Nevertheless, those four categories are closely connected, because they are different attributes of the One Reality, the Tao (道). To Sum up the four schemes: myriad things in the universe are generated from the primordial Tao, which is called several different names such as *wu* (無), *Li* (理), *t'i* (體) and so forth, which represents the generative point of view: since the Tao is the Mother or primordial source of myriad things, the former is the root (本), or substance (體) of things in general which in turn is the branch (末), or the function (用) of the Tao, which represents the substantial point of view: Tao is homogeneous one (一) and things are various many (多), still one and many are interrelated in such a way every parts of organism constitute one entity, which represents the organic point of view: one principle is immanent in everything in the phenomenal world (事) that form the universe as a whole, which represents the noumenal point of view. In conclusion, even if he was accredited with advocator of the idea of 'honoring *wu* (貴無)', he did not depreciated the world of things and events.

THE QUESTION OF MIND

Lao-tzu took *hsin* (心) and *hsing* (性) to be two different entities as they are reciprocally exclusive mental processes: Hsing was an immutable, everlasting basis for the true nature of both human and the universe, whereas *hsin* was attributed to a major betrayer who alienates the human from the natural world. As *hsin* was considered to be an impetus of desire, Lao-tzu, especially in his *Tao Te Ching*, never affirmed the function of mind.[83] One of Lao-tzu's inventives, 'achieving flexibility through predominant vital energy (專氣治柔)', shows his own appreciation of the human mind. Removing the cognitive functions of mind, according to Lao-tzu, one should return to the physiological instinct (氣 *ch'i*) of a living creature, i. e., human being. It was a primary concern for Lao-tzu that the intrusion of the cognitive function should be blocked to restore the true nature of humanity. His famous epigram, 'banish sagacity: forsake wisdom (絶聖棄智)',[84] may be understood in this context. Lao-tzu's distrust of discriminative nature of human cognition

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83) Hsu fu-kuan, p. 143. The contemptuous attitude toward *hsin* was, however, not monopolized by Taoist thinkers but shared with most of thinkers of pre-Ch'in dynasties.

84) *Lao-tzu*, ch. 19.

can be found hither and thither in his *Tao-te ching*:

> ...(the sage) empties the people's hearts and fills their stomachs, weakens their will and strengthens their bones...[85]

Or,

> The pursuit of learning increases daily.
> The pursuit of Tao decreases daily,
> Decreasing more and more
> Until it reaches the point of inaction.
> Inaction: then nothing cannot be done by it,
> Therefore the capture of the world should always be done by inactivity.
> As for activity, it is insufficient to capture the world.[86]

By cognitive function of mind, Lao-tzu means a discriminative consciousness, the object of which is things and events of the

85) *Lao-tzu*, ch. 3, '虛其心. 實其腹. 弱其志. 强其骨...' Wang Pi's commentary on this passages goes as follows: 'The heart embraces knowledge. The stomach embraces food. The empty (heart) contains knowledge, but the full stomach does not. Their bones without knowledge are the trunk; their will, causing trouble, brings confusion. If their hearts are emptied, their will be weakened.' One's will power is closely related to the deliberate mind, one's will also should be weakened to return to the true nature of beings.

86) *Lao-tzu*, ch. 48, '爲學日益. 爲道日損. 損之又損. 以至於無爲. 無爲而無不爲. 取天下常以無事. 及其有事. 不足以取天下.'

external world. From this discriminative cognition, is the emotional bearings of desire or aversion are originated, ending up with the loss of virtue (德 *te*). It is thus no wonder that Lao-tzu always warns of the malfunction of mind. Furthermore, his attitude may be understood if we take into account the historical background in which Lao-tzu was active. Having examined the turmoil of the era, Lao-tzu must have come to the conclusion that every respect of the collapse was solely due to men and women's desire always creating conflicts among people as well as between people and nature. His Taoist philosophy came out of this outlook of the world.

Even if man's mind is, for Lao-tzu, a main agent causing human disaster, mental activity of human beings is not totally negated. In other words, it is a discriminative cognition that is to blame. When our cognition does not discriminate things according to our like or dislike, we remain in a genuine state of mind, that is, the state of virtue. From the perspective of wisdom that comes out of te, there is no difference between self and others, good and bad, like or dislike, etc.. This is called bright (ming 明), the so called 'profound mirror (玄覽).'[87] Yet the sage who has

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87) *Lao-tzu*, ch. 10, The notion of *Hsuan-lan* (玄覽) can also be translated as 'profound insight.'

the brightness looks like a fool from the perspective of an ordinary person. Therefore the Lao-tzu, ch. 20 reads:

> Abandon learning: then one has no sorrow.
> Between "yes" and "no", what is the difference?
> Between good and evil, what is the difference?
> ....
> Lustly the people seem to be enjoying a feast
> or ascending a tower in the springtime
> I alone am unmoved, showing no sentiment,
> Like a baby who does not yet know how to smile.
> ....
> My heart is like a fool's!
> How chaotic! Chaotic!
> While the common people are so bright,
> I alone am so dull!
> While the common people know how to differentiate,
> I alone cannot see the difference.
> Boundless as the sea,
> Aimless as the breeze,
> I seem to have no stop.
> All the people have their purpose,
> But I alone am stubborn and despicable.
> I alone differ from the others
> And value getting nourishment from the Mother.[88]

This beautiful stanza poetically elaborates the epistemology of Lao-tzu himself. Wang Pi basically inherited Lao tzu's

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88) Ibid., ch. 20, '絶學無憂. 唯之與阿. 相去幾何? 善之如惡. 相去若何?....熙熙. 如享太牢. 如春登臺. 我獨泊兮其未兆. 如嬰兒之未孩. 我愚人之心也哉! 沌沌兮! 俗人昭昭. 我獨昏昏. 俗人察察. 我獨悶悶. 澹兮其若海. 飂兮若無止. 衆人皆有以. 而我獨頑似鄙. 我獨異於人. 而貴食母.'

understanding of human mind. However in the case of Wang Pi, idealistic trends, which in Lao-tzu's system is scarcely found, became dominant to the extent that the mind is an universal, ontological reality immanent in both human existence and each things in the phenomenal world. In other words, mind and the so-called objective outside realm jointly constitute one and the same reality, inasmuch as they mutually constitute one another. From the standpoint of the mind, there can be no activities of the mind without those activities being responses to the external world, nor can there be the external world without the meaning-forming function of the mind. Since it is apparent that Wang Pi regards the reality of the mind as holistic, discussion about it in terms of his 'substance and function' distinction is appropriate.[89] As the mind and its object are not different, the mind itself, in Wang Pi's system, is an ontological reality which is understood to be inherently empty, and at the same time, should be emptied when it is filled with discriminative consciousnesses. Yet even though it is understood to be an ontological reality, it is not a concrete object as found in a daily life like a desk or a pencil, nor has any predetermined proclivity.[90] We can see here the incipient emergence of the

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89) Chung-yue Chang, JCP, "*Wang Pi on the Mind*", pp. 77-78.

Taoist version of 'no deliberate mind (無心).'

2-3) KUO HSIANG (郭象, A. D. 252~312)

Li (理, PRINCIPLE) AS THE TRANSCENDENTAL REALITY

In general, Kuo Hsiang is noted for his exclusion of metaphysical leanings from *Lao-chuang* philosophy developed by his predecessors including Wang Pi.[91] He edited and interpreted the Chuang-tzu in a somewhat arbitrary way and is often criticized for his unfaithfulness to the philosophy of Chuang-tzu. Thus, a common saying to the effect that 'it is not the case that Kuo Hsiang interpreted (the philosophy of) Chuang-tzu, but the latter did the former.'[92]

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90) Ibid., p. 86.

91) Ch'en, JCP, 39, 'Hsiang Hsiu (c.221-c.300) and Kuo Hsiang, in their join commentary on the *Chuang-tzu*, interpreted this wu as nothing, or absolute zero. This was contrary to the dominant idea contained in the *Lao-tzu* and *Chuang-tzu*, which maintained that the Tao was wu, but this wu meant the Nameless. Also see Hsu fu-kuan, p. 62.

92) See Livia Knaul, "*Kuo Hsiang and the Chuang Tzu*", JCP, p. 430. Within the 'Inner Chapter' of the *Chuang-tzu*, the concept of Li is used but once as in *t'ien-li* (天理). However, Kuo Hsiang used the concept as many as some seventy times in his commentary on the *Chuang-tzu*.

Kuo Hsiang, in his commentary on the Chuang-tzu, ch. 24, concludes: 'Thus I understand that beings are what they are by nature: they are not caused by anything else.' In his system there is no primordial cause which creates the universe. The myriad things in the universe are self-so or self-transformative. The universe according to Kuo Hsiang is just what it is, it did not come from anything else, nor does it lead anywhere in particular (22/764) It is spontaneous, it does not act in any way, it is "of itself." Its prime characteristic is change. (Heaven and earth and the myriad beings change and transform into something new every day. They go along with the times. Why? They do so spontaneously (2/55)) Even if each thing is what is self-so (自然), it is not randomly created, transformed or sustained. There is a certain rule or principle that regulates things and events of the phenomenal world. In this sense, it can be called an external or transcendental principle:

> When the principle goes to its extremity, its trace disappears: is to be annihilated. Going in accordance (with the principle) without helping it, since one unifies oneself with the principle, it is called 'no-merit.'[93]

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93) Commentary on *Chuang-tzu*, ch. 1 (逍遙遊), '理至則迹滅: 順而不造, 與至理爲一, 故無功.'

In this passage, the principle is the relative concept of its trace. The former represent the metaphysical principle and the latter, concrete things and events. In this regard, Kuo Hsiang follows Wang Pi's understanding of the pair concept, *Li-shih* (理事).[94] Even though he, unlike Wang Pi, denies the Tao as the genetic source, still he holds it as the regulating principle of the universe.[95] Therefore we may rightly assert that Kuo Hsiang in fact did not exclude metaphysics, but that he introduced another type of metaphysics, named is principle, into Taoist thought:[96]

Li AS IMMANENT ATTRIBUTES

In regards to *Li*, there are of two kinds of perspectives: one is to take it to be something outside of things, and the other, something inside of things. When we take the former point of view, *Li* is transcendental entity as we have hitherto examined.

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94) Ch'ien Mu, p. 138.

95) Owing to the Tao, there is nothing that has not the principle. (道故無不理; 繕性). Knowing that the principle of the heaven is 'self-so,' one roams the realm of spontaneity without deliberate actioning. (天理自然, 知故無爲乎其間; 刻意)

96) However, Kuo Hsiang's notion of Li is not his original invention. In fact his understanding of the term did not go beyond Wang Pi's. See Ch'en Mu, p. 138, 143.

To the contrary, when we take the latter point of view, it is an immanent attribute of things. Each thing is invariably the manifestation of the Tao, or *Li*:

> Tung Kuo-tzu (東郭子) asked Chuang-tzu: 'Where is the Tao?' Chuang-tzu said: 'Everywhere.' Tung Kuo-tzu said: 'Specify instances of it.' 'It is in the ant.' 'How can Tao be anything so low?' 'It is in the panic grass.' 'How can it be still lower?' 'It is in the earthenware tile.' 'How can it be still lower?' 'It is in excrement.' To this Tung Kuo-tzu made no reply. Thereupon Chuang-tzu said: 'Your question does not touch the fundamentals of Tao.......You should not specify any particular thing, nor should you think there is a single thing without Tao...[97]

We can see from this passage that the Tao is, in addition to its transcendental quality, something that is internalized in each particular thing of the phenomenal world. As Fung yu-lan says, *'it is in the world'*, *'it is everywhere'*, and *'it is the whole.'* 'The whole of what?' He asks himself - *'the whole of the spontaneity of naturalness of the world.'*[98] The reason the Tao is

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97) *Chuang-tzu*, ch. 25, '東郭子問於莊子曰: '所謂道惡乎在?' 莊子曰: '無所不在.' 東郭子曰: '期而後可.' 莊子曰: '在螻蟻.' 曰: '何其下邪?' 曰: '在稊稗.' 曰: '何其愈下邪?' 曰: '在瓦甓.' 曰: '何其愈甚邪?' 曰: '在屎溺.' 東郭子不應. 莊子曰: '夫子之問也, 固不及質........汝唯莫必, 無乎逃物...'

98) Yu-lan Fung, *Chuang Tzu, A New Selected Translation with An Exposition of the Philosophy of Kuo Hsiang*, 1975, New York, p. 8.

omnipresent in everything in the universe is that they share the same principle, i. e., *Li*. We can see here the *Li* is simultaneously an immanent and transcendental principle. Even so, the status of *shih* (事, things and events) in Kuo Hsiang's system is much higher than that of Wang Pi's. It is true that he was compelled to employ the abstract term, principle, to embrace and equalize the variety of the phenomenal world. Yet Kuo Hsiang made every effort to emasculate the transcendental tenor from the notion of *Li* in order to emphasize the reality of the natural world. Nature was for him only the real, concrete, meaningful world.[99] In this world of reality, *tzu-jan* (自然, nature, naturalness or spontaneity), each member has equal right. They are equally important because they share equal principle. 'Each individual has principle as much as each and every affair has what is appropriate to it.'[100] Principle determines the particular way of being of the entire cosmos as much as of each individual being and affair. By the term Principle, as Livia Kohn states, Kuo Hsiang means *'a cosmic power'* that makes everything be what is.[101] The Tao in the

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99) 'Myriad things all acomplishes their own inherent nature.' (萬物各全其性)

100) *Chuang-tzu*, ch. 3.

Lao-tzu is the 'Mother' who creates the myriad things and at the same time the transcendental reality which is outside things and events, while Chuang-tzu granted to it an immanent quality in addition to the transcendental features established by Lao-tzu.

Still each thing has an internal relationship with one another through *Li* (理, the principle), which came to be another designation of the Tao by Kuo Hsiang. According to him, each thing shares the same universal principle by which everything in this world obtains homogeneity. It is called *pen* (分, allotment) of *Li*. This sort of new interpretation of the relationship between the Tao and phenomena signifies a unique feature of Kuo Hsiang's Taoism:

> The myriad things and forms are equal in terms of their self-acquisition (i. e., self-realization of the Tao). What they acquire is one and the same. As it (what they acquire) is one, there is nothing to say about the Li.[102]

or,

> Being trusted to the Li, things are particularized by

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101) Livia Kohn, *Early Chinese Mysticism*, p. 71.

102) *Chuang-tzu*, ch. 2, '萬物萬形. 同於自得. 其得一也. 已自一矣. 理無所言. (齊物論)'

themselves.[103]

or.

> Great things come into being in a great place, and also a great place gives rise to great things. This is the natural way things go. Therefore (we) do not have to worry about losing anything...[104]

In this way, the equality of things are established, and a close relationship among things is secured. The idea of harmonization between the universal principle and particular things is Kuo Hsiang's major contribution to the Chinese philosophical development. More specifically, the worldview of the Hua-yen and Neo-Confucianism owe in a large amount to his concept of *Li* and *shih* (理事) - the concept that each thing shares the principle of the universe itself and thereby each thing is perfect by itself. Thus, the Chinese way of thought that 'the heaven and earth are identical with myself (天地如我一體).' It is worthwhile to note here that regardless of origin or distinct development there is no Chinese philosophical thought that denies the dictum of homogeneity among man and the universe (天人合一).

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103) Ibid., '任理而自殊. (秋水)'

104) Ibid., ch. 1, '...大物必自生於大處. 大處亦必自生此大物. 理固自然. 不患其失...(逍遙遊)'

NO DELIBERATE MIND (無心)[105]

In the world of 'self-transformation', humanity is a part of the cosmos, bound to it by its mere existence. According to Kuo Hsiang, the share or part (分, *fen*) of the universal principle, that is *Li*, is immanent in everybody's inner nature. Inner nature is the individual's Tao, "what he relies on spontaneously without ever being conscious of it." He takes the universe as a 'constantly changing organism.'[106] Each being, by sharing the universal Tao, participates in the cosmic order. "Each single being has its principle (理) as much as each individual affair has what is appropriate for it."[107] However the inner nature (性), which is inherently pure, is his own invention.[108] As the *Li* in

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105) The notion, *wu-hsin* (無心) was, not the Taoist concoction, as is often regarded, but was in the first place Buddhist terminology. See Yun-hua Jan, A Comparative Study of No-Thought (*Wu-nien*) in Some Indian and Chinese Buddhist Texts, JCP vol. XVI-1 (1989). The concept of No-mind is found in the translations of Fo-shuo hui-yin san-mei ching (*Tathāgatajñānamudrāsamādhi*) as well as the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa by the Indo-Scythian monk, Chih-ch'ien (fl. A. D. 222-229).

106) Ibid, p. 431, 2/73.

107) Ibid., 2/84.

108) The notion *hsing* (性) does not appear in the 'Inner Chapter of the *Chuang-tzu*' at least with meaning of 'humanity's pure inner being or nature.' Chuang-tzu used the concept of *ching* (情) to denote the

humankind's nature and the *Li* of the cosmos are not different, it is no wonder he used the terms, the nature of the natural world or heaven (天性), the principle of the natural world (天理), the nature of human beings (人性) and the principle of human beings (人理) interchangeably.[109] In his system, principle (理) and the human being's inner nature (性) are hardly differentiated. This idea can be also deduced from his understanding of the phenomenal world, that is, the conception of the 'Distinctive Particularization (分殊).'[110]

Kuo Hsiang's innovation of the philosophy of mind was, if not entirely, handed down from Chuang-tzu's thoughts on mind. The mind as understood by Chuang-tzu is far different from that of Lao-tzu.[111] Chuang-tzu highly evaluated mind to the extent that it is called the 'residence of soul (靈府)' or the 'basis of soul (靈臺).' The true nature of mind, according to Chuang-tzu, is by nature void (虛) and quiescent (靜), so in its innermost state it

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mental function as a whole.

109) Ibid., '性分各自爲者, 皆在至理中來, 故不可免也.......任其天性而動, 則人理亦自全矣.' (達生)

110) The idea that human being's inner nature is itself the principle (性卽理) is the key notion of the Neo-Confucianism of the Sung dynasty.

111) See previous chapter.

already converges with the *Tao* and *Te*. Once this mind becomes deluded by external objects, it begins to discriminate what it conceives, resulting in a total corruption of the original state of the pure mind. Chuang-tzu's saying that the sage makes use of his mind just like a mirror (至人用心若鏡)[112] refers to the stage of mind in which the mind does not drift away with objects in the external world. It is important therefore that one should keep the mind of purity by cultivating the state of void (虛), serenity (靜) and concentration (止).[113]

Kuo Hsiang, inheriting Chuang-tzu's conception of mind, more systematically organized and clarified it by giving new tenor to certain notions such as *Li*, *hsing* and *hsin* as mentioned above. That is, when mind that is originally unified with the principle of the heaven is disturbed by desire, it loses its purity.[114] And in turn, the origin of that desire is the abundance of knowledge that

112) *Chuang-tzu*, ch. 7, (應帝王).

113) Hsu fu-kuan, p. 138.

114) The quiescence of life is the Nature of Heaven. What functions in response to things is the desire of Nature. As things that stimulate man are innumerable, and man who is in the pursuit of desire is without abstinence, the Principle of Heaven is annihilated. (人生而靜, 天之性也. 感物而動, 性之欲也. 物之感人無窮, 人之逐欲無節, 則天理滅矣.) 莊子; 大宗師註.

is nothing but discriminative functions.[115] He thought the nature of heaven (天性) and knowledge (心知) to be uncompromisingly contrasting powers. Only if one discards discriminative knowledge, and coincides with 'no deliberate mind (無心)', he asserts, can one eventually converge with the universe and the myriad things in it.[116]

The meaning of the dictum that knowledge is to be extremely perfect only when it reaches where nothing is known[117] leads us to a new horizon of knowledge advocated by the Neo-Taoists - a new horizon of knowledge that emerges when discriminative knowledge ceases to function.[118] This is called *wu-hsin* (無心) in the sense that there is no more discriminative mind (分別心). This realm of the new cognition (a certain kind of cognition without a

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115) What reveals Heaven is the impetus of *hsing* (性). What discloses is the function of knowledge (開天者, 性之動也. 開人者, 知之用也.) 莊子; 達生注. If one makes use of mind (心), he would betray Tao. (用心則背道) 莊子; 大宗師註.

116) Therefore, those who embody No-mind are mysteriously merged with things, never conflicting with Heaven and Earth (故無心者, 與物冥而未嘗有對於天下也). 莊子; 齊物論註.

117) *Chuang-tzu*, ch. 2.

118) Kuo Hsiang, in his commentary on the *Chuang-tzu*, first introduced the concept of *wu-hsin*: 'make your mind no-mind (無心)' (ch. 11).

cognition by an ordinary subjectivity) is not an analytical cognition but rather, an intuitive one. *wu*-hsin, in the fable of chaos (混沌), acquires mythic expression since chaos is exactly mythologized *wu-hsin*:

> The Emperor of the South was called Shu. The Emperor of the North was called Hu. And the Emperor of the Center was called Hun-tun. Shu and Hu at times mutually came together and met in Hun-tun's territory. Hun-tun treated them very generously. Shu and Hu, then, discussed how they could reciprocate Hun-tun's virtue saying: "Men all have seven openings in order to see, hear, eat and breathe. He alone does not have any. Let's try boring him some." Each day they bored one hole, and on the seventh day Hun-tun died.[119)]

The death of Chaos is caused by activation of sense organs and the subsequent differentiation of consciousness.

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119) Girardot, *Myth and Meaning in Early Taoism*, p. 81.

3. CHI-TUN, A BUDDHO-TAOIST[120]

3-1) THE HERO OF *CH'ING-T'AN*

As mentioned above, the intellectual environment in the period of the Wei-Chin Nan-Pei dynasties (A. D. 220~580) is characterized by the *Ch'ing-t'an* movement which is again noted for its method of free discussion in terms of its topics. Having experienced the decay of the Confucian Han dynasty, the literati group tended to be attracted to the Taoist philosophy, so much so that it came to be one of their indispensible subjects. Buddhism was not yet then popularized among the cultured Chinese. Chih-tun, who was well versed in *Lao-chuang* thought appeared on this scene.[121] At the age of nineteen (A. D. 333), he went to the capital city of Eastern Chin to be extolled by the members of

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120) The standard with which we tell Buddhists from Buddho-Taoists is very ambiguous. In a sense, Chinese Buddhists more or less have the characteristics of Buddho-Taoists. In this work, the notion refers to those who are much influenced by Taoist worldview. As to Chih-tun's career as a Buddhist monk and Ch'ing-t'an debater, E. Zurcher extensively discussed in his masterpiece, *The Buddhist Conquest of China,* pp. 116-37.

121) Wandering in the wide expanse of the empty mystery, he holds to the principle of "Saintliness within," and by maintaining the purity of the Five Precepts he matches the transforming (rule) of "Kingliness without." (遊虛玄之肆, 守內聖之則. 佩五戒之貞, 毘外王之化.) KSC, T 50, 349a. In this chapter, quoting Kuo Hsiang's commentary, he encourages the harmonization of Buddhism and Taoism.

high society. The record has it that he gave them a startling impression of being an excellent interpretator of Lao-chuang philosophy rather than of Buddhism.[122]

He was celebrated by his contemporaries as well as by his descendants for being not only an outstanding Buddhologist but also an intermediate harmonizer (or mixing together) *Hsuan-hsueh* (玄學) and Buddhism. Since Chinese Buddhism owed its evolution in a large amount to this intellectual circumstance, Chih-tun's position in Chinese Buddhist history cannot be overemphasized. He is often criticized by modern Buddhologists as a typical Buddho-Taoist who put the Taoist framework on Chinese Buddhism in its early stage. Paradoxically enough, however, his career as a Buddho-Taoist must have been all the more an influential factor for the propaganda of Buddhism, because the self-esteem of the Chinese for their glorious cultural legacy was so great that, but for the competent mediator such as Chih-tun, would not have glanced at Buddhism for a long time.

122) Wang Meng, a leading scholar at the time, praises Chih-tun in a very curious way because he compares Chih-tun, who is a Buddhist monk, with Wang Pi, who is a Neo-Taoist; 'His achievement in articulation of the mysterious (truth) is no less than that of 輔嗣 (造微之功 不減輔嗣- 慧皎, 高僧傳). 輔嗣 refers to Wang Pi who is regarded as one of the founders of *hsuan-hsueh* 玄學.

3-2) K'UNG 空 AND WU 無

It is held that ko-yi Buddhists, one of whom was Chih-tun, in the incipient stage of Chinese Buddhism, identified the concept of Buddhist *k'ung* with Taoist *wu*. If the two notions, which originated from totally different cultural settings, were wrongly identified, either the definition of *k'ung* or *wu* must have been altered. The answer for this question seems to be clear, because under any given condition, what is transformed is the alien factor, even though the indigenous factor may be influenced by imported factors. It is therefore important to understand how the transformation of a concept took place, in order to find out the way in which Indian Buddhism was distorted by the Chinese. Still, it is even more important to note whether the alleged transformation was ever corrected by, if not Taoists, Chinese Buddhists of subsequent ages. Chih-tun is credited with being the advocator of the idea of 'matter as such (卽色義)' through which we can trace his understanding of *k'ung* (空, emptiness). Most of his work being not extant, sometimes it is quite obscure to distinguish his own thoughts from those of the authors who cited a part of the former's work:

> A) The nature of matter is such that matter does not exist by itself. This being so, it is empty, although

(seemingly existent as) matter. Therefore it is said that matter is identical with Emptiness, and again (on account of its seeming existence) different from Emptiness.[123)]

B) I hold that "matter as such is Emptiness, and that matter does not (need to) be eliminated (in order to reach) Emptiness." These words express the highest (Truth). Why is this? The nature of matter is such that matter does not exist by itself: it is empty, although (seemingly existent as) matter. In the same way, knowing does not know by itself, and is therefore always tranquil, although (seemingly active as) knowing.[124)]

C) The colors of blue and yellow do not exist inherently. Due to naming 'blue' or 'yellow', (they are called as such.) But for discrimination of mind, the colors of blue or yellow would be all empty.[125)]

As these are almost all of passages which are attributed to Chih-tun, it is hard, if not impossible, to deduce his understanding the Buddhist concept of emptiness. What is, first of all, meant by the sentence, 'matter does not exist by itself'

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123) *Miao-kuan chang* 妙觀章, 世說新語, '夫色之性也. 不自有色. 色不自有. 雖色而空. 故曰: 色卽爲空. 色復異空.'

124) *Miao-kuan chang,* '吾以爲. "卽色是空 非色滅空". 此斯言至矣. 何者? 夫色之性色. 〔不自色〕 雖色而空. 如知不自知. 雖知恒寂也.' Zurcher's translation. T'ang Yung-t'ung added 不自色 (p. 259) which is plausible.

125) *Chao-lun hsin shu,* T45, 209a, '靑黃等相. 非色自能. 人名爲靑黃等. 心若不計. 靑黃等皆空.'

(色不自色)? This problematic passage can be interpretated in many different ways: 1) matter can be matter on the basis of what makes it matter, i. e., a substance: 2) matter is manifested by discriminative cognition of the subjectivity: 3) matter comes into being by the combination of causes and conditions, and thus does not have its own inherent existence. Seng-chao (A. D. 374~414) in his 'Treatise on negation of real-emptiness' (不眞空論),[126] criticized the theory of 'matter as such' maintained by Chih-tun:

> Those who speak about matter must only (realize) that matter is matter as such (without any substrate). For how would matter be dependent on anything which causes matter to be matter 色色 in order to become matter? This merely explains that matter does not exist by itself. Yet it does not point out that matter is not matter.[127]

It is clear that Seng-chao took Chih-tun's standpoint to be number 1). T'ang understood Chih-tun's theory as number 3):

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126) *Chao-lun*, T 1858, 152a.

127) *Ch'u san-tsang chi chi* (出三藏記集), T 2145, 29a, '(卽色者明色不自色. 故雖色而非色也) 夫言色者. 但當色卽色. 豈待色色而後爲色哉? 此直語色不自色. 未領色之非色也.' Chi-tsang, the great systematizer of San-lun School, fully acknowleges Chih-tun's standpoint; 'without negating conventional world, he successfully expound the the realm of reality (此猶是不壞假名, 而說實相.). This shows that Chih-tun's understanding of k'ung was accepted by his desendents as a reliable example.

that is, according to him, the meaning that 'matter does not exist by itself' (色不自色) is that 'matter does not have its own inherent existence' (色無自性).[128] Zurcher thought that matter in Chih-tun's system was empty because it is conditionally formed. 'According to Chih-tun', he states, 'this principle of causation, this conditional state is what is meant by Emptiness.'[129] The arguments of the latter two are basically the same, and are contradictory to that of Seng-chao. If Chih-tun asserted that matter is empty because it is established by various causes and conditions, to the contrary of Seng-chao's accusation, he *does* point out that matter is not matter (領色之非色也).

To settle this controversy, it is necessary to re-examine the criticism of Seng-chao on the theory of 'matter as such.'[130] Since Seng-chao was born only sixty years later than Chih-tun,

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128) T'ang yung-t'ung, p. 260.

129) Zurcher, p. 123.

130) E. Zurcher, pp. 121-122, According to him, the reason Chih Tun's theory was 'severely criticized by Seng-chao in the early fifth century for not being drastic enough,' which means that 'Chih Tun saw only the conditional and causal nature of all phenomena, but did not realize the complete truth, viz. that conditionality and causality themselves are mere names without any underlying reality.'

his criticism might have been based on Chih-tun's writings that are not now extant. This is the reason we have to pay more attention to his opinion. Seng-chao has it that Chih-tun asserted that 'matter is dependent on anything which causes matter to be matter 色色 in order to become matter (待色色而後爲色).' Even though it is asserted by Chih-tun that because matter is the matter based on substance, matter is not established as matter by itself (此直語色不自色), Seng-chao argued, (as there is no such thing as substance) Chih-tun did not know that matter in self is not matter.

In this argument, the precise meaning of 'what makes matter be the matter' (色色) is a crucial point in determining the controversy. First, it may indicate the function of the cognitive subject. And second, it may refer to *Li* or *wu*, that is, the primeval source of myriad things. The illustrations, B and C, endorse the first case. To take this line, we may assume that Chih-tun argued as follows: "what makes matter be matter is subjective discrimination. If subjective mind does not discriminate (心若不計), all matters would be empty. Therefore, it is claimed that all matter was empty. In short, if we see things as they are without any prejudice, it is the emptiness of all beings." It is evident in this case that Chih-tun brings the question of ontology

into that of epistemology. In other words, he regarded emptiness as 'no deliberate mind' (無心). The meaning of the dictum, 'matter is not matter by itself' (色不自色) is, therefore, that matter can not be established without the intervention of cognitive subject. When the discriminative function of a cognitive subject does not intervene, objects will remain something that is not known to us. Being not entirely no-thing, it is some-thing that makes matter be matter (色色者). Even if Chih-tun uses the notion of *k'ung* (空), it is nothing but the 'original non-being (本無) of the Neo-Taoists. Thus identifying *k'ung* and *wu*. From this point of view, to re-interpretate the illustration of A:

The reason that matter does not exist by itself (色不自有) is that matter as the phenomenal existence is based on the primordial source, *wu*. So even though being called matter, it is no other than the manifestation of *k'ung* (or pen-*wu*) (雖色而空). Even so, pen-*wu* and its manifestation are not different from each other.[131] Therefore I say (故曰) that even though matter in itself is *k'ung* (色卽爲空), (since there is an ontological distinction

131) What is consistently emphasized by *Hsuan-hsueh* was the identity of things in the phenomenal world and metaphysical substance, whatever name it assumes.

between substance (or noumenon) and phenomena), again matter is different from *k'ung* (色復異空).

In conclusion, the concept of *k'ung* as understood by Chih-tun is objectively original non-being (本無) or metaphysical substance, and subjectively no-deliberate mind (無心). In this way the ontological aspect of *k'ung*, which is metaphysical, and the epistemological aspect of are united in Chih-tun's philosophy. However, *k'ung* as posited by the prajñā sūtra cannot be identified with Neo-Taoist *pen-wu*. As shall be illustrated in the following chapter, k'ung is always an epistemological term in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism. At any rate, Seng-chao's accusation of Chih-tun's concept of *k'ung* is, as far as the above mentioned analysis is concerned, not without foundation.

3-3) METAPHYSICAL SUBSTANCE, *Li* (理)

Chih-tun recognized the Tao as the metaphysical substance. Even if the category of *t'i-yung* was invented and given new implication by Wang Pi, it was Chih-tun who exclusively prescribed it as the Chinese worldview. He was probably the first thinker in Chinese Buddhism who successfully combined Taoism and Buddhism. It is not an exaggeration to say that he

virtually founded Sinicized Buddhism, because even Chi tsang, the great systematizer of the San-lun School, admired him for his accurate understanding of the concept, *k'ung*. Under the influence of the *Chuang-tzu* and Kuo Hsiang's commentary on it, Chih-tun mitigated the substantive tenor of *wu*, instead he patronized the notion of *Li*, which takes the central position in Hua-yen Buddhist ontology.

The series of metaphysical concepts such as Tao, *wu*, *Li* and so forth do not concretely exist as a tree does, but they are not totally non-existent.[132] This is what is meant by so-called 'metaphysical notions' in the Buddho-Taoist tradition. Among them the notion of *Li* (理) was defined by Chih-tun as the transcendental, absolute Principle.[133] *Li*, which is immutable or unmovable itself, is, according to him, a transcendental as well as an immanent principle regulating and activating myriad things in the universe:

Therefore, the Principle is not the transformation (of

132) *Ch'u san-tsang chi chi*, T55, p. 55a. "the ultimate Li that is deep and profound returns to namelessness (無名). What is namelessness and beginninglessness is the substance of Tao (道之體) [至理冥壑, 歸乎無名. 無始無名, 道之體也.]"

133) Kenneth Ch'en, p. 78.

things), and the transformation (of things) is not the Principle. The doctrine is not the substance, and the substance is not the doctrine. Thus the transformation of myriad things are not beyond the Principle (理).[134]

As E. Zurcher observes:

His (聖人, 至人) realm is not that of change but that of absolute Truth, detached from all phenomenal existence and discursive reasoning. This truth is denoted by the term Li 理 "order, principle", one of the basic terms of the Chinese philosophical vocabulary which had already been used by several authors since pre-Han times with different shades of meaning. But which here (as far as we know for the first time) acquires a new and more abstract significance, the Chinese concept of cosmic or natural order having merged with the Buddhist notion of transcendental Truth, Suchness (tathatā).[135]

Nevertheless, for him, *Li* was not always a metaphysically oriented term. It sometimes meant a kind of pattern, paradigm, or law. Thus, distinction between the 'ultimate *Li*' (至理) and 'numerous *Li*' (萬理). The latter refers to the internal principle immanent in each thing which enables it to be produced and transformed, while the former refers to absolute truth or suchness

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134) Ibid., p. 55b, '故理非乎變. 變非乎理. 敎非乎體. 體非乎敎. 故千變萬化莫非理外.'

135) E. Zurcher, p. 125.

regulating all things in the universe:

> The production of things is not dispense with the basis (宗). The origination of events can not do without the fundamental (本). Both the basis and the fundamental are the source of myriad principles (萬理).[136]

136) Ibid., 56b, '夫物之資生. 靡不有宗. 事之所由. 莫不有本. 宗之與本. 萬理之源矣.'

4. CONCLUSION

In his assessment of the prevailing tendencies of both Neo-Taoists and Buddhists during the Wei-Chin dynasty, Kenneth Ch'en summarizes as follows:

> The ideals that motivated the activities of both Neo-Taoists and Buddhists were to be contemptuous of and to belittle human affairs, and to wander about carefree as in a happy excursion. To value non-being, to depreciate being, to return to the original nature, these were the fundamental tenets held by both groups.[137)]

This observation, though generally correct, fails to notice two points: first to say , that both the Neo-Taoists and the Buddhists, belittling human affairs, wandered about in a happy excursion is a superficial observation. Such an attitude may applied to the sentimentalist Taoists, the Seven Sages in the Bamboo Grove for instance, but may not be correct in case of most of the rationalistic Taoists, letting aside Buddhists. As was frequently mentioned, for both Taoists or Buddhists, their ultimate concern was not 'a happy excursion,' but 'human affair.' Furthermore, their cosmology is not aimed at cosmology on its own accord, but at understanding or finding the human place in

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137) Kenneth Ch'en, JCP p. 43.

this world. It is not in the Greek notion of leisure but in the urgent demand in the period of catastrophe that they launched into philosophical inquiry.[138]

Second, it is partly true that as their primary concern was the transcendental realm, they depreciated phenomena. The central figures of the early *Hsuan-hsueh*, Wang Pi and Kuo Hsiang, did not divide the transcendental and the phenomena as two uncompromising realms: The two (i. e., *Li* and *shih*) were always both sides of a coin and thus inseparable. The Chinese, especially for the Taoists, have never given up this world at the cost of the other world.[139] Human beings and their environment, that is heaven and earth (天下), are eternal issues for the Chinese.

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138) T'ang yung-t'ung, p. 274.

139) Roberta Lion Kong rightly asserts; 'it was integral to Wang's system (or nonsystem) that matters relating to ontology, and only such matters, be the domain of the Taoistic heritage....' (PEW, p. 53).

CHAPTER THREE: HUA-YEN WORLDVIEW

1. THE FORMATION OF HUA-YEN SCHOOL

1-1) BUDDHIST-TAOIST SYNCRETISM

As the Sui dynasty achieved the unification of the Chinese continent, Chinese Buddhism entered a new phase. According to Arthur F. Right's periodization,[140] Chinese Buddhism, through the period of preparation (A. D. 65~317) and the period of domestication (A. D. 317~589), entered the period of independent growth (A. D. 589~900). Being "independent" not only means that it no longer was influenced by Indian Buddhism,[141] but also that Chinese Buddhism, through a sufficient domestication process, already reorganized sinicized Buddhism in accordance with Chinese tastes and sentiment. Main Chinese schools are

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140) See Arthur F. Right, *Buddhism in Chinese History*.

141) At the time of the pilgrimage (A. D. 629~645) of Tripitaka Master, Hsuan-tsang (A. D. 600~664), Buddhism, centered in Nālandā, was still a dominant religion in India. However it sharply fell into a decline in subsequent ages.

T'ien-t'ai, Hua-yen, and Ch'an Buddhism which are called 'Neo-Buddhism' by some Japanese Buddhologists. There is no doubt that these new forms of Buddhism were indebted to Taoism in their theories and practices. Among these does Hua-yen Budddhism lie like a gigantic lake. The teachings of Hua-yen, which began to develop six centuries after the introduction of Buddhism to China, embraced and summed up all the achievements of previous Chinese Buddhism, and influenced, either directly or indirectly, the ensuing Buddhism, such as Ch'an and the Pure Land School, as well as the Neo-Confucianism of the Sung dynasty.

The milieu around which new Buddhism (i.e., the 'sinicized Buddhism'), especially Hua-yen, came into existence and developed can be viewed from various different perspectives.[142] In this chapter, however, we will solely be concerned with the relation between the Hua-yen School and Taoism. It is too symplistic a view to regard the establishment of the Hua-yen doctrine, which is extolled as the paramount of Chinese thoughts,

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142) See Yuki Reimon (結成令聞), "*Chugoku Bukkyo no keisei* (中國佛教の形成, The Formation of Chinese Buddhism)". *Chugoku no Bukkyo* (中國の佛教), pp. 79-104.

as something accomplished by only a few patriarchs of its incipient stage, such as Tu-shun or Chih-yen. Many varied strains of Buddhist thought, developed after the introduction of Buddhism into China, such as Mādhamika, Yogācāra, Tathāgātagarbha doctrine, etc., formed the flesh and bones of the teachings of the Hua-yen School.[143] And the views of Taoism, which were the closest to Buddhism among Chinese Thought, constituted the background of Hua-yen.[144] In the following

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143) William Theodore de Bary, in his anthology, *The Buddhist Tradition in India, China and Japan*, p. 142, states as following: 'They (the Three-Treatise school and the Consciousness-Only school), like the Hīnayāna schools, taught one-sided philosophies, the former reducing everything to Emptiness and the latter reducing everything to Consciousness. Representing such extreme positions, they did not suit the temper of the Chinese. Both the concepts of Emptiness and of the Mind, however, were accepted as basis tenets of the remaining schools, and in this way they have been of great importance in Chinese Buddhism.' Judging from their literature, it is evident that the Yogācāra thought and the Madhyamika philosophy were combined in the tenets of later Chinese Buddhist schools, T'ien-t'ai, Hua-yen and Ch'an.

144) The distinction between religious Taoism and philosophical Taoism is very important in the history of Chinese Buddhism. Religious Taoism, which is represented by the Taoist Order, continuously competed with Buddhism to win religious hegemony in the society. On the other hand, philosophical Taoism, as it is seen in the tradition of

pages, the interaction of Buddhism and Taoism up to late 6th century, when the Hua-yen School has been firmly established, will be examined.

The history of Chinese Buddhism is practically nothing but the history of the reaction by the different strata of Chinese society to the Buddhist challenge.[145] But the fact that the main figures in leading the changes were not Buddhists but Taoists and, more rarely, Confucianists, who were the preachers of indigenous thoughts, became a critical factor in defining the character of Buddhism thereafter. It would be an exaggeration to say that Indians brought their religion and conquered the spirit of the Chinese people. Even though it is a historical fact that Buddhist monks of India and Central Asia came into China to introduce Buddhism around the 1th century A. D., it may be fair to say that Chinese indigenous Thought contributed more to the development of Chinese Buddhism than Buddhism , a foreign

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Ch'ing-t'an during the Wei-Chin Nan-Fei dynasties, directly contributed to the development of Chinese Buddhism through "discussion" with Buddhism. Even though there were some disputes between philosophical Taoism and Buddhism, they were mostly about insignificant issues. Therefore it is safe to say that there was implicit agreement on essential issues.

145) Walter Liebenthal, *"Chinese Buddhism During the 4th and 5th Centuries"*, MN, vol.XI-1, April (1955).

religion, itself did. The mentality of the "Glorious Center (中華)" kept by the Chinese was so proud and their assimilative capacity was so powerful that no foreign religion ever attempted to replace a Chinese one.

To examine the relationship between Hua-yen and Taoism, we need to pay attention to the general philosophical trend of Southern dynasties. As we have seen in the above, throughout nearly 350 years of the Wei-Chin Nan-Pei period, the Southern dynasties' philosophical trend can be characterized by the *Ch'ing-t'an* tradition. There was a noticeable tendency in the concerns of Buddhists of that period leaning towards Taoism. The most essential topics of Chinese thought were the questions of "human being" and "Nature" as the environment of the former, and their relationship.[146] This trend is, most prominently, embodied in the Taoist philosophy. Upon the soil of the Taoist perspective of world and human being, Buddhism slowly and steadily began to encroach, and vice versa. The tradition of *ko-yi* Buddhism, the method of matching the meanings of Buddhist and

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146) Hajime Nakamura, in his '*Ways of Thinking of Eastern People*,' singled out several characteristics of the Chinese way of thought. Of them he particularly emphasized their fondness toward 'concreteness' and 'particularity' in explaining their world-view.

Taoist concepts, has been a consistent stream throughout the history of Chinese Buddhism.[147] The most noticeable example, which shows the affinity of Buddhism and Taoism, is found in the fact that they understood *k'ung* (空, emptiness) of the *Prajñā* Thought as the equivalent of Taoist *pen-wu* (本無, original non-being). As early as the end of the Late Han dynasty, Buddhists began to identify Taoist *pen-wu* with the Buddhist term tathatā, suchness, or the absolute reality. In attempting to understand Buddhism, Taoists, without much trouble, applied their own frame to Buddhism. And it was beyond Buddhists' capacity to resist this atmosphere.[148] As Ch'en pointed out:

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147) This contention is what is going to be demonstrated in this work. It is curious to see that no Chinese Buddhist ever criticized ke-yi Buddhism in a serious manner. Although Tao-an (道安, A. D. 312~385) criticized it, he allowed his disciple, Hui-yuan (慧遠, A. D. 336~416) to use Taoist ideas to interpret the *Prajñā* Thought. Kumārajīva (A. D. 344~413), the Central Asian, also was not able to resist the current intellectual circumstance; judging from his and his disciple, Seng-chao's (僧肇, A. D. 374~414) writings, both of them did not totally discard the *ko-yi* method.

148) Before the establishment of *Ch'ing-t'an* tradition in the Wei-Chin dynasty, two schools of Buddhism already flourished. One is the Dhyāna school and the other the *Prajñā* school. See Kenneth Ch'en.

> Buddhism under the Southern Dynasties (A. D. 420-589) continued to develop generally along the lines laid down during the previous period. That is to say, monks in the south were more interested in philosophy and literature and in maintaining close relations with the Neo-Taoists.[149]

That is to say, throughout this period which follows the Chinese surrender of their cultural center Ch'ang-an to foreigners, and when they lived as refugees (A. D. 317~420), the general characters of the Southern dynasties can be described as the period of a honeymoon between Neo-Taoism and Buddhism. Of course, even in this period, there were times of serious conflicts between them. However, they did not develop into physical conflicts but ended up as verbal disputes. Even those verbal conflicts were mainly concerning some partial and trivial issues. Generally speaking, conflicts between Buddhism and Taoism in the Southern dynasties were primarily about something other than religious or philosophical issues.[150]

It was another important trend of the Southern-Northern dynasties to take Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism as,

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149) Kenneth Ch'en, *Buddhism in China*, p. 121.

150) Ibid., pp. 135-144.

fundamentally, the same teaching. This trend, which slowly began to develop from the 4th century A. D., not only means that Chinese people approved of Buddhism as an independent culture, but it also means that they already harmonized Buddhism within their philosophical system. Even though it can be said that there was a general agreement among the Chinese that these three traditions are not different in their essence, that does not mean that there were no disputes whatsoever among these three philosophies. It would not be an exaggeration to say that even though there were occasions when followers of different teachings competed with one another, they did not go to the extent that they entirely denied even the existence of their counterparts.

During the Chin dynasty (A. D. 265~316), Wang Fou (王浮) compiled a book called the *Hua-hu ching* (化胡經, Scripture on Converting Barbarians). This alleged scripture, based on what is probably a fictitious story that Lao-tzu founded Buddhism in India, reflects typical Chinese reactions to Buddhism at the time: they thought that Buddhism was, in fact, not different from Taoist teaching, and that the former was inferior to the latter. Even if it was a sheer fiction without historical foundation, the Taoists for a long time insisted that Lao-tzu went west to

convert the barbarians and to become the Buddha. This insistence gave birth to a series of Buddhist-Taoist debates lasting over a thousand years, to be settled finally by the Mongol emperors in favor of the Buddhists.[151]

As early as the 4th century A. D., the trends of 'harmony among the three teachings, i.e., Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism' began to emerge. This integrational view was advocated by Sun Cho (孫綽, A. D. 300~380) one of the lay followers and friends of Chih-tun, who combined Confucian social responsibility, the *Lao-chuang* ideal of contemplation, and Buddhist enlightenment. In his *Yu-tao-lun* (喩道論, Treatise Illustrating the Tao), Sun Cho in the first place tried to reconcile Buddhism and Confucianism, as, he thought, the difference between the two were mere expediency. According to him, even though Confucianism represents this-worldly social virtues, while Buddhism the other-worldly creed, as to their inner nature, they are same. Thus he says in the treatise to the effect that 'the Duke of Chou and Confucius are identical with the Buddha: the Buddha is identical with the Duke of Chou and Confucius.'[152]

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151) Kenneth Ch'en, p. 53. Morgol tribes invaded China in the year of A. D. 1280 to found the Yuan dynasty.

152) *Yu-tao-lun*, T 52, p. 17a, '周孔卽佛, 佛卽周孔.....'

He also attempts to reconcile Buddhism and Taoism by employing key Taoist terms to define the Buddha: 'The Buddha is......the one who does nothing and yet there is nothing that he does not do.'[153] Furthermore, he does not hesitate to quote passages from the Lao-tzu to praise the virtue of the Buddha.[154] In this context, the Buddha is quite identical with the Taoist sage.

During the Liu Sung dynasty (420-470), a Taoist monk Ku-huan (顧歡, A. D. 390~453)[155] wrote '*I-hsia lun* (夷夏論, Treatise on Barbarians and Chinese)' where he denounced Buddhism in favor of Taoism because the former was a 'barbarian's religion.'[156] Livia Kohn formulized Ku Huan's scheme dividing Buddhism and Taoism as depicted in the *I-hsia*

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153) Ibid., T 52, p. 16b, '夫佛也者......無爲而無不爲者也.'

154) Ibid., T 52, p. 17a, '爲而不恃, 長而不宰, 德被而功不在我...'

155) Kenneth Ch'en raises a question on the dates of Ku Huan as what have been known. According to him, Ku Huan must have been active in the year of A. D. 483.

156) "Buddhism originated in the land of the barbarians, is that not because the customs of the barbarians were originally evil? The Tao originated in China, is that not because the habits of the Chinese were originally good?.....Buddhism is not the way for China; Taoism is not the teaching for the western barbarians." See K. Ch'en, "*Anti-Buddhist Propaganda*," HJAS, 15 (1952), 172.

lun:

Buddhism / Taoism

barbarian / Chinese
concerned with salvation of the spirit / concerned with longevity of the body
secondhand / original
involves no filial piety / very filial
contains abstruse ideas / concrete, practicable
complex / straightforward

It is noteworthy, however, that even if Buddhism were barbarian's teaching and thus unsuitable for Chinese, Ku Huan did not insist to root it out altogether. It is also interesting enough that Chinese Taoists seldom showed, if any, a radical enmity toward Buddhism from the very beginning of the introduction of Buddhism into China. It was always the matter of inferiority of Buddhism to Taoism that Taoists tried to demonstrate.

Many prominent figures of the time, not only Buddhists but even Taoists, wrote against Ku Huan's argument.[157] They

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157) HMC, T 52, 41b-47a.
1) 謝鎭之與顧道士 (T 52, 41b)
2) 朱昭之難夷夏論 (T 52, 43a)
3) 疑夷夏論諮顧道士 (T 52, 44b)
4) 駁顧道士夷夏論 (T 52, 45b)
It is a very rare case that a treatise written by a certain Taoist monk in favor of Taoism created such heated disputes

argued, without exception, that Buddhism and Taoism are not different. Views on Buddhism held by intellectuals of 6th century Southern dynasties can be best seen in writings of the well known Fan Yeh (A. D. 398~445) and Liu Ch'iu (A. D. 438~495), who could be considered as representatives of the period.

> From the K'un-lun Mountain eastward the term 'Great Oneness' is used. From Kashmir westward the term sambodhi (omniscience of the Buddha) is used. Whether one looks longingly toward 'non-being' or cultivates 'emptiness,' the principle involved is the same. (by Liu Ch'iu)[158]

> If we examine closely its (Buddhist) teachings about purifying the mind and gaining release from the ties of life, and its emphasis upon casting aside both 'emptiness' and 'being,' we see that it belongs to the same current as do the Taoist writings. (by Fan Yeh)[159]

The statements like these made by the leading literati of the mid and late 5th century, which is regarded as the time of a

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as this.

158) Fung Yu-lan, *History of Chinese Philosophy*, Princeton, 1953, p. 2240.

159) Ibid.

matured understanding of Buddhism, can be viewed as evidence of the general circumstances of the time. It was regarded that Buddhism and Taoism were merely different applications of the same teaching, which shows a different application of the *t'i-yung* paradigm. This deeply rooted tradition remains in even today.[160] Hajime quotes another instance showing syncretic trends of Buddhism and Taoism: Chang-jung, a Taoist in the southern Ch'i dynasty, is said to have passed away, with the *Lao-ching* and *Lao-tzu* in one hand and the Chinese version of the *Wisdom Sūtra* (*Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*) and the *Lotus sūtra* (*Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra*) in the other hand, on his deathbed.[161]

Lastly, we must not overlook two large scale persecutions by Emperor *Wu* of the Northern Wei (A. D. 446) and of the Northern Chou (A. D. 574) caused by conflicts between Buddhism and the Taoist Order, which was a age-old counterpart as well as

160) 'It is a matter for regret that even today some people still hold the wrong view that Taoism is heretical and should be discarded entirely when studying Buddha Dharma......' Lu Kuan Yu, *The secret of Chinese Meditation*, p. 166.

161) Hajime Nakamura, *Ways of Thinking in Eastern peoples*, p.287.

antagonist of Buddhism. Unlike the case of the Southern dynasties, the anti-Buddhism movement of the Northern dynasties was done on a massive scale, initiated by edicts of Emperors. These were severe trials to Buddhists and this played a tremendous influence to the direction of Buddhism in the ensuing years.

Among these incidents, the one that is directly related to the evolution of Neo-Buddhism is the persecution of year of A. D. 574 by the Northern Chou.[162] In comparison with the persecution of

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162) The persecution by Emperor Wu of the Northern Wei is the incident caused by not only backlashes by Confucians and Taoists, but also by a unique circumstances of the Northern dynasties, the regime of non-Han tribes. Kenneth Ch'en writes: 'In this light the persecution of 446 was not merely a Buddhist-Taoist struggle but was also an episode in the Sinicization of a non-Chinese people. Ts'ui, good Confucianist that he was, wanted to Sinicize the T'o-pa people, and to him the foreign religion Buddhism had to be suppressed. (Ch'en, *Buddhism in China*, p. 151) This persecution, however, came to an end with the death of Emperor Wu in 454 followed by the resurrection of the Teaching until the advent of another Emperor Wu of the Northern Ch'ou dynasty. However, I may have to add that the more direct cause of the persecution was the policy of enhancing wealth and military power of the country held by the Emperor as well as the corruption of the Buddhist Order. As a result, Emperor Wu was able to confiscate vast manors Buddhist monasteries once owned and augment his military forces.

the Northern Wei, it was by far a more thorough and longer lasting one.[163] Being left on the ruins after this massive disaster, it was a natural reaction for Buddhists to sense crisis and seek a new direction. What they wanted to accomplish was to take Buddhism, which had been merely a foreign religion so far, and spread its root deep into Chinese soil. It is not without connection to the influences of these persecutions that historians view this period around the year of A. D. 600 as the time when Chinese Buddhism was firmly established and finally overcame Indian Buddhism.[164]

As the thought that Buddhism is not different from Taoism began to spread, Buddhism, which has been left out by Chinese

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163) As to the persecution of 574, even though it is true that the conflicts among the three teachings were the main causes of it, at least on its surface value, and the power struggle between Buddhism and Taoism was behind the incident, it was rather the result of conflicts among secular powers than the result of doctrinal or philosophical disputes. We can draw this inference from the fact that the childish dispute over the seniority between the Buddha and Lao-tzu contributed to the incident. After all, the incident was the by-product of the personal characters of Emperor Wu, Wei Yuan-sung's secular desire for political power, and the conflicts with Confucians.

164) Every things and events are themselves the manifestation of the Truth (卽事而眞).

intellectuals ever since it had been introduced, began to have opportunities to take part in the history of Chinese philosophy. Looking from the perspective of Buddhism, self-examinations and searches for new direction in Buddhist study can be viewed as a positive adoption of Taoism. However, if we look at them from the perspective of traditional Taoism, they were the beginning of the misunderstanding that Buddhism is merely an imitation of Taoism. In any case, by fulfilling Chinese sentiments and intellectual desires, the honeymoon between Buddhism and Taoism became an undeniable cultural phenomenon. Thereafter, the development of Buddhism hardly could escape from the general atmosphere founded in this period. Facing the persecutions of the Northern dynasties and the Sui dynasty's unification of the continent, this strong trend became the force that opened the gate leading toward Neo-Buddhism. Buddhists' reactions to the idea, which viewed three teachings as one, did not take the path of total disapproval, but instead, it developed into the creation of a unique and independent growth of Buddhism. These we call the Neo-Buddhist Schools among which Hua-yen is the most noticeable.[165]

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165) See Ocho, Einichi (横超慧日) (ed.), *Chugoku no Bukkyo* (中國の佛教, Buddhism in China) p. 93.

1-2) TU-SHUN AND CHIH-YEN

As most of the biographical data concerning Tu-shun and Chih-yen seems accurate and as there do not appear to be any significant disputes concerning them, I do not intend go into more detail here.[166] Certain facts which have direct relevance to this thesis, in particular, those concerning the influence of Taoism will be addressed.

Historically, Tu-shun has been accepted as the first patriarch of the Hua-gen School since Tsung-mi established the theory of three patriarchs.[167] Noteworthy about Tu-shun are his practice of meditation, religious miracles and relations with political power. Tu-shun entered the monastery at 18 years of age and engaged in Ch'an meditation under Dhyāna Master Seng-chen.[168] As Buddhist meditation underwent serious changes due to the influence of Taoist practice, the fact that he engaged in Ch'an

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166) As to the recent study on Tu-shun and Chih-yen's biographies, see Robert Michael Gimello, *Chih-yen and the Foundation of Hua-yen Buddhism*, Columbia University, 1976, pp. 57-133.

167) Tsong-mi, *Chu Fa-chieh kuan-men* (註法界觀門) T 45, p. 684c.

168) HKSC, '事因聖寺僧珍禪師, 受持定業.'

meditation itself implies his Taoist tendencies. In this period, Taoist meditators and Buddhist practitioners are often confused.[169] His supernatural power or miracle working appear to have resulted from his power of meditation. According to record, he is said to have transformed a villain into a good man, cured a person of deafness, and drove away pests.[170]

It appears as though it was due to these supernatural powers that he became known to the imperial court. Tu-shun was summoned by T'ang T'ai-tsung to court to have the title 'Imperial Mind (帝心)' in 632 A. D.[171] Further relations to political power, however, are not known. The second patriarch Chih-yen also seems to have been remote from politics as he concentrated on research and lecturing in the temples. Generally speaking, it is with the third patriarch Fa-tsang to whom the Empress Wu entrusts absolute confidence that the relation between Hua-yen and political power becomes solidified. This

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169) See Otani Tetsuo (大谷哲夫), *"Gi-shin-dai ni okeru shuzen-sha no keitai* (魏晉代における習禪者の形態, *The Features of Dhyāna Practitioners in the Wei-Chin Period)"*, JIBS, XIX-1, (1970), p. 268.

170) HKSC, T. 50, pp. 653b-654a.

171) HKSC, T 50, p. 654a.

implies that up until Chih-yen, who had little if any support from political power, the school that is later identified as the Hua-yen School had neither been fully formed nor established.[172]

There are scholars who doubt whether the works regarded as Tu-shun's really are his by pointing out that there are no systematic works dealing with the Hua-Yen Ching and also that the *Kuan-men* is part of Fa-tsang's *Hua-yen fa p'u-t'i-hsin chang* (華嚴發菩提心章). Rather than being a scholar who studied the complex system of Hua-yen, he was more a practitioner of dhyāna or an ascetic either in a village or in caves.[173] Therefore, if he does have relation to Hua-yen, then it is none other than that he practiced the practice of Samantabhadra.[174] The practice of bodhisattva Samantabhadra refers to the meditation on emptiness through dhyāna practice and mixing together with ordinary people to help them through supernatural powers. The main reason why he is regarded as the first patriarch of Hua-yen

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172) As Tao-an (道安) asserts, in order to propagate Buddhism in China, it is imperative to rely on Emperial authority.

173) KSC, T 50, p. 653b. '志存儉約. 野居成性.'

174) According to the *Hua-yen ching ch'uan-chi* (華嚴經傳記, T 51, 166c) Tu-shun encourages his disciple to recite the *Hua-yen ching* and to cultivate the practice of Samantabhadra. (順卽令讀誦華嚴爲業. 勸依此經修普賢行.)

is probably due to his relation to Chih-yen, who laid the foundation of Hua-yen. In other words, the Hua-yen doctrine of Tu-shun - though problematic if there ever was such a thing - permeates all of the teachings of his student Chih-yen by Tu-shun's influencing the latter's thought. Therefore, though it is almost certain that Chih-yen wrote the '*Hua-yen i-ch'eng shih-hsuan men* (華嚴一乘十玄門)' by restating the teachings of Tu-shun and thus it is possible through this work to get a glimpse at Tu-shun's thought, it is impossible to separate his from Chih-yen's.[175]

Chih-yen is generally regarded as Tu-shun's student, though there are recurring questions concerning the identity of Chih-yen's real teacher. There are scholars who argue that Chih Cheng instead of Tu-shun was the real first patriarch of the Hua-yen School. Others say that at least in terms of intellectual influence it is Chih Cheng who should be viewed as the teacher of Chih-yen.[176] Considering the facts that Chih-yen took lessons

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175) Kimura Kyotaka (木村清孝). *Chugoku Bukkyo shisoshi kenkyu* (中國佛教思想史研究. The Study of the History of Chinese Buddhist Thoughts), p. 96.

176) See Sakaino Koyo (境野黃洋). *Shina Bukkyoshi Kowa* (支那佛敎史講話, *Lectures on the history of Chinese Buddhism*) 下, pp. 490-99.

on the Hua-yen Ching from Chih Cheng and that he had close relations with the Southern Ti-lun School, it is beyond doubt that there indeed was some intellectual interaction between Chih-yen and Chih Cheng. But due to the direct evidence of intellectual influence, the theoretical affinity between Tu-shun and Chih-yen is difficult to deny. For example, there is the striking similarity between Chih-yen's early work, the *Hua-yen i-ch'eng shih-hsuan men* (華嚴一乘十玄門) and *Hua-yen fa-chieh kuan men* (華嚴法界觀門), which is accepted as Tu-shun's work. Another example is the commonality in structure and key interpretative standpoints between another early works, the *Sou-hsuan chi* (搜玄記) and the *Shih-hsuan men* (十玄門), which was handed down by Tu-shun.[177]

The importance that Tu-shun's *the kuan-men* has within Hua-yen is due to its being the expression of the Hua-yen world view based on the doctrine of emptiness. We can readily infer that as Tu-shun's student Chih-yen must have been influenced by the doctrine of emptiness. According to the *Hua-yen ching chuan-chi*, Chih-yen learned the *She ta-ch'eng lun* and the *Shih-ti ching lun*.[178] From the former, the She-lun School was

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177) See Ishihara Shinkei (石橋眞誠), "*Chigon no shisoteki keifu* (智儼の思想的系譜, *The Lineage of Thought of Chih-yen*)", JIBS, 768-769.

178) HCCC, T 51, p. 163c.

formed and from the latter, the Ti-lun School was formed. Now, as these two schools primarily dealt with the problem of the 'mind', it is probable that Chih-yen was also influenced by Yogacara. In fact, there are signs of strong influence, though indirect, on the part of T'an-ch'ien who introduced the She-lun School to the Northern dynasties. Based on such facts, we can conclude that Chih-yen was the one who integrated two key influences, namely the Mādhyamika philosophy, which deals with Śūnyavāda, and the Yogācāra philosophy, which intends to explicate the mind.[179] Based on such a foundation, he inherited the Hua-yen Thought from Dharma Master Chih-cheng and on attaining enlightenment at the age of 27, wrote his treatise based on this enlightenment.[180]

The influence of *Lao-chuang* thought on Chih-yen has not been the focus of much research. At the most, people mention the fact that 수현기, the book regarded as initiating the Hua-yen School, contains the character *hsuan* 玄 and since this character is from

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179) Chih-yen quoted in his *K'ung-mu chang* (孔目章) the whole text of the *Wang shih-fei lun* (亡是非論) written by T'an-ch'ien (曇遷).

180) Ibid., '謂別教一乘無盡緣起.....於焉大啓. 遂立教分宗. 製此經疏. 時年二十七......'

'玄之又玄' of the Tao-te ching there must have been some influence from Taoism. There are several reasons why it is reasonable to think that Chih-yen would have had very little if any direct contact with the 'external scriptures' (those of Confucianism or Taoism). First is the fact that Chih-yen became the student of Tu-shun at a very early age[181] and thus would not have had the chance to read the Classics of Confucianism or Taoism before renunciation as is the case with the majority of monk scholars of the Nan-Pei dynasties. Secondly, because he had been entrusted to Tu-shun's another disciple, immediately after he was ordained as a monk, not only did he have to constantly engage in reading Buddhist sūtras, but he also had to learn Sanskrit. Thus even if he had direct access to the 'the external scriptures', it must have been very limited. In this respect, the discussion of the influence of Lao-chuang Thought on Hua-yen by focusing on Chih-yen's works tells us something about the general intellectual mood and circumstances surrounding the formation of the Hua-yen School. We know that the Hua-yen School was not established by a few individuals but rather through the fusion of various factors dominant in the period. Though the influence of Taoism is not

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181) HCCC, T 51, p. 163b, '年十二, 有神僧杜順.....曰, 此我兒. 可還我來. 父母知其有道 欣然不悋.....'

overtly detectable, it had a wide ranging and deeply penetrating influence on the fundamentals of Buddhism due to the long history of Buddhist-Taoist syncretism.

1-3) THE *HUA-YEN CHING* AND HUA-YEN SCHOOL

The Hua-yen ching was first translated into Chinese by Buddhabhadra (359-429) in the Eastern Chin dynasty, but it was only after 300 years, namely, at the time of Tu-shun (A. D. 557-640), Chih-yen (A. D. 602-668), Fa-tsang (A. D. 643-712) that it was established as a separate distinct school. Though it could be said that the initial formulation of the various schools of Chinese buddhism had taken place rather early on,[182] up until the 6th century, Chinese Buddhist schools were of a rather ambiguous character in that they had neither acquired the distinctive features of Chinese Buddhism nor remained faithful to their Indian origins. It was in such circumstances that the so-called 'Neo-Buddhism (新佛教)' emerged, around the same period as the unification of the Sui dynasty. This Neo-Buddhism, especially in the cases of T'ien-t'ai, Hua-yen, and Ch'an,

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182) See ch. II. Six Houses and seven Schools that showed up in the 3rd and 4th century.

indiscriminately absorbed the achievements and elements of all the previous Schools based on the Indian sūtras and śāstras, which they regarded as fitting to their needs, and thus formulated distinct and peculiar systems of thought. As a result, the sūtra on which a School is founded only functioned as an external denomination of the School and in reality each School contained multiple and diverse elements from various sources. The main character of the School was often determined by the intellectual inclinations of the founder of the School. The Hua-yen School was no exception, and there are tendencies of arbitrary interpretations to fit particular objectives, a common phenomenon to the movements referred to as 'Chinese Buddhism' or 'Neo-Buddhism' after the Sui-T'ang dynasties.

The central theme of the Chinese Hua-yen philosophy is Multifaced-unexhaustive Causality (重重無盡緣起) which reveals 'things-as-they-are (諸法實相)'. As the *Hua-yen ching* itself is often regarded as a historically significant and profound sūtra which reveals or gives sensory form to the reality of emptiness (or causality) by displaying the universe as one sees it in enlightenment, it is understandable that the Hua-yen School endeavored to describe the scenery of dharma-dhātu through such categories as the Four Dharma-dhātus, the Teaching of Ten

Profundities and so forth. Nevertheless, a series of concepts derived from the *Hua-yen ching* do not constitute the main ideas of the *Hua-yen ching.*[183] This will be clear when we look at the structure of the sūtra. According to the Chinese tradition, we can propose a general outline of the eight assemblies held in the *Hua-yen ching* as follows:[184]

1) the Buddha at the moment of enlightenment is one with Vairocana (books 1-5)

2) the Four Noble Truths form the basis for the bodhisattva's practice and liberation (books 6-12)

3) the bodhisattva's progress, from initial aspiration to the highest station in the bodhisattva's path: ten vihāras (books 13-18)

4) ten types of conduct (*caryā*) of bodhisattvas (books 19-22)

5) ten dedications of merit (books 23-25)

6) ten stages of the bodhisattvas (books 26-37)

7) a summary of the themes that form the core of the

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183) Kamata Shigeo, *Kegon-shu no seiritsu* (華嚴宗の成立, *The Formation of Hua-yen School*) p. 214.

184) Luis O. Gomez, "*The Avataṃsaka-Sūtra*", *Buddhist Spirituality*, Kakeuchi Yoshinori (ed), p. 164.

collection (book 38)

8) the bodhisattva's career and inconceivable liberation (book 39)

In these respects, the *Hua-yen ching* is more of a sūtra for practice than a text for expounding the Buddhist worldview. It is possible to view 1), 6), 8) as focusing on the reality of the world grasped in the state of enlightenment but even in these cases it was intended to show the transcendental power of incomprehensible meditation rather than explain 'things-as-they-are (諸法實相).' Therefore, one could say that D. T. Suzuki's view of taking the central tenet of *Hua-yen ching* to be 'the balancing of unity and multiplicity or, better, the merging of self with others'[185] is a result of confusing the central thought of the *Hua-yen ching* and the central idea of the Hua-yen School.

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185) D. T. Suzuki, *Zen Buddhism and Its influence on Japanese Culture*, p. 226. The categorizing by Luis O. Gomez as to the core notions of Avataṃsaka-sūtra follows in the wake of Suzuki. The former set forth: 'The grandeur of its vision is achieved through an original combination and poetic elaboration of earlier notions of (1) the visionary power of meditation, (2) causal interdependence, (3) the equality or sameness of all things in emptiness, and (4) the freedom of those who experience emptiness. His statements appears to be those of a Hua-yen spokesman's.

The *Hua-yen ching* too does not deviate far from the central thought of Buddhism, namely, 'all dharmas not having their own being (諸法無自性).' As this basically has the same meaning with *k'ung* or causality, we can trace the influence of the Thought of *k'ung*. What is a Buddha? Being empty of own-being is Buddha. Therefore, we know that in the *Hua-yen ching* the idea of 'Seeing the Buddha (見佛)' is based on the meditation of *k'ung*.

> As the nature of dharma is void and not attainable, seeing without seeing is seeing the Buddha.[186]

> If one has insight into the fact that all dharmas do not have their own being, and knows dharmatā, one could see the Buddha Vairocana.[187]

Early Hua-yen writings such as *the kuan-men* or the *shih-hsuan men*, as with the *Hua-yen ching* itself, retain the key elements of Śūnyavāda, which claims that everything formed by causality is empty and without own being they are empty.

> ...*se* temporarily comes together and has no substance (體) thus is itself *k'ung*.[188]

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186) *Hua-yen ching*, T 10, 81c.

187) *Hua-yen ching*, T10, 82a.

All things necessarily lack own being thus se is itself *k'ung*.[189]

As one is made through conditions, in one there already is ten. As one is made as such, if there is no ten, one cannot be made. As (things) have no (inherent) nature and are made by conditions, in one there already is ten. As one is made as such, two three four.....all are made. If there is a self-nature residing in one, ten cannot be made. If ten is not made, then one also cannot be made.[190]

The truth of causality is that everything does not have essence and is temporarily formed through causality.[191]

On the other hand, this corresponds to the true intention of

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188) *Fa-chieh hsuan-ching*, T 1883, p. 673c, '會色無體故, 是卽空.' The *hui* '會' in this treatise has the same meaning as that of the *Chao-lun*, i.e., '緣' as in '緣會', by Seng-chao.

189) Ibid, T 1883, p. 674a, '以諸色法必無性故, 是故色卽是故.' The last character, *ku* (故), must be typographical error of *k'ung* (空).

190) *Shih-hsuan men*, T 1868, p. 514b, '如一者一緣成故 一中卽有十 所以一成故 若無十一卽不成 無性緣成故 一中卽有十 所以一成故 二三四等一切皆成也 若一住自性十卽不成 十若不成一亦不成也.'

191) *Treatise on the Golden Lion*, T 1881, p. 668a, '明緣起者, 謂萬法無體, 假緣成立.'

Śākyamuni since it makes explicit the requirement for purified mind. The *Hua-yen ching* says that 'seeing purified mind is seeing all Buddhas.'[192] Purified mind here means that one does not distort objectiveness through subjective discrimination, and the ability to see without the ignorance of taking there to be own being when there is no such being. The famous aphorism of the doctrine of mind-only (everything is made by the mind)[193] also reveals the 'mind-only' tendency of the *Hua-yen ching.*

> The mind is like a skillful painter:
> It draws the picture of all worlds,
> Creating all including the five skandhas!
>
> The Buddha differs not from the Mind,
> Nor sentient beings from the Buddhas
> Yet both Mind and Buddhas are by nature infinite!
> He who knows the Mind as the creator of all worlds,
> Sees the Buddha and His true essence.
>
> ....
>
> If You want to know all the Buddhas in the past, the present,
> And the future, just observe the nature of the universe
> That one's own Mind creates the total and

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192) Ibid., T 9, 486a, '見淨心, 卽是見佛.'

193) *Hua-yen ching*, T 279, p.101.

everything![194]

Since the *Hua-yen ching* was created sometime between the 1st and 2nd centuries, it precedes by a few centuries the Mādhyamika or Yogācāra of India.[195] Therefore, the mind-only doctrine of the *Hua-yen ching* is quite different in terms of inspiration and development from the mind-only doctrine which was established by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, even though fundamentally speaking they are the same. If we consider the early patriarchs of Hua-yen, we find that Tu-shun was focused on the meditation on *k'ung* and Chih-yen transplanted the mind-only doctrine in to Hua-yen while succeeding the meditation on *k'ung* by Tu-shun. This is evident in 'The wonderful formation of all dharmas through the transformation of mind-only,' which is among the *shih-hsuan men* (十玄門, the Teaching of the Ten Profundities). Moreover, even though the *Hua-yen ching* has no direct relation with tathāgatagarbha thought,[196] it presents its

194) Garma C. C. Chang's translation, *The Buddhist Teaching of Totality*, p.174.

195) Nakamura Hajime, "*Kegon no shisoshiteki igi* (華嚴の思想史的 意義, *The Meaning of Hua-yen Doctrine in the history of Thought*), p.98.

196) Nakamura Hajime, p. 98, Even though the term, 如來藏, is found in the *Hua-yen ching*, its Sanskrit counterpart is

key claims relying on tathāgatagarbha thought.

The ninth is the wonderful formation of all dharmas through the transformation of mind-only. This is posited in regards to mind. The so called the transformation of mind-only refers to, along with all previously mentioned teachings such as doctrine and so forth, what is established by the nature of the Tathāgatagarbha is pure, true mind. As either good or evil is produced according to the mind, it is called the wonderful formation of all dharmas through the transformation. Because there is no other objective world apart from mind, it is called mind-only. When (the mind is) favorably transformed, it is called nirvāṇa. So the sūtra says: mind creates all Tathāgatas. If (the mind is) unfavorably transformed, it is called (the transmigration of) birth and death. So (the sūtra) says: Untruthful is the triple World that is produced by mind only. Neither the transmigration of birth and death or nirvāṇa is apart from mind. There is, therefore, nothing definite. The nature (of mind, or reality) possesses the attribute of both pure and impure, therefore the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: The Buddha-nature is neither pure nor impure. Both the pure and impure are dependent on mind only. So apart from mind, there are no other dharmas whatsoever. Thus, the Laṇkāvatāra Sūtra says: Apart from mind there is no objective world, nor objects or false views.[197]

Buddhagarbha, and thus it does not imply particular meaning as it is used in the Tathāgatagarbha Thought. (T 10, p. 72a, p. 482, l 26).

197) *Shih-hsuan men*, T 1868, p. 518b.
'竝是如來藏性淸淨眞心之所建立. 若善若惡, 隨心所轉故, 云迴轉善成.

The essentials of the Hua-yen, namely, the Four Dharma-dhātus (四法界, the Four Dharma-realms) and the *shih-hsuan men* are concrete expressions of 'things-as-they-are, 諸法實相.' What is meant by 'things-as-they-are'? It is the same as '*bhūtakoṭi* (實際)'.[198] Again '*tathatā* (眞如, suchness ot thusness)' has the same meaning as 'things -as-they-are' and is the synonym of '*naihsvabhāvya* (無自性)' and '*k'ung* (空, *śūnyatā*).' It also has same meaning as causality (*pratītyasamutpāda*).

All these concepts refer to the world as it really is (the reality of existence) and thus is neither an absolute being itself nor can be understood as a metaphysical principle.[199] Sense organs and the objects of these sense organs are all that exist, according to

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心外無別境. 言唯心. 若順轉卽. 名涅槃. 故經云.**"心造諸如來. 若逆轉. 卽是生死." 故云. "三界虛妄. 唯一心作." 生死涅槃. 皆不出心. 是故. 不得定說.**性是淨及與不淨. 故涅槃云. "佛性非淨亦非不淨." 淨與不淨. 皆唯心. 故離心更無別法. 故楞伽經云. "心外無境界. 無塵虛妄見.'

198) *Ta ch'i-tu lun* (大智度論) vol. 32, T 25, p. 297c.
Question) Do those three notions, that is, tathatā (眞如), dharmatā (法性), and bhūtakoṭi (實際), have different implications or not?......
Answer) They are all different names of the same truth, which is 'things-as-they-are (諸法實相).

199) Nakamura Hajime, "*Kegon no shisoshiteki igi* (華嚴經の思想史的 意義)", p. 107.

Buddha's teaching. Then what change occurs to the sense organs so that reality can be comprehended? According to Buddha's doctrine, it is not the sense organ itself that matters. In other words, the sense organ can be the same organ, but to see the truth and see Causality one must see without the contamination of the Three Poisons.

If so, what is own-being (自性) as mentioned by Hui-neng in the introduction of the first chapter of this work? According to Nakamura's analysis, there are two kinds of 'self-nature (自性 *tzu-hsing*)': They are the self-nature as conventional truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*) and supreme truth (*paramārthasatya*). Therefore as the latter is none other than *k'ung* or 'things-as-they-are 諸法實相', it cannot be a metaphysical being or principle. It is none other than the true world which is revealed to the enlightened one.

In this respect, the truth of Buddhism is the truth of the subject. The objective world or world of objects always remains 'as they are.' Seeing this world as it is without the influence of the Three Poisons is seeing Causality and contemplating *k'ung*. This is the enlightenment of Buddhism. Truth in Buddhism thus has this strong subjective element, but it can also be explained from the aspect of the objective world. Truth refers to the

objectively existing world without the influence of the subject. This is why among the synonyms of *tathatā* there are both subjective and objective expressions. The following discussion concerning *k'ung* can be also applicable to causality or self-nature. *K'ung* and causality are both expressing in different ways the subjective experiencing of the world.

k'ung is merely an adjective or verb which describes the non-existence of an everlasting substance (śūnya) and the added 'tā' depicts a corresponding state. Therefore, the accurate translation of 'śūnyatā' should be 'being empty' rather than 'emptiness.'[200] The Sanskrit terms which can be translated into *k'ung* in the Chinese translations of Indian scriptures are śūnya and *śūnyatā*. The former evidently is used as an adjective (empty, void) or a noun (emptiness, voidness) while the latter is used as an abstract noun (being empty). It might seem odd to trace the original meaning of *k'ung* from the works of the Hua-yen Buddhists since their works were not translations of sanskrit texts, but such tracing is not impossible. First of all, it is noticeable that Tu-shun distinguished between *k'ung* and *se* (色, matter) and Fa-tsang wrote the commentary on the

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200) In this respect, it is generally correct to translate *'śūnyatā'* into *k'ung-hsing* (空性) instead of just *k'ung (空)*.

Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya-Sūtra (般若心經). Moreover, we are aware of the fact that since the establishment of Chinese Buddhism, the *Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya-Sūtra* has been recited by the sangha and had been the most popular sutra. Thus it seems safe to conclude that his concepts of *k'ung* and *se* are those of the *prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya-sūtra*. In the Sanskrit version, we read:

> *iha Śāriputra rūpaṃ śūnyatā śūnyataiva rūpaṃ rūpām na pṛthak śūnyatā śūnyatāyā no pṛthag rūpaṃ yad rūpaṃ sā śūnyatā yā śūnyatā tad rūpaṃ eva vedanā-saṃjñā-saṃskāra-vijñānaṃ.*[201]

As *k'ung* is constantly used as *śūnyatā* here, *śūnyatā* here can be said to be the *k'ung* as an abstract noun. *k'ung* as an abstract noun refers to the attribute of emptiness or being empty. But *śūnyatā* here does not merely refer to the state of being empty or emptiness but also to a certain lack of something, which is none other than svabhāva (own being, self-existence).[202]

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201) Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India*, p. 150.

202) Musashi Tachikawa, "*Svabhāva and Śūnyatā*", JIBS, XLIII, March, (1995), pp. 1026. He says: 'The compound "*svabhāva-śūnya*" seems to mean simply that intrinsic nature (or own-being) is absent, and there is no further implication. The term "*śūnya*" as the second element of a compound often means: to be devoid of."

In other words, śūnyatā refers to being empty of own being.[203] Thus, dependent-arising and emptiness have a common ground in terms of being devoid of inherent existence: Whatever is dependently arising has no inherent existence and vice versa: the lack of inherent existence is called emptiness.

Both of these have two aspects: *Pratītyasamutpāda* has negative aspects in that it is described by a lack of inherent existence, whereas it also has positive ones in that it supports the phenomenal world. *Śūnyatā* has negative aspects in that it denotes the negation of inherent existence, and contrarily, it again has positive ones in that it refers to the realm of reality. The compatibility of the two can be demonstrated by their common ground, that is, the negation of inherent existence as elaborated thus far.[204] We must always be aware of this point

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203) Edward Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India*, p. 161.

204) See Elizabeth Napper, *Dependent-Arising and Emptiness*, 1989, p.59. The *Prāsaṅgika* system has it that, at the time of directly perceiving emptiness, one only sees *śūnyatā*, and the conventional world utterly disappears even though this psychological reality should not be mistaken for ontological fact. Non-perception of the conventional world at that time does not necessarily mean it does not exist. Likewise, when we perceive the phenomenal world with only a conventional valid cognizer, the world of reality, that is śūnyatā, never appears, since our normal consciousness, according to Dzong-ka-ba, is not valid with respect to reality. In the

when we understand the term of *k'ung*. Chinese Buddhism has caused immense misunderstanding by not making explicit the definition of this term.

K'ung was always taken to mean being empty of own being based on the presumption that Nāgārjuna had a correct understanding of early Buddhism and Śūnyavāda. What does this suggest? None other than that *k'ung* is not a metaphysical entity but the subject's insight into or apprehension of the real nature of things. Only if it is understood in such a way can it be regarded to have the same meaning as causality and be the synonym of tathatā.[205] That things lack their own being and thus come in and out of being, changing capriciously according to causes and conditions, is what is meant by causality (temporal as well as spatial or logical) and this is also what *tattva* (ultimate reality) or *tathatā* (suchness) refers to as the real being of

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Ge-luk-ba exposition, only a Buddha is able to perceive directly all conventional phenomena and their emptiness simultaneously.

205) Thomas Kochumuttam, *"Śūnyatā and Tathatā: Emptiness and Suchness"*, Journal of Dharma, p.18, '*śūnyatā* (emptiness) is an epistemological term while *tathatā* (suchness) is an ontological one. In other words, *śūnyatā* refers to the emptying of one's own mind of all prejudices about reality so as to enable the mind to have a vision of reality in its suchness."

things. Because tathatā or reality is expressed through words, it easily gives off the impression that the notion of reality is to be contrasted with illusion or fiction and is the objective realm of things revealed to the subject, which inevitably involves metaphysical implications and commitments. In other words, it can easily be misunderstood as a metaphysical reality or as being independent from the subject.[206] The development of Chinese Buddhism was based on such a misunderstanding. One factor of such a misunderstanding naturally is the influence of the Taoist worldview, but another, more fundamental factor is the tendency within Chinese Buddhism itself to render reality substantive or to posit phenomena absolutely as a substance.

1-4) THE MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF CHINESE BUDDHISM

Buddhism, whatever form it may take, does not establish a real underlying being or noumenon. This is the most distinct difference it has with Chinese Lao-chuang and it is also the criterion for distinguishing heretic forms of Buddhism. As its understanding of the notion of *k'ung* deepened and matured, Chinese Buddhists started to realize that *k'ung* was not a metaphysical concept such as *pen-wu* (original nonbeing), but

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206) See 'ch. I. Introduction' of this work.

this did not mean that the tendency to posit *k'ung* as a substance or substratum was eliminated. This is primarily due to the fact that the substantial perspective of Taoism was deeply embedded in the viewpoint and thought of Chinese Buddhists. The seed of the distortion of Indian Buddhism was sown when the *k'ung* of the Śūnyavāda was understood through the notion of *wu* (無) of Taoism.

The *pen-wu* of Taoism is the Primordial Source and is a metaphysical substance as well as a universal principle. When *k'ung* is identified with such *wu*, it is not difficult to anticipate the results. Rather than the meaning of the indigenous concept of *wu* changing and gaining new connotations, it was rather the new concept of *k'ung* that lost its original meaning and was fitted in with *wu*. The result was that *k'ung* took on a foreign, metaphysical significance, which however was intrinsic to the notion of *wu*. As long as *k'ung* was understood as a transcendent absolute metaphysical substance and the primordial source of universe, it was inevitable that it be understood as a concept in contrast to the phenomenal realm. Just as the dualistic scheme of *wu-yu* was primary in Taoism, Buddhism also was approached with a similar dualistic scheme of *k'ung* and *yu* (emptiness and existence).

This dualistic scheme of *k'ung* and *yu* is transformed once again into the scheme of *k'ung* and causality, since *yu* refers to the phenomenal realm which is dependently co-arising. However, as we have observed above, *k'ung* and causality are not different. Nevertheless, through this misidentification of *k'ung* and causality with noumenon and phenomena respectively, Chinese Buddhism comes to fundamentally misunderstand the Two Truths of Mādhyamika philosophy.[207] What was an epistemological notion is transformed into a substantial metaphysical distinction. In other words, the distinction between supreme truth and conventional truth was originally one decided by the level of cognition (between the exalted cognition and ordinary cognition), emphasizing the experienced world of the subject. But in the Chinese San-lun School, the supreme truth and conventional truth came to be understood as referring to absolute reality and phenomenal reality, respectively. This subtle yet fundamental

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207) Paul L. Swanson, *"The Spirituality of Emptiness in Early Chinese Buddhism"*. *Buddhist Spirituality*, Takeuchi Yoshinori (ed), p. 373. He discusses: 'An unfortunate legacy of the *ko-i* practice of matching Buddhist concepts with Taoist terms was the tendency to discuss emptiness and the two truths in terms of *yu* (Being, existence) and *wu* (non-Being, nothingness). The provisional truth was often discussed in terms of *yu* or worldly existence, and the ultimate truth in terms of *wu* or nothingness, that is, emptiness.

misunderstanding is at the core of the entire development of Chinese Buddhism and such a legacy continues to the present.

The first new interpretation, or rather, misinterpretation of the *k'ung* of Śūnyavāda was by *ko-yi* Buddhism, which attempted to comprehend the *k'ung* of Buddhism through the *Hsuan-hsueh* thought dominating the Wei-Chin dynasty. From the end of Han to the Liu Sung dynasty, the Prajñā School was so dominant that various groups arose within this School, called *liu-chia* (六家, six Houses), *ch'i-tsung* (七宗, seven Schools).[208] Of these seven Schools, three Schools, *Pen-wu* School (本無宗, School of Original Nonbeing), *Chi-se* School (卽色宗, School of Matter as Such), *Hsin-wu* School (心無宗, School of Nonbeing of Mind), were most popular.

1) *Pen-wu* School (School of Original Nonbeing)

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208) Information on these groups is found mainly in Chi-tsang (吉藏, A. D. 549~623), the *Chung-lun-shu* (中論疏), and An-cho (安澄), *Chung-lun-shu-chi* (中論疏記). The names of these groups were: 1)本無宗 (School of Original Nonbeing) 2)本無異宗 (Variant School of Original Nonbeing) 3)卽色宗 (School of Matter as Such) 4)識含宗 (School of Stored Impressions) 5)幻化宗 (School of Phenomenal Illusion) 6)心無宗 (School of Nonbeing of Mind) 7)緣會宗 (School of Causal Combination). For further illustrations of these schools, see Kenneth Ch'en, JCP, pp. 35-37.

Chu fa-shen (竺法深) and Tao-an (道安) were those who argued in support of the pen-*wu* School. Chi-tsang (吉藏) describes *pen-wu* of Chu fa-hsin in the following manner: "*pen-wu* means that *wu* was prior to there being matter. Being came from nonbeing. In other words, nonbeing is before being and being is after nonbeing. That is why is it is called Original Nonbeing."[209]

This means that since *yu* as phenomena is derivative from *wu*, *wu* is the underlying reality of the phenomena, that is, it is the noumenon behind the phenomena and hence *pen-wu*. This coincides perfectly with Wang Pi's understanding of *pen-wu*. An-cho (安澄) quotes *pen-wu* of Chu fa-hsin like the following:

> ...what is *wu*? Being empty, everything comes to be from it. yu merely comes into being but wu enables everything to come into being. That is why the Buddha, in answering his disciple, says that the Four Elements come into being from *k'ung*.[210]

We can see from this that Chu fa-hsin took *k'ung* to be the same as *wu* and thus understood *k'ung* to be the underlying reality (*pen-t'i*) of phenomena. Moreover, he goes on to identify

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209) *Chung-lun shu*, T 42, p. 29a.

210) *Chung-lun shu chi*, T 65, p. 93b.

k'ung with supreme truth and characterizes *yu*, i.e. the universe, as conventional truth:

> ...the original nonbeing of all things is empty and has no form and thus is the supreme truth. The universe which comes from this is called conventional truth.[211]

We can conclude from this that the *pen-wu* of Chu fa-hsin is a metaphysical substance derived directly from Wang Pi's notions of *pen-wu* and *yu*. Now we shall consider Tao-an's *pen-wu*. According to Chi-tsang, Tao-an's *pen-wu* does not conflict with the understanding of *k'ung* by Seng-chao[212] but it is difficult to find any difference between pen-*wu* of Tao-an and pen-*wu* of Chu fa-hsin. According to the quotes of Chi-tsang, the *pen-wu* of Tao-an is like the following:

> ...wu is prior to the changing universe and *k'ung* is the source of all appearances. In general, people are inhibited by the manifold phenomenal world. If one puts one's mind to pen-wu, the multifarious wandering thoughts will cease.[213]

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211) Ibid., T 65, p. 93b.

212) *Chung-lun shu*, T 42, p. 29a.

213) Ibid.

Insofar as Tao-an's *wu* is also a metaphysical substance it is essentially the same as Chu fa-hsin or Wang Pi. Moreover as Tao-an also applies *wu* and *yu* to the Two Truths of Mādhyamika, one must conclude that he is to be classified as a classical Buddho-Taoist.[214)]

2) *Chi-se* School (School of Matter as Such)

It is Chih-tun who argues for and we have dealt with him in the previous chapter. His *Chi-se* ultimately presupposes *wu* as the ultimate reality and thus is basically adhering to the Taoist world view.

3) *Hsin-wu* School (School of Nonbeing of Mind)

It is said that Chu fa-wen (竺法溫), Tao-heng (道恒), Chih min-tu (支敏度) are those who represented the standpoint of the *hsin-wu* School. Seng-chao criticizes *hsin-wu* in his *Chao-lun* in the following manner:

hsin-wu says that having no mind for everything is

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214) *Pen-wu* (本無) represents, according to Neo-Taoists, the ultimate Reality (眞, supreme truth), while *mo-yu* (末有) indicates mundane truth. '本無爲眞, 末有爲俗耳.' 卍續藏 150, p. 866a.

k'ung, but does not say that nothing is not itself.[215]

According to Chi-tsang, Chu fa-wen argues the following:

> The reason why sūtras say that all beings are *k'ung* is to prevent the essence of the mind from being fixated on illusions and that is why it is called wu. But this does not mean that objects themselves are empty. In other words, phenomenal beings are not empty.[216]
>
> ...yu is that which has form and wu is without form. That with form cannot be called wu and that without form cannot be called yu. But the sutra says there is no matter in order for us to think properly internally but this does not mean that matter, i.e., the object itself, is empty. If one stops the mind internally and does not think of matter, i.e. the object, then the thought of matter will disappear.[217]

The claim of Chu fa-wen is simple. He argues that *k'ung* is *wu-hsin*. This has a striking similarity with *Chi-se* of Chih-tun and is directly succeeding the philosophy of Kuo Hsiang. In general, there had been two interpretations concerning *k'ung*. One argues that *k'ung* is a subjective state of mind (see the

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215) *Chao-lun*, T 45, p. 152a.

216) *Chung-lun shu*, T 42, p. 29a.

217) *Manji Zokyo* (卍藏經), 150, p. 866a.

essay of Thomas Kochumuttam)[218] and the other argues that *k'ung* is the ultimate reality of the objective world. But the apprehension of *k'ung* (this is Buddhist enlightenment) transcends the distinction between subject and object. In other words, the subject which apprehends *k'ung* is not the ordinary subject which does not see *k'ung* and what is seen in this apprehension is no longer the same as the object seen by the ordinary subject. Though it is certain that the cognizing subject changes and that it is only before a purified consciousness that the objective world reveals itself as without own-being and co-arising dependently, nonetheless it is an unequivocal truth, regardless of the state the subject is in, that objects have ultimate reality and are empty. Therefore the objection to Chu fa-wen would be like the following: "Whether or not one stops the mind internally, matter in itself is empty." The criticism of *Seng-chao* is similar to this.[219] For Chu fa-wen, since he took

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218) Conze, *"The Ontology of Prajñāpāramitā"*, PEW, p. 121. "The exposition of the theory of emptiness takes either the form of a description of the ontological status of separate dharmas, or of the psychological attitudes we should adopt toward them, or of the logical structure of any statements that may be made about them."

219) *Chao-lun*, T 45, 152a. '此得在於神靜, 失在於物虛'

k'ung to be *wu-hsin*, it is no surprise that he identified *wu-hsin* as supreme truth.[220] His understanding of Two Truths as an epistemological problem shows his affinity to the position of Indian Madhyamika but his identification of *se* as conventional truth, on the other hand shows that Chu fa-wen too was not able to avoid the mistakes committed by the Chinese *ko-yi* Buddhists.

The remaining question is whether the distortion of the fundamental ideas of Buddhism brought about by the Chinese ended with the six houses, seven Schools of the 4th and 5th centuries or persisted afterwards.

Seng-chao, who is praised by Kumārajīva for the supreme understanding of *k'ung* criticizes *ko-yi* Buddhism and tries to expound the original intentions of Indian Mādhyamika but he too was not able to fully purge himself of the ghost of Taoism:[221]

...supreme truth means nonbeing and the conventional

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220) *Chung-lun shu chi*, T 65, p. 94b. '色有故爲俗諦, 心無故眞諦'

221) It is a very controversial issue whether he, departing from Taoist influence, was faithful to the tradition of Indian Mādyamika. Richard H. Robinson stands on the positive standpoint: "The epistemology, ontology, and theory of language in the Chao-lun are thoroughly Mādhyamika." *Early Mādhyamika in India and China*, 1967, p. 159.

truth means not nonexistent, and that non-being and not nonexistent have ultimately the same meaning.[222]

1-5) THE THOUGHTS OF THE *HSIANG-HSUAN FO*

Shortly before the formation of the Hua-yen School, Hui-ming, a brilliant Buddhist monk, appeared on the scene. He was admired as 'the Senior Sage (前德)' by Chih-yen, the second patriarch of the Hua-yen School.[223] Judging from his *Hsiang-hsuan fo*, which shows a very beautiful and refined style, he must have been one of the leading literati of the time. The most distinctive feature of this stanza is the close syncretism of Buddhism and Taoism. His understanding of the metaphysical substance faithfully follows that of Neo-Taoists:

> From the One Reality that is profound and spacious,
> O, myriad forms are exuberantly produced![224]

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222) T 45, p. 152b. Swanson says: "Seng-chao does not explicitly identify saṃvṛtisatya with yu and paramārthasatya with wu, but sometimes comes close to doing so." Paul L. Swanson, p. 375.

223) *K'ung-mu chang*.

224) *Hsiang-hsuan fo*, '惟一實之淵曠, 嗟萬相之繁雜.'

The One Reality (一實)[225] in this passage is quite different from tathatā of Buddhist philosophy. By the term he meant a primordial source of substance that produces myriad things. It is almost the same notion as Tao or pen-wu introduced by Wang Pi or Kuo Hsiang in the 3rd century. As the reality is 'neither empty nor existent (旣非空而非有)',[226] it is equivalent to the Taoist notion wu which is so called because it does not exist in the same sense that concrete things do (see chapter II). However, as it is not utterly nothing, it is temporarily called wu. To show his understanding of reality, Hui-ming adds: 'it seems to exist and not exist (又若存而若亡).' This passage is directly quoted from the Lao-tzu, indicating his identification of a Taoist and Buddhist worldview.[227] Again, the reality understood by Hui-ming is

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225) There are a lot of terms which seems to indicate metaphysical substance as the One Reality (一實) does: 一虛 (One Voidness), 一眞 (One Truthfulness), and so forth. '湛一虛而致極 (By submerging in One Voidness, I approach the ultimate domain, or '抱一眞而不識 (Though embracing One Reality, they do not recognize it.).

226) *Hsiang-hsuan fo.*

227) *Lao-tzu*, ch. 41, 'The superior man, on hearing Tao, practices it diligently. The average man, on hearing Tao, regards it both as existing and not existing. The inferior man, on hearing Tao, laughs aloud at it.' He cited this passage to indicate a somewhat different meaning from what is meant in

infinite in terms of space and time:

> It is so vast, without boundary, and so far off as it is endless. In regards to its source, it has no beginning, In terms of extension, it has no ending.[228]

And,

> Encompassing the whole universe i.e., time and space, it is homogeneous.[229]

Furthermore, Hui-ming applied the Taoist worldview to the Buddhist one in exactly the same manner as Hua-yen Buddhists would. From his interpretation of the key terms of the Hua-yen School, such as *i-tuo* (一多, unity and diversity), *Li-shih* (理事, noumenon and phenomena), *t'i-yung* (體用, substance and function), we may safely infer the fact that he, even before Tu-shun, the first patriarch of Hua-yen School, was active, founded the worldview of Hua-yen.

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the context in which it is used. Presumably he must have meant by the passage what is found in the *Lao-tzu*, ch. 4: 'So serene, as if it hardly exists. (湛兮, 似或存.).'

228) *Hsiang-hsuan fo*, '豁乎無際, 眇乎無窮, 源乎無始, 極乎無終.'

229) Ibid., '括宇宙而通同.'

1) 一多: 一而能多 靜而能亂 (It is one that has the potential to be many. While being serene, it is ready to be agitated.)

2) 體用: 體無非而不是 用無相而不爲 (Its substance defies dissent or assent [to its existence]. Its function has no forms or intentional activity.)

3) 理事: 若純金不隔於環釧 等積水不憚於漣漪 (This is like pure gold not being different from the bracelets, and amassed water not worrying about ripples.), or 事若萬軫殊轍 理則千輪共規 (Phenomena are like the many tracks left behind by myriad chariots. Principle is like the common structure that thousands of wheels are sharing.)

It does not need much explanation that these categories are almost the same as those of Neo-Taoists, and even more significantly, as those of Hua-yen doctrine. His awareness of the concept *k'ung* also illustrate that he did not escape from the standpoint of *ko-yi* Buddhists. For instance, the dicta, 'neither empty nor existent (非空非有)', or 'emptiness and existence (空有)'[230] contrasts *k'ung* with yu suggesting the former is not

230) Ibid., '該空有而閴寂. Embracing both emptiness and existence, it is serene.'

different from wu which is an antonym of yu. For him, *k'ung* is the source or basis, i.e., Tao or *pen-wu*, of the multiplicity of things and events in the phenomenal world.

The notion of *k'ung* in Hua-yen, in appearance, seems to accept what the Mādhyamika philosophy held: 'If one directly sees that things, such as matter and others, are established by conditions, it is indeed the causality of the Dharma-realm:'[231] 'Since there is no own being, it is called emptiness.'[232] As the Mādhyamika did, Tu-shun, in his *Wu-chiao chih-kuan*, denies the substance of dharmas:

> Because delusive forms are established without substance, because they are produced by conditions without own being, and because delusive existence is established from no substance, the nature and mark (of dharmas) are mixed together to be one reality.[233]

Even so, Hua-yen Buddhists, denying substance or own being, still do not entirely discard what is substantial whatever it may be. A very peculiar idea of substance is found in the *Treatise of*

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231) *Hua-yen wu-chiao dhih-kuan*, T 1867, p. 512b.

232) Ibid., p. 512c.

233) Ibid.

the Golden Lion of Fa-tsang:

> It means that the character of the lion is unreal: there is only real gold. The lion is not existent, but the substance of gold is not nonexistent. Therefore they are (separately) called matter and Emptiness. Furthermore, Emptiness has no character of its own: it shows itself by means of matter. This does not obstruct its illusory existence. Therefore they are (separately) called matter and Emptiness.[234]

Fa-tsang asserts that the lion is unreal and not existent, while gold is real and not nonexistent. He probably takes something substantial as inherently existing. From the perspective of the Mādhymika, not only the lion but gold is unreal and not inherently existent. It is clear that the notion of 'without its own being' as posited by Fa-tsang, the great systematizer of Hua-yen School, is imperfect since he endorse a certain form of substance. This attitude of Fa-tsang was never criticized by either his followers or other Chinese sectarian Buddhists. *The kuan-men shu'* of P'ei Hsiu is a typical example showing the way by which Chinese Hua-yen Buddhists understand the Dharma-realm, which

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234) *Treatise of the Golden Lion*, T 45, 663c-664a, Chan's translation, p. 409. (謂師子相虛 唯是眞金 幻色之相既虛 眞空之性唯實 師子不有 金體不無.... 故名色空... 又復空無自相 約色以明......不礙於色.)

is a substance for them:

> The Dharma-realm is the fundamental substance of all sentient beings' soul and body. From the very beginning, it is mysteriously bright and enlightened, spaciously void. It is the realm of One Truthfulness. Even though it has no form whatsoever, the variety of things in the great universe are produced (from it). Even though it has no boundary, it embraces myriad things and events.[235]

No further explanation is needed to demcnstrate that the concept of Dharma-realm understood by Hua-yen Buddhism is nothing other than the Taoist concept of Tao, *pen-wu*, or *Li*.

2. MIND PHILOSOPHY OF HUA-YEN

2-1) ONE MIND

With reference to the development of Mind philosophy in China, the 6th century was the most important period during which Paramātha exerted influence in a large measure on the Chinese Buddhist philosophers at that time. Paramātha is a key figure in the introduction of philosophical ideas which exited the Chinese imagination to develop the great Buddhist philosophical

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235) P'ei Hsiu, *Fa-chieh kuan-men shu* (by Tsung-mi) '法界者. 一切衆生身心之本體也. 從本以來, 靈明廓徹, 廣大虛寂, 唯一眞之境而已. 無有形貌而森羅大千, 無有邊際而含容萬有.'

systems. He paved the way for the glorious Schools of Sui and Tsang Buddhism: Hua-yen, T'ien-t'ai, Fa-hsiang, and Ch'an. T'ien-t'ai and Hua-yen developed on the basis of Paramātha's translations and as a response to his She-lun School (攝論宗).

Though Yogācāra literature was first introduced into China in the first half of the 5th century by Dharmarakṣa (A. D. 385-433) and Guṇavarman (A. D. 367-431), it was not until the North-South dynastic period that the transmission of Yogācāra literature was greatly accelerated through the efforts of Bodhiruci, Ratnamati, and Buddhaśanti, who translated the *Daśabhūmika*, the *Ratnagotra-vibhāga*, and the *Mahāyāna-sāṃgraha*. In the revision of the *Daśabhūmika* by Ratnamati and Bodhiruci, the theory of ālaya-vijñāna began to have an impact on Chinese Buddhism. By the time Paramārtha arrived in China, two forms of Yogācāra, Northern Ti-lun School (北道 地論宗) and Southern Ti-lun School (南道 地論宗), had been established. In addition to translating Yogācāra treatises, Guṇabhadra had translated the *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra*, and Ratnamati had translated the *Ratnagotra-vibhāga*, which are concerned with Tathāgātagarbha. Since Tathāgātagarbha literature was translated at the same time as Yogācāra and by the same masters, these two

types of thought became closely linked in the minds of the Chinese.

According to some scholars, this association of Tathāgatagarbha with Yogācāra carried over into some of Paramārtha's interpretation as well, particularly with his concept of amala-vijñāna (菴摩羅識), 'pure consciousness', or the 9th consciousness.[236] Though it needs further consideration whether amala-vijñāna is the amalgam of Tathāgatagarbha and Yogācāra, it goes without saying that amala-vijñāna is a new innovation that cleared up the negative feature of ālaya-vijñāna. Amala-vijñāna is, according to Paramārtha's own definition in his *Chuan shih lun* (轉識論), inherently pure and indestructible. This kind of positive description of mind is not found in most early Yogācāra texts such as *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra*, *Yogācārabhūmi*, *Viṃśatikā*, and *Triṃśikā* which were mainly concerned with analyzing the deluded state of mind. This is not to say that early Yogācāra texts did not mention the pure state of mind but to say that they did not posit any pure consciousness beyond ālaya-vijñāna, the 8th consciousness, which is a container of defiled seeds. This innovation of amala-vijñāna is the

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236) Dianna Y. Paul, *Philosophy of Mind in Six-Century China*, Stanford Univ. Press, 1984, p. 7.

stepping-stone leading to the more ontologically oriented term-One Mind (一心).

Paramārtha's innovation, the 9th consciousness, which is transcendent and pure, eventually terminates the functions of the seed system of the ālaya-vijñāna, replacing it with the absolute nature of reality, the amala-vijñāna. This new structure of consciousness is what remains when the defiled seeds are no longer produced. The amala-vijñāna is, therefore, a 'seedless' state, whereas the eight consciousnesses system speaks of a 'purified seed' contained in ālaya-vijñāna. The nature of ālaya-vijñāna is totally different from the nature of amala-vijñāna. This pure consciousness is identified with reality (parinișpanna) or Suchness (眞如) in Paramārtha's interpretation. It is also the wisdom of the Buddha and Tathāgātagarbha. A fixed entity of self or thing is denied by all Buddhist Schools. Is amala-vijñāna, then, an entity or substance in Paramātha's system? In Paramārtha's exegesis, the amala-vijñāna is equivalent to 'Consciousness-Only (唯識)'. The '*Chuan shih lun* (轉識論)' says:

> The meaning of 'Consciousness-Only (唯識)', fundamentally, is to dispense with sense objects and to dispense with the mind. For that reason, outside of consciousness, there are no other sense objects … one

> dispenses with sense objects in order to empty the mind … When both the sense object and consciousness are eliminated, this is identical to the true nature(眞如). The true nature is identical to Pure Consciousness (amala-vijñāna)[237]

The amala-vijñāna is, strictly speaking, not a consciousness at all because when we use the term 'consciousness', we presuppose subject-object dichotomy. That consciousness is itself empty is the meaning of the amala-vijñāna. A thorough understanding of Consciousness-Only equivalent to spiritual freedom entails eliminating subject-object constructs that affect our lives. In this state of mind, since there is neither knower nor known, though we refers to it as 'consciousness', Pure Consciousness (amala-vijñāna) ceases to be a epistemological term, rather it can be validly designated an ontological one.

Hui-Yuan (523-592), the brilliant master of the Southern Ti-lun School, in his later work, *Ch'i-hsin lun i-shu* (起信論義疏), presents a new interpretation of One Mind in terms of the 9th vijñāna borrowed from Paramārtha (though he does not use the term 'amala'). In his commentary on the *AMF*, he states that "

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237) *Chuan-shih lun* (轉識論), T 31, 61c.

the mind has the aspect of reality or suchness (眞如), being equivalent to a 9th mode of consciousness", and he continues that "the One Mind is the same as the 9th consciousness." This is apparently the union of the 9th consciousness and Tathāgatagarbha thought found in the *Śrīmālādevī-Sūtra*. This mind of suchness, in his exegesis, is the essence of all things. While the ālaya-vijñāna is a combination of true and false consciousness, the 9th is originally pure, immutable reality. Not only the She-lun School (攝論宗) represented by Paramārtha, but also the later Ti-lun School (地論宗) evolves its theory of consciousness from ālaya combined with true and false consciousness to the 9th, pure consciousness which is equivalent to suchness or Dharma-nature (法性, *fa-hsing*). The following lines from the *AMF* shows how it understands the One-Mind:

> …the so called nature of Mind is neither arising nor ceasing. All dharmas are differentiated depending on delusive thought … (It is) ultimately equable and is immutable. It is not perishable. There is only One Mind, so it is called Suchness…[238]

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238) *Ta ch'eng ch'i-hsin lun* (大乘起信論), T 32, 584b. '所謂心性不生不滅 一切諸法有依妄念而有差別…畢竟平等無有變異 不可破壞 唯是一心 故名眞如'

In this manner, the Mind originally derived from the Yogācāra mode of thought comes to have an ontological ground which is resorted to by Mādhyamika philosophy.

2-2) NO DELIBERATE MIND (*wu-hsin*, 無心)

Chih-yen, in his *K'ung-mu chang*, refers a couple of times to *wu-hsin*: 1) Among the five abrupt realizations of Buddhahood (速疾成佛) he places the 'abrupt realization of Buddhahood through no-thought' on the fifth:[239] 2) Quoting the entire treatise of T'an-ch'ien, the *Wang shih-fei lun* (亡是非論) on the last tenth stage, he put *wu-hsin* as the highest quality of mind. Herein, only the latter, since it is directly related to the Neo-Taoist impact, will be discussed:

> As to there being no right and wrong: Those who maintain that it is wrong to argue about right and wrong, and that it is right to say there is no right or wrong, though despising the fallacy of right and wrong, are still not freed from the fallacy of right and wrong. They, despising the fallacy of right and wrong, may have something superior (to the dichotomy of right and wrong) in their minds. Retaining an admiration for something in one's mind, however, is itself an evidence of being not free from the fallacy of right and wrong. If one wishes to

239) *K'ung-mu chang*.

> avoid the fallacy, there is no way other than that of being no-mind. There being no-mind, what in the world could raise the issue of right and wrong? Right and wrong accordingly will vanish. Consequently, other and self will also vanish. There will be neither gain nor loss. What had been so is no longer as such. What had been valid is no longer cogent. In this way, being free and not-actioning, may we wander about the realm beyond afflictions![240]

T′an-ch′ien, in his conclusive remarks, without any hesitation, uses the terms, *Wu-wei* (無爲) and *Wu-hsin* (無心), which are major terms used by Taoists.[241] The tenets of

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240) *Wang shih-fei lun* (亡是非論) ′十無是無非者: 若夫以是非爲非. 無是非爲是者. 彼且惡於是非. 猶不免是非累也. 而欲惡於其累. 別更有所存者. 然其所上. 已存於心. 亦未免於累也. 將欲不累 莫若無心. 以無心故. 誰謂爲是非? 是非亡矣. 彼我隨喪. 彼我喪故. 得失亦無也. 不然於然. 不可於可. 爾乃任放無爲. 逍遙累外耳!′

241) It is as early as the 3rd century A. D. that Wu-hsin was to used in the Chinese translation of the Buddhist scripture: Fo-shuo hui-yin san-mei ching (佛說海印三昧經, *Tathāgatajñānamudrasamādhi* has it:
′What is the characteristic of no-work? The characteristic is unobtainability. What is the characteristic of unobtainablity? What is the characteristic of immovability? The characteristic is the freedom from movability. What is the characteristic of freedom from movability? The characteristic is no-mind. What is the characteristic of no-mind? The characteristic is no-thought (*wu-nien*). What is the characteristic of no-thought? The characteristic is non-duality. What is the characteristic of non-duality? The characteristic is the sameness of things. [Yun-hua Jan′s translation of T vol. 15.

'non-duality' as well as 'the sameness of things' shows a striking similarity to the commentary of the *Chuang-tzu* by Kuo Hsiang. By *Wu-hsin*, Kuo hsiang also means 'no deliberate mind of one's own'.[242] *Wu-hsin*, according to him, was not no-mind, but a state of mind in which one knows something through direct intuition that is the embodiment of *Li* (理). Even if this exalted cognition transcends all conceptual thoughts, it is still some kind of thought (遺知而知). It is some sort of mystic experience where subject and object are profoundly (玄, *hsuan*) identical and things are subtlely converged into one another (與物冥合).[243] He says in his commentary of 'The Great Master':

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p. 466c.] He continues in his analysis: 'The statement contains a number of technical terms of Indian Buddhism which are clearly not of Chinese origin. Although the original Indian text of this work is no longer extant, some of these technical terms are identifiable from other works.' See Yun-hua Jan, JCP p.55, note 4.

242) Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book*, p. 791. Wu-hsin comprises not only intellectual activities but volitional and emotional activities. [Knowledge, as it is boundless, damages the nature of beings. Mind, as it desires evil, exhausts truthfulness. (知以無涯傷性. 心以慾惡蕩眞.]

243) Meng p'ei-yuan, p. 402.

> How can one not forget? Having forgot the trace of things, and forgot what made things as they are, inwardly one forgot one's own body and outwardly one forget the universe. Then one throughly becomes one entity with transformation itself, thereby leaving nothing that is not understood![244]

again, in his commentary on the 'Treatise on the Equality of Things':

> "This" and "that" oppose each other but the sage is in accord with both of them. Therefore he who embodies No-mind is silently harmonized with things and is never opposed to the world. This is the way to occupy the central position and to be in union with the profoundly mysterious ultimate in order to respond with things from any direction they may come.[245]

The concept of no-mind gained a philosophically distinct meaning by the Neo-Taoist Kuo Hsiang as was elaborated in the chapter II. The main idea attached to the concept of mind is that if mind is apart from discriminative function, it will be converged

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244) Kuo Hsiang. *Chuang-tzu chu.* '夫坐忘者. 奚所不忘哉! 既忘其跡. 又忘其所以跡者. 內不覺其一身. 外不識有天地. 然後曠然與變化爲體. 而無不通也.'

245) Kuo Hsiang. *Chuang-tzu chu.* '彼是相對. 而聖人兩順之. 故無心者. 與物冥而未嘗有對于天下也.'

with the universe. This state of mind is called *hsing* or no-deliberate-mind. (see chapter II) On this ground, wu-hsin influenced by the Neo-Taoist idea is related to *Hsing-ch'i* of Hua-yen doctrine.

2-3) *HSING-CH'I* (性起)

According to the Neo-Taoist idea of mind, the innermost nature of a human is inherently pure. The pure mind, when disturbed by desire, evades the original *hsing* (本性) and is corrupted.[246] This affirmation of *hsing* by Neo-Taoists appears to be the precedent of hsing as in *hsing-ch'i*, which is definitely either a Chinese concoction or, at least, an appropriation of the Sanscrit version of the *Hua-yen ching*.[247] The Dharma-realm of Hua-yen doctrine is a different expression of One Mind, which represents an epistemological perspective of the ultimate truth. Tsung-mi, the fifth patriarch of Hua-yen School, in his *kuan- men*, sets forth:

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246) Hsu fu-kuan, p. 72.

247) See Takasaki Jikido, "*The* Tathāgatotpattisaṃbhava -nirdeśa *of the* Avataṃsaka *and* Ratnagotravibhāga, *with special reference to the term* 'tathāgata-gotra-saṃbhava (如來性起)'", JIBS, VII-1, pp. 48-53.

> What encompasses myriad existences is One Mind. When mind embraces myriad existences, it establishes the Four Dharma-realm.[248]

He makes clear that mind is the substance of the universe, and that, by the substance, myriad things are established (or produced).[249] This represents the real meaning of the 'the arising of substantial nature' (自體性起) emphasized by Hua-yen Buddhists. *Hsing-ch'i*, indicating 'things-as-they-are', refers to the supreme form of causality. Everything assuming its own form and nature is itself *hsing-ch'i*. This attitude is quite similar to that of Kuo Hsiang who mentions that 'each thing, being granted with its own nature' (物各有性), 'is satisfied with its own nature.' (自足其性)[250] After all, early Hua-yen patriarchs must have invented and give new implications to *hsing-ch'i*. That is to say, for them, the notions hsing, in Neo-Taoism and in Hua-yen, One

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248) Tsung-mi, *Chu hua-yen fa-ch'ieh kuan-men*, '總該萬有, 即是一心. 然心融萬有, 便成四種法界'

249) In the Hua-yen School, the generative quality of the Reality seems to have been faded out.

250) The idea that each individual shares the nature of the heaven is frequently found in the Kuo Hsiang's commentary on the *Chuang-tzu*: '天性所受, 各有本分, 不可逃亦不可加.' (養生主註), '各然其所然, 各可其所可, 則理雖萬殊而性同得, 故曰道通爲一也.' (齊物論註).

Mind, and No Mind, are all synonyms.

Another innovation of the notion of *hsing-ch'i* made by Hua-yen patriarchs clearly shows the impact of Taoist thought on the formation of Hua-yen doctrine. It is the application of the *t'i-yung* paradigm of the former to *hsing-ch'i* of the latter:

> ...hsing refers to substance, while origination the present mind.[251]

Also hsing is not related to human cultivation of it (離於修造)[252], which means that it is an immutable substance. That is, the substance of mind is intrinsically void, serene, and pure. The arising of that substance is our everyday mental activities. Borrowing from the Taoist framework, Hua-yen philosophers went a step further to affirm the mind of daily lives. Infinite affirmation of human mind is another feature of the Hua-yen philosophy of mind. This seeming contradiction is successfully resolved through the application of the *t'i-yung* paradigm. In other words, even our deluded mind is the function of the substance which is originally pure and spiritual. Thus

251) *K'ung-mu chang*, T 35, p. 79c. '性者體, 起者現在心地耳.'

252) Ibid.

deluded mind is not different from enlightened mind that is hsing. Fa-tsang interprets the passage of the *Treatise on the Buddha-Nature* (佛性論) saying:

> ...it says that "he is called Tathāgāta as he comes from the abode of self-nature." (Let me interpret it): the non-alterable is called *hsing*, and its function is called 'origination.' That is to say, tathāgāta is *hsing-ch'i*. Also, the true principle is called *yu* (如) or *hsing* (性), whereas what represents function is origination (起) or *lai* (來)[253]

'The non-alterable' or 'true principle' designates *t'i* or substance, while 'origination' yung or function. Even if the wordings of this passage are those of Buddhism, it is a direct adoption of the *t'i-yung* scheme, the typical worldview of Taoism, to *hsing-ch'i* of Hua-yen, indicating the latter owes its worldview, fundamentally, to that of the former. At any rate, the concept of *hsing-ch'i* represents the subjective expression of ultimate reality while Dharma-realm the objective one. (see ch. I, Introduction)

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253) *T'an-hsuan chi*, T 35, p. 405a '從自性住來至來至得果 故名如來 不改名性 顯用稱起 卽如來之性起 又眞理名如名性 顯用名起名來 卽如來爲性起.'

3. HUA-YEN WORLDVIEW (四法界)[254]

3-1) *LI* AND *SHIH* (理事)

UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE

It has been discussed so far that Chinese Buddhists misunderstood *k'ung* as *wu* and causality as *yu*. As the understanding of Indian Mādhyamika philosophy advanced, however, they did not fail to find their inaccuracy in

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254) The Dharma-realm of Hua-yen Buddhism has two aspects. As principle (Li), it is the realm of suchness, of transcendental and immanent Dharma. As phenomenon (Shih), it is the realm of the dharmas, the conditioned world of transmigration. According to the evaluation of Buddhist doctrines by the Hua-yen school: The Hīnayānists see the Dharma-realm of phenomena; Mādhyamika Yogācāra see the Dharma-realm of principle; T'ien-t'ai and the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith are said to consider a Dharma-realm where phenomena and noumenon (principle) do not impede each other; The Hua-yen doctrine claims to see a Dharma-realm where phenomena do not impede each other but enter into each other and are identical with each other. Richard H. Robinson, *The Buddhist Religion: A Historical Introduction*, 1970, pp. 84-85.

interpretation of the notion of *k'ung* as well as the real implication of the Two Truths. As a result, they, especially Hua-yen thinkers, sought another way where they could manage to compromise the worldview of original Chinese Thought, one of which is Taoism, and that of Buddhism. Even though Buddhism was fully recognized and even admired, they did not want to accept the latter at the cost of the former. At least both of them had to co-exist. In order to achieve this task, they readily incorporated Neo-Taoist terms, such as *Li* and *shih*, into the fabric of Buddhism. They came to feel that the concept of *k'ung* had too negative a nuance to indicate an eternal substance of the universe. Thus the innovation of a totally new paradigm. R. Gimello, in his attempt to understand the adoption of *Li* and *shih* by Hua-yen patriarchs, suggests:

> As shih is not the exact equivalent of dharma or rupa, so li is not the exact equivalent of śūnyatā. Neither, however, is it a denial of śūnyatā......Li is not so much the principle of emptiness as it is the principle that all particulars are empty. This distinction, between a nominative and a propositional function, is difficult to clarify. It is a modal, not an essential, difference.[255]

255) Robert M. Gimello, p. 17.

This observation is correct in the sense that Hua-yen Buddhists still did not give up an ontological dualism, *k'ung* and *se* (空色), and extended it to noumenon and phenomena (理事), and that *Li* represents the universal principle as in the system of Wang Pi, Kuo Hsiang, and Chih-tun. However, this application of *Li* and *shih* is not an insignificant alteration. By using those Taoist notions, they stepped further into the Taoist worldview, so that they *affirm* this-worldliness.[256] They did not have to use

256) Francis H. Cook, JCP, 6 (1979) pp. 371-372, 'Fa-tsang seems to have accurately assessed the difference between Indian Śūnyavāda and the Hua-yen version when he spoke of the difference between negative and affirmative approaches. Another indication that this is the case may be observed in the interesting fact that in his writings Fa-tsang tends to substitute the Chinese term *li* (理), with its ancient Taoist connotations, for the term *k'ung* (空), which is usually translated as the Sanskrit *śūnyatā*. Other Chinese also frequently made the same substitution, and the reason seems to be that although they wished to deal faithfully with the concept of emptiness, they felt that *k'ung* (emptiness) carried with it negative connotations or flavorings which *li* did not. *Li*, meaning something like 'pattern' or 'principle,' always had 'warm' connotations for the Chinese. Thus, both *k'ung* and *li* were used to denote interdependence, change, and substancelessness, but the former connoted voidness and valuelessness, while the latter connoted fullness and goodness. I do not consider this to be a distortion of the emptiness doctrine itself, for it is primarily an esthetic orientation towards the fact of interdependence which is the basis for the Indian doctrine itself. The affirmation of interdependent things

the troublesome concept, *k'ung*, to picture the Dharma-realm that is cherished from the beginning in their mind. It is evident that their admission of *Li* and *shih* into their system indicates the continuation of misconceptions as to Mādhyamika philosophy.

Garma C. C. Chang, providing the various usage of *Li* and shih, emphasizes the noumenal aspects of the notions:257)

> If the main concern of philosophy is to search for an even more universal truth, the application of "synthetic" words will be unavoidable in any philosophic enterprise. Since Hwa Yen is a philosophy dealing with the problem of Totality, it can not help but use all sorts of "synthetic" and overlapping words. The wider and more vague the connotations of a word are, the more useful that the word might be for Hwa Yen. To Hwa Yen, a word is quite useless if it is not flexible and yet inclusive. These two Chinese words, *Li* and *Shih*, are therefore chosen by Hwa Yen philosophers to wrestle with the problem of Dharmadhātu, since they possess these qualities.'

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is thus a different way of responding to interdependence and change.'

257) Garma C. C. Chang, p. 142. "Looking at the multiple meaning of Li and Shih...Li, in different contexts, can mean 'principle', 'universal truth', 'reason', 'the abstract', the 'law', 'noumenon', 'judgement', 'knowledge', and so forth. Shih can mean a 'thing', an 'event', the 'particular', the 'concrete', 'phenomenon', 'matter', and so forth."

We can infer the reason why an excessively broad sense of *Li* and *shih* was introduced into Hua-yen philosophy on two points: one is that Hua-yen Buddhists needed to escape from the inconvenient category of *k'ung* and causality which was too negative and vague to show an all embracing truth or reality: the other is that, in the same context, they wanted to embrace indigenous, thoughts within the Buddhist doctrine. Mostly, *Li* was understood as a principle regulating things and events of the external world. It is a more scientific, universal principle than what is suggested by the term, *k'ung*.

TI-YUNG PARADIGM

More evidence that the pair concepts of *Li* and *shih* are derived from Taoist wu and yu, particularly in terms of the *t'i-yung* paradigm, is found in the relationship between them. The relationship between *Li* and *Shih* is clearly seen from the most favored metaphor in Chinese Buddhism of 'Wave and Water'[258]:

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258) Chinese Buddhists are very familiar with this metaphor. Hui-ming also make use of it in his stanza: 'This is like pure gold not being different from the bracelets, and amassed water not worrying about ripples.' (若純金不隔於環釧 等積水不憚於漣漪).

> ...using the waves of water as a metaphor, the undulating forms of the water are the waves, the uniform wetness is the water. There is no wave that differs from the water-the wave itself is the same revelation of the water: there is no water that differs from the waves-it is water itself that makes the waves. The very fact that water and waves are one does not impede their being different...[259]

From Tu-shun's *Wu-chiao chih-kuan* (Cessation and Contemplation Practice in the Five Doctrines),[260] this metaphor, which seems to have appeared in the very early stage of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Being emphasized in the 'Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith,' this metaphor, which is nothing other that the application of the *t'i-yung* paradigm to *Li* and *shih*, is shared by the Hua-yen and Ch'an Schools as well. De Bary also endorses this proposition:

> ...all dharmas are in the state of Suchness. In its static aspect, Suchness is the Void, the noumenon, the realm of Principle. In its dynamic aspect, it is manifestation, the phenomenon, the realm of facts.[261]

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259) *Ta ch'eng ch'i-hsin lun*, '如不動水 爲風所吹而作動水 動靜雖異 水體是一 而得說言依靜水故有其動水 當知此中道理亦爾.'

260) T 1867, p. 511.

261) De Bary, p. 167.

3-2) SHIH AND SHIH (事事)

This Non-Obstruction of *Shih* against *Shih* is elaborated through either the so-called 'Ten Non-Obstructions (*shih wu-ai*)', or through the 'ten Profundities (*shih hsuan*) by Fa-tsang and Chih-yen:

> The Non-Obstruction of Totality in complete freedom (*yuan-t'ung wu-ai*) is to say that this very body of Buddha is *Li* and also *Shih:* It is one and also many: It is the dweller and also the world that is dwelt upon. It is the man who teaches and also the Dharma that is taught. It is identical with this and also with that: the same as sentient and as in sentient beings. It is deep and also vast. It is the cause as well as the effect.......This is to say that the true Body of Buddha Vairocana is the great Dharma-realm itself. Nothing is different from it. No divine revelation is required here to validate Its simultaneous identity with all beings since nothing is outside of the embrace of the Body of Dharma-realm....[262]

How can we explain this dimension of Non-Obstruction of *Shih* against *Shih*? The answer is rather simple: It is simply so and profoundly so. That is to say, no reduction of *Shih* into *Li* (as

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262) Ch'eng Kuan's "*A Prologue to Hua-yen (*Hua-yen Su Ch'ao)", chap. II, p. 71.

was done in the case of Non-Obstruction of *Li* against *Shih*) is at all necessary to validate the Non-Obstruction of *Shih* against *Shih*, which is the ultimate and only Dharma-realm that truly exists. The other three Dharma-realms are merely explanatory expediencies to approach the fourth Dharma-realm of Non-Obstruction of *Shih* against *Shih*, that is what actually exists. This is a unique conception solely found in Hua-yen thought. Borrowing from Kamata Shigeo's expression, this is the realm of intuitional insight, not of speculative reasoning.[263] The followings are well-known analogies to describe the realm of *Shih-shih Wu-ai*:

> There is the analogy of Indra's net, made of precious gems, hanging over Indra's palace. "In each of these gems are found reflected all the other gems composing the net; therefore, when it is picked up, we see in it not only the entirety of the net, but every one of the gems therein.[264]

Or, here is the burning candle, surrounded on all sides by mirrors which reflect in a perfect interplay of light the central light of the candle and the light as reflected by the other

263. Kamata Shigeo, *The Thought of Hua-yen*, 1983, p. 136.

264. D. T. Suzuki, in the *Introduction to Buddhism*, p. xxxiv. Also see Francis H. Cook, *Hua-yen Buddhism*, p. 2.

mirrors. As has been said, these are descriptions of the Hua-yen world view-the interrelatedness and interpenetration of all things. In every particle of dust the whole universe is contained, and every particle of dust engenders all the powers of the cosmos. For every particle of dust is the Buddha, who in a single pore of his skin can reveal the history of all the worlds from their beginning until their destruction.

In *Shih-shih W-ai* (事事無礙, Non-obstruction between phenomena), facts and events, in order to interpenetrate and non-obstruct one another, some kind of homogeneity, or identity should be presupposed. There are various interpretations concerning the relationship between *shih* and *shih*:

First, Francis H. Cook suggests that all phenomena including humanity are identical in the sense that they all are empty of their own being just as human races are all identical because they belong to the same species:

> there is a common denominator that links all races, despite differences in color, hair, language, and so on. They are all identical on the basis of their humanity. Once we can accept the fact that all things are empty, we can see that despite differences in form and function they are identical because they are all empty. Hua-yen

> observes. even celebrates. the difference. but for purposes of emancipation and enlightenment. the identity of things in their common emptiness is more significant than the fact that some things are long. some short. some red. some square. and so on.[265]

He understands the tenet of *Shih-shih Wu-ai* within the framework of the Buddhist doctrine. However. as we shall see in the subsequent discussion, Hua-yen doctrine can not be fully understood when we take into account only Buddhist factors. Since the notions *Li* and *shih* are employed to denote rather positive aspects of the Dharma-realm, the concept of *k'ung* is more or less ignored by Hua-yen patriarchs except Tu-shun. the first patriarch.[266] Yet this does not imply that they denied the emptiness (of own being) in dharmas. Even though they held the notion of *k'ung* in terms of Taoist *wu*, we can not see any sign that they entirely discard the emptiness doctrine as expounded by the Mādhyamika. It seems that they amalgamate the emptiness of Mādhyamika with *wu* of Taoism within the concept of *k'ung*. Furthermore, it seems, by emphasizing the Taoist *wu*,

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265) Fracis H. Cook. JCP 1. p. 373.

266) It is generally accepted that Tu-shun. in his *Fa-chieh kuan-men*. incoporated the notions of *Li* and *shih* into his own system of Hua-yen thought.

they constructed a *positive* worldview.

Second, Kenneth Ch'en argues that because all phenomena share one same principle, they are identical with one another:

> since all phenomena are manifestations of the one immutable noumenon, they are in perfect harmony with one another, like the different waves of the same water. From the religious point of view everything in the universe, animate and inanimate, are all representations of the same supreme mind, and can perform the work of the Blessed One.[267] (italics added)

Whether he intended it or not his concept of *Li* shows a striking similarity with that of Neo-Taoism in that phenomena are the manifestation of noumenon, that is, in Taoist philosophy, Tao or *pen-wu*. His simile, water and waves, also suggests that *Shih-shih Wu-ai* is directly derived from the tenet of *Li-shih Wu-ai*. In this perspective, *Shih-shih Wu-ai* is not a new innovation by Hua-yen philosophers, but rather a detailed elaboration of *Li-shih Wu-ai*, because the former is logically implied in the latter.

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267) Kenneth Ch'en, p. 319.

Third, Garma C. C. Chang asserts that there cannot be a particular reason for *Shih-shih Wu-ai* because they are so of their own accord, though he also agrees that there must be identities among things not to be obstructed among things: 'So far as facilitating men's comprehension of the principle of Non-Obstruction is concerned, this reasoning process of reducing the distinct phenomena (*Shih*) into noumenon (*Li*) is perhaps necessary, but the realm of Non-Obstruction itself, if it is a true fact, needs no such rationalization for its existence. *It is simply so and profoundly so*. That is to say, no reduction of Shih into *Li* is at all necessary to validate the Non-Obstruction of Shih against *Shih, which is the ultimate and the only Dharmadhātu that truly exists*. The other three Dharmadhātus-the Dharmadhātu of *Shih*, of *Li*, and of the Non-Obstruction of *Li* against Shih-are merely explanatory expediencies to approach the fourth Dharmadhātu of Shih-shih Wu-ai... in its dimension each and every individual *Shih* enters into and merges with all other *Shih* in perfect freedom, without the aid of *Li*.'[268]

His arguments overlook the fact that *Shih-shih Wu-ai*, which is objective reality, presupposes the experiences of the ultimate

268) Garma C. C. Chang, p. 153.

truth, or reality. The truth of 'things-as-they-are' can not be revealed apart from realization of the truth of the subject part. But for the consideration of either one of these two expression of reality, any expression of Buddhist truth is liable to be misunderstood. On the other hand, he correctly points out that, with the *Shih-shih Wu-ai*, Hua-yen Buddhists attempted to establish the absolutism of the phenomenal world.

EMPHASIS ON THIS-WORLDLINESS

It is true that Indian Buddhism was not very interested in the phenomenal world, while Chinese Buddhism was more concerned with this-world. This is the reason that Hua-yen Buddhists replaced *k'ung* with *Li* and causality with *shih* to give the latter more comprehensive connotations. Therefore it is *shih* that Hua-yen Buddhism wanted to give a more important role in this scheme than *Li*, (which constitutes most distinctive feature of the Hua-yen worldview). The emphasis on this-world, however, did not suddenly appear at the time of the formation of Hua-yen. We find many precursors in Chinese Buddhist history who declared this type of worldview. For instance, in Seng-chao's dictum, 'Wherever one stands on, it is truthful' (立處卽眞)[269], in the

269) *Chao-lun*, T 45, p. 153a.

T'ien-t'ai's 'the Truth of things-as-they-are' (諸法實相), or in the catchphrase of late 6th century Northern dynasty, 'things and events themselves are the manifestation of Truth' (卽事而眞)[270], we can find the absolutism of this-world. Even though this way of thought is not entirely a Chinese concoction, but reflects the influence of the Mādhyamika,[271] it is in Hua-yen Buddhism that it gained such an absolutist position.

It should be pointed out in passing that this absolutism of this-world may create unnecessary disputes if it is delineated without referring to the subjective reality that is the experience of enlightenment. It is true especially in Mahāyāna Buddhism that the phenomenal world itself is not different from Reality or the realm of the Truth. Still, this declaration presupposes a subjective experience of the ultimate truth. For ordinary sentient beings, this world is no more than the sea of suffering. Hua-yen Buddhists, intentionally or not, makes this point ambiguous.

MUTUAL IDENTITY AND INCLUSION

One of the rationales the Hua-yen School uses to support the *Shih-shih Wu-ai* is the 'mutual identity and inclusion.' (相卽相入)

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270) Kamata Shigeo, p. 32, 36.

271) Nakamura Hajime, pp. 100-113.

This is the key term the School uses in describing the way in which things and events of the world are inter-related. The patriarchs of the Hua-yen School, at least Tu-shun and Chih-yen, find the textual source of the idea in the *Hua-yen ching*:

> It should be known that a single world is itself identical with immeasurable, boundless worlds and that immeasurable, boundless worlds themselves are identical with a single world. It should be also known that a single world enters into immeasurable, boundless worlds and that immeasurable, boundless worlds enter into a single world.[272)]
>
> (One) knows that innumerable kalpas themselves are equivalent to one instant thought and that one instant thought is equivalent to innumerable kalpas. (One) also knows that innumerable kalpas enter into one instant thought and that one instant thought enters into innumerable kalpas.[273)]
>
> The immeasurable may be understood through One, and One may be understood in the immeasurable. What is produced by transformation (cause and condition) is not real. (So) the man of wisdom does not have fear.[274)]

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272) T 9. 450c. '知一世界卽是無量無邊世界. 知無量無邊世界卽是一世界. 知一世界入無量無邊世界. 知無量無邊世界入一世界.'

273) T 9. 451a. '知無量劫卽是一念. 知一念卽是無量劫. 知一切劫入無劫. 知無劫入一切劫.'

274) T 9. 423a. '一中解無量無量中解一 展轉生非實 智者無所畏.'

...the meaning of 'One is identical with Many, Many is identical with One' is calm cessation and totally egalitarian, far departed from the mark of distorted views discriminating between one and many. This is called the stage of the bodhisattva without sliding back (不退轉菩薩位).[275]

In this Ocean World contained in the lotus flower, one sees all the Dharma realm within every particle of dust.[276]

Those passages, found in the *Hua-yen ching*, backing the doctrine of 'mutual identity and inclusion', may be classified as two kinds: one is explained in terms of time: the other in terms of space. Hua-yen Buddhists claim that all these passages are logical and textual sources of the pivotal term the 'mutual identity and inclusion.' Kamata Shigeo also asserts that the philosophical foundation of the 'mutual identity and inclusion' is not found in the Hua-yen Buddhists of the Sui dynasty but in the *Hua-yen ching* itself.[277]

It is true that the passages cited from the *Hua-yen ching*

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275) T 9, 448b. '如第七住經云 一卽是多多卽一 義味寂滅悉平等 遠離一異顚倒相 是名菩薩不退住.'

276) T 9, 412c. '於此蓮華藏世界海之內, 一一微塵中 見一切法界.'

277) Kamata Shigeo, *Chinese Hua-yen Thought*, p.41.

represent the same idea as those elaborated in the treatises by early Hua-yen patriarchs. However, there are two points that need our attention:

first, those passages deal with the subjective reality experienced in enlightenment;[278] second, those passages do not represent the main idea of the sūtra. Since these two points have been already explained in the above, it is not necessary to repeat them here again.

ORGANIC WORLDVIEW

Buddhism is not concerned with objective reality, i.e., with anything beyond the reach of consciousness or cognition.[279] However, Hua-yen is engrossed in the illustration of the phenomenal world, which they understood as an organism under the influence of the *t'i-yung* and *i-tuo* paradigm. Wang Pi, who invented the *t'i-yung* dichotomy in the early 3rd century A. D., established through the dichotomy a new way of thought through which the Chinese could see the world. It was the Hua-yen and

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278) *Hua-yen i-ch'eng fa-chieh t'u* (華嚴一乘法界圖, by Uisang 義湘) '...it (the Reality or the realm of Truth) is known by enlightened wisdom, but not by others.' (證智所知非餘境).

279) See Leon Hurvitz, "*The First Systematization of Buddhist Thought in China*", JCP, p. 366.

the T'ien-t'ai philosophers[280] who adopted this category into their systems to illustrate the relationship between noumenon and phenomena. We can find that they use the paradigm for the purpose of explaining the Two Truths theory of Mādyamika philosophy:

> ...within the level of worldly truth, every event or character is the total t'i of absolute truth. Therefore we say that t'i and yung are not different.[281]

The organic view of the universe established by Neo-Taoists such as Wang Pi and Ho Yen, influenced the formation of the Hua-yen worldview. For instance, Francis Cook observes in his interpretation of the simile of the coin discussed in the *Shih-hsuan men*:

> when we speak of "whole", parts are implied, for there is no whole apart from its constituents. When each part plays its own role, there is a whole, and the identity of discrete particulars results from the situation whereby

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280) Reverta Lion Kong, *"Metaphysics and East-West philosophy: Applying the Chinese t'i-yung paradigm"*, PEW, XXIX-1, (1979).

281) *Mo-ho-chi-kuan*, Wing-tsit Chan's translation in his *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, p. 404.

> each particular acts as a necessary condition for the whole identically with all other particulars when it plays its own unique role. If all things are literally and exactly identical, there can not be a whole. The Mahayana Buddhist life of respect and gratitude for all things finds its ideological support in this understanding of identity.[282]

He grasps the Dharma realm of Hua-yen doctrine as an organic entity. This is nothing but the application of the *t'i-yung* theory of Neo-Taoism to the Hua-yen worldview (according to him), the relationship between parts and whole has, the Dharma-realm as an organism in which each part serves the perfection of the integral whole. In this system, part and whole are so closely interdependent that without the former, the latter can not exist, and vice versa.

282) Francis H. Cook, JCP, 1, p. 375.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

As D. T. Suzuki put it,[283] a religious tradition is not a static entity but an ever changing organism. So is Buddhism. Ever since the Indian religion was introduced into China, Buddhism has undergone drastic transformation. Indeed, it is through the process of assimilation that an organism like Mahāyāna Buddhism may survive in a certain environment, otherwise it would die out. Hua-yen Buddhism, therefore, is a result of the assimilation of Indian Buddhism to Chinese indigenous thoughts, which specifically Confucianism and Taoism. This work is preliminary research aimed at tracing the process of transformation of

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283) D. T. Suzuki, *Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism*, p. 15. 'It is naught but an idle talk to question the historical value of an organism, which is now full of vitality and active in all its functions....Mahāyānism is not an object of historical curiosity. Its vitality and activity concern us in our daily life. It is a great spiritual organism: its moral and religious forces are still exercising an enormous power over millions of souls: and its further development is sure to be a very valuable contribution to the world-progress of the religious consciousness.'

Buddhism in China, especially with respect to Taoist influences.

No matter how much Taoist thought contributed to the formation of the Hua-yen worldview, and no matter to what extent Hua-yen doctrine is different from Indian Buddhism, it is not our intention to evaluate or criticize it. That which we would like to see is 'what it was', not 'what should have been.' Then we may properly determine the place Chinese Buddhism occupies in the history of Buddhist thought. Thereby we can establish the goal to which Buddhism of this age was directed.

In the period of upheaval, the Wei-Chin Nan-Pei dynasties, the dominant movement led by Chinese intellectuals was the *Ch'ing-t'an* tradition within which Chinese Buddhists managed to find their way to settle down in Chinese soil. *Ch'ing-t'an* culture contributed in various ways to the development of Chinese thought in general:

First, it created the current of the 'sameness of the Three Teachings, i.e., Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism' through liberal discussions among them. Interactions among the Three Teachings allowed them to influence one another.

Second, the founders, the Neo-Taoists, Wang Pi and Kuo Hsiang, established the Chinese metaphysics of Tao. In this

sense, *Ch'ing-t'an* can be called the womb of Chinese metaphysics, giving birth to all kinds of Chines thoughts developed by future generations, especially to Hua-yen of the T'ang dynasty and to Neo-Confucianism of the Sung dynasty.

Third, Buddhism, in this cultural furnace, transformed itself to appeal to the Chinese people who were extremely proud of their native thoughts. Of these, Hua-yen Buddhism is a final and paramount version of the domestication of Indian Buddhism.

The Neo-Taoist metaphysics developed in those days was so influential that Chinese Buddhist Schools have not seemed able to escape from its impact until even this day. That is to say, throughout the Chinese Buddhist evolution, the dualism of *k'ung-yu*, which is the brother of Taoist wu-yu, and, at the same time, the result of a misunderstanding of the Mādhyamika Two Truths, has been retained in a variety of forms. To put an end to this tradition, Hua-yen philosophers adopted the notion of *Li* and shih, which are Neo-Taoist innovations, in the effort of constructing their worldview. However, it was no more than a extension of the connotations of the *k'ung-yu* paradigm, which means Hua-yen Buddhists, by using *Li* and *shih*, took a step closer to Taoist metaphysics. Furthermore, *Shih-shih Wu-ai*,

acclaimed as the most unique innovation of Hua-yen philosophy, only shows the organic worldview of Neo-Taoism.

In addition to the examination of ontological aspects of Hua-yen, the mind philosophy of Hua-yen, which is *hsing-ch'i*, was also explored to give a more comprehensive idea of the Taoist impact on Hua-yen Buddhism. By doing so, it has been demonstrated that *hsing-ch'i* is influenced by Taoist no-mind (無心). More specifically, *hsing-ch'i* is an incorporation of the universal mind of Tathāgatagarbha Thought and no-mind introduced by the Neo-Taoist, Kuo Hsiang.

TRANSLATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Three texts have been selected in the attempt of showing Taoist impact on Hua-yen philosophy: T'an-ch'ien (曇遷. A. D. 542~607)'s *Wang shih-fei lun* (亡是非論). Hui-ming (慧命. A. D. 532~568)'s *Hsiang-hsuan fo* (詳玄賦) and Chih-yen (智儼. A. D. 602~668)'s *Hua-yen i-ch'eng shih-hsuan men* (華嚴一乘十玄門. abbr. *shih-hsuan men*). Former two texts. with T'an-ch'ien's in full and Hui-ming's partly. are quoted in Chih-yen's *K'ung-mu chang.*[1] indicating their influences on the formation of Chih-yen's thought. *Shih-hsuan men* was also translated as it reflects the very early stage of hua-yen philosophy that was established by Tu-shun. the first patriarch. and Chih-yen. the second patriarch.

WANG SHIH-FEI LUN

This essay has been translated a couple of times into Japanese by Japanese Buddhologists.[2] and. as far as I

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1) *K'ung-mu chang* vol. 4, T 45, pp. 580c-81b. (*Wang shih-fei lun*), 586c (*Hsiang-hsuan fo*).

2) Yuki Reimon, "*Zui seikyo zenjo dojo shaku Dosen no kenkyu* (隋西京禪定道場釋曇遷の硏究)" in *Toyo shiso ronshu* 東洋思想論集 (Tokyo, 1961) pp. 708-721, Ui Hakuju, *Seiiki Butten no kenkyu* 西域佛典の硏究 (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1969), pp. 5-17.

know, translated into English by Professor Whalen W. Lai and Robert Gimello,[3] with all of whom I do not agree in most occasions. The errors of punctuations in *Tai-sho* edition are too many to enumerate. As in the case of the other two translations, using period (.), comma (,), colon (:) and semi-colon (;), I tried to clarify my own readings.

Among various works attributed to T'an-ch'ien,[4] this essay is only one that is extant today. He seems to have been a leading scholar of the period well equipped with broad understanding of various Buddhist literature, such as the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra*, the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, the *Vimalakīrti*, the *Ta-sheng ch'i-hsin lun*, *and Ti-lun* literature.

HSIANG-HSUAN FO

Presumably, present translation of this text seems to be

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3) Whalen W Lai, *"T'an-ch'ien 曇遷 and the Early Ch'an Tradition: Translation and Analysis of The Essay 'Wang-shih-fei-lun' 亡是非論"*, *Early Ch'an in China and Tibet*, Whalen Lai and Lewis R. Lancaster (ed.).

4) According to KSC, he wrote the She-lun shu (攝論疏, 10 volumes), the commentary of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, the Hua-yen ming nan-pen hui (華嚴明難品玄解, Profound Elaboration of the Controversial Chapters of the Hua-yen ching), and so forth.

the first time to present in English, even though a Japanese scholar made an attempt to translate it, if not complete one, into Japanese.[5] Chih-yen, in his *K'ung-mu chang*, quoted the first four lines of the stanza, and added as follows:

> ...this shows that the senior (i.e., Hui-ming) was well versed in the meaning (of the doctrine of this school). What is quoted above succinctly presents the features of an introduction for the One Vehicle School (一乘宗).[6]

As *K'ung-mu chang* is one of the latest works of Chih-yen, and his quotation of *Hsiang-hsuan fo* is found in the chapter for conclusive remarks,[7] it is evident that Chih-yen must have highly appreciated Hui-ming's thought. As a typical Buddhist intellectual of the time, Hui-ming

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5) Kimura Kyotaka, *Shoki chugoku kegon shiso no kenkyo* (初期中國華嚴思想の硏究, *A Study of Early Hua-yen Thought in China*), pp. 285-89.

6) *K'ung-mu chang*, vol. 4, T 45, p. 586, '...此則, 先人已通斯趣耳. 上來所擧, 略開一乘宗序之狀相也...'

7) The title of the chapter is 'Submerging the Three Vehicles to Decisively Reveal the Profound Meaning of the One Vehicle (融會三乘決顯明一乘之妙趣)'

embodies the general ways of thought of the contemporary Chinese Buddhists. From his stanza, we may extract two aspects of his thought which are noteworthy: first, he regards the three teachings of Chinese classical tradition as the different expressions of the same truth; second, some unique ideas which are often exclusively taken to constitute Hua-yen doctrine are clearly discoursed in his work with the same notions and implications as those of Hua-yen Buddhists.

This text as found in *Tai-sho* edition is also full of punctuational errors. In my translation, as it is a stanza, the whole work was divided into pairs in accordance with related ideas and gave my own way of readings.

HUA-YEN I-CH'ENG SHIH-HSUAN MEN

It is generally accepted that *shih-hsuan men* was written by Chih-yen, who inherited Tu-shun's teaching as was recorded in the beginning of the text.[8] Along with the *kuan-men*, this treatise represents the intellectual circumstance around which Hua-yen doctrine began to

8) *Shih-hsuan men*, T 45, p. 514a, '大唐終南太一山至相寺釋智儼撰, 承杜順和尙說.'

emerge. So-called *shih-hsuan* (or the Ten Profundities) which is unique invention of Hua-yen Buddhists, are the characteristics of the causality of the Dharma-realm. In other worlds, *shih-hsuan* is an classification of *Shih-shih-wu-ai*, one of the Four Dharma-realm. Even though *Shih-shih-wu-ai* is a 'new' terminology employed by Hua-yen Buddhists, it is none other than an extension of the connotation of the *Li-shih-wu-ai*, or, at best, a device to incorporate Taoist worldview into the Hua-yen doctrine.[9]

This text also includes so many punctuational errors that, instead of referring to each occasion, by using punctuation marks, I suggested my own readings.

9) See chapter III of this work.

亡是非論（曇遷禪師撰）

WANG SHIH-FEI LUN (TREATISE ON DESERTION OF DICHOTOMY BETWEEN RIGHT AND WRONG)[10)]

by the *Dhyāna* Master T'an-ch'ien

夫自是非彼．美己惡人．物莫不然．以皆然固．擧世紛紜．無自正者也．斯由未達是非之患．

In general, there is nothing in the world that does not contend self is right and others are wrong, or self is good and others are bad. Therefore, there is wide dissension in the world and nothing is inherently right. (In other words, there is no standard by which anything is to be measured.) This[11)] is a fallacy resulting from the lack of thorough understanding of the nature in right and wrong.

云其患者．乃有十種不可． There are ten propositions:

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10) This text was cited in full by Chih-yen in his *K'ung-mu chang* (孔目章, T 45, pp. 580c-81b.)

11) 'This' refers to the contention that "self is right and others are wrong, or self is good and others are bad."

一是非無適主 1) There is no relevant subject to judge right and wrong.

二自性不定[12] 2) The nature of right and wrong is indeterminate.

三彼我俱有 3) Others and self exist as equals.

四更互因生 4) Right and wrong arise interdependently.

五互不相及 5) One fails to influence the other.

六隱顯有無[13] 6) Depending on being manifested or hidden, there is right or wrong.

七性自相違 7) The nature of things conflict with one another.

八執者情偏 8) Contender's thought is biased.

九是非差別[14] 9) There are differences in the meaning of

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12) As is evident in the subsequent explanation, the 'nature' mentioned here does not mean that of things, but that of right and wrong. By negating the self nature of right and wrong, the author emphasis the side of contenders rather than things to be affirmed or negated.

13) This refers to the case that when seen from others's side, my standpoint is concealed, and vice versa. Thus there being right and wrong according to manifestation or concealment of each side's standpoint.

14) 'Distinction (差別)' here does not mean discrimination or grade but simply different usage of the terms, right and wrong.

right and wrong.

十無是無非　　10) There is no right and wrong.

初明無適主者: 此云我是. 彼云我是. 彼此競取. 乃令是無定從.
彼復云此非. 此復云彼非. 彼此競興. 遂使非無適趣.
惑者必欲以是歸自以非屬彼者. 此有何理而可然也? 理不然故. 强爲之者.
莫不致敗耳. 物豈知其然哉[15]?

1. As to there being no relevant subject to right and wrong: This person says, "I am right." That person says, "I am right." This one and that one dispute with each other, thereby eliminating any definite standard for being right. That person asserts this person is wrong, and this one asserts that one is wrong. As this one and that one dispute with each other, there is no applicable common ground to be taken. Deluded ones always want to attribute right to themselves and wrong to others. How can it be rational to do that? Because it does not stand to reason, one who

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15) Here wu (物) may not be a subject but an object of this sentence. Things can not think anything. Inversion of objects to be placed in front of a sentence is not rare in Chinese linguistic system.

insists on his being right is at fault. How can he know that things are so?

二自性不定者：是性是於是；或復是於非．非性非於非：亦或非於是．[16] 然愚者竊竊唯言 是是．[17]不許是非．亦許非非．不論非是．[18] 自謂得理．不患其失．且共論之．若以是是於是．卽有二是過：一所是過．二能是過．所是過者．所是若是．是已是何用是？所是若非 是．[19]應言是非是．云何言是是？能是過者．待所故說能．所是旣不立．能是亦不成．能所俱不成故．何處當有是也？若復非於非．其過亦如此．例是取悟．勿更分別．理盡於此．是以不可也．

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16) It refers to that the nature of right is inclined to claim right whether it may be right or wrong and that the nature of wrong is inclined to claim wrong whether it may be right or wrong. This argument is much clear when looked up the context of following argument.

17) The reading should be '唯言是是，不許是非.'

18) Professor Whalen Lai, in his translation, appropriates the meaning of shi (是) as 'to be' or 'being.' Shi, however, is only used as a copula but never used as the verb meaning 'to be' in Chinese grammatical system. This misunderstanding must come from false identification of the English verb 'be' with the Chinese verb shi. In this treatise, the word shi assumes two functions, noun and verb. For example, shi-shi (是是) means that 'to assert to be right (verb shi, the first shi) what is right. (noun shi, the second shi)

19) The reading should be '所是若非是，應言......'

2) As to the nature of right and wrong being indeterminate: The nature of right claims what is right to be right (是於是). Yet sometimes it claims what is wrong right (是於非). It is the nature of wrong to claim what is wrong wrong (非於非). Yet sometimes it claims what is right wrong (非於是). Imprudent people, however, would obstinately cling to the view that what is right is right (是是), whereas they would not acknowledge (不許) that what is wrong could be claimed to be right (是非). Again, they acknowledge that what is wrong is wrong (非非), while they would not acknowledge that what is right could be claimed to be wrong (非是). Contending that they have acquired the principle of things, they do not realize their fallacies.

Let's discuss this point: If one claims what is right is right (是於是) from the standpoint of right (以 是) it follows that there are two fallacies. The one is the fallacy of objectively right (所是過), the other is that of subjectively right (能是過). *If what is claimed to be right is objectively right, then what is the point of saying it is right? (What is right is right in itself.)*[20] On the other hand, what is

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20) This is the case of the 'begging the question:
absolute right: there being no right or wrong = objective right

claimed to be right is in fact wrong (所是若非), then you should say that what is claimed to be right is not right (是非是). *How can you claim alleged right (是) to be right (是)?*[21] What is then the fallacy of subjective right? Subject can be said only when there is object. How then can there be subjective right when there is no objective right? There being no subjective or objective right, how can one claim that there is right? If we try to make an argument that what is wrong is wrong (非於非), its fallacy would be the same (there will be the same fallacy). Therefore, realizing (truth) from the example of the fallacy of right, do not try to distinguish right from wrong again. The true principle has been exhausted here. Accordingly it is not correct (to argue over right and wrong)

三彼我俱有者: 此是而非彼. 彼是而非此. 此之與彼. 各有一是一非. 惑者唯自謂有是. 不言有非. 謂彼有非. 不許有是. 斯有何理而可然乎?

If (objective right = absolute right = no right, no wrong) then yes, to say something is right (in contrast to wrong) is fallacy. But the question is whether absolute right = no right no wrong.

21) = What you thought to be right is right?

3) As to others and self existing as equals: This person claims that he is right and that person is wrong. That person claims that he is right and this person is wrong. In this way each side has one right and one wrong respectively. Deluded people tend to assert that they only are right and do not say that they are wrongs. Moreover, they say others are wrong but they don't recognize that others could be right. What rationale could ever be here to be so?

四更互因生者: 非因自是心生. 是因非他心起. 以從自是心生故. 此卽自是者.[22]非非他非也. 是復從非他心生故. 此乃他非者.[23]是非我是也. 然惑者. 偏欲取是自歸以非許人. 無如此理故不可也.

4) As to right and wrong arising interdependently: (Others' being) wrong comes from the preoccupation that self is right. And (one's being) right comes from the preoccupation that others are wrong. Since all those claims comes from the belief that self is right, they are nothing

22) This line should be cut here because they are two different clauses.

23) The same case as the previous Note.

but the claim that 'only' self is right. Therefore, 'wrong' in those claims (second 非 in 非非他非) do not (necessarily) imply (first 非 in 非非他非) that others are wrong (他非). Because (one's being) right also comes from the belief that others are wrong, it merely indicates that others are wrong (他非者) and asserted right (first 是 in 是非我是) does not (necessarily) mean (非) that self is right (我是). Deluded people, however, attribute right to themselves and don't allow others to be right. Since there can be no such reasons for this, it is not valid (to argue over right and wrong.)

五互不相及者: 凡是自非他者. 本欲望非至彼. 然彼猶自謂爲是. 以猶自謂爲是故.即驗 非不至彼[24]. 非他自是者. 亦希是至此. 然猶爲彼所非. 以彼非故.即明 是不至此[25] 是不至此. 而言我是. 非不至彼. 復謂他非. 理窮於此故不然也.

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24) 以猶自謂爲是故,即驗 非不至彼; There should be left a space between 故 and 即 because the former is the last word of adverbial clause of whole sentence, whereas the latter is a particle modifying the principle clause. Accordingly, the space between 驗 and 非 should be eliminated since the latter is object clause of the former.

25) This is the same case as the previous Note.

5) As to one failing to influence the other: Generally speaking, one attributes right to himself and wrong to others because he desires to impart wrong to others. However, others also contend they are right. From the fact that others also contend they are right, we are informed that wrong has not been imparted to others. By the same token, one attributes wrong to others and right to himself because he wants to impart right to himself. Yet he is rather criticized by others. Being criticized by others, it is clear that right has not been imparted to himself. One maintains oneself is right when right has not been (exclusively) imparted to himself, and maintains others are wrong when wrong has not been (exclusively) imparted to others. As such reasoning falls short, it can not be true.

六隱顯有無者: 尋夫物情惑也[26]. 莫不同於自是. 均於詳非. 均詳非故.

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26) The sentence '(尋夫)物情惑也' may be read in two ways; one is '(尋夫)物 情惑也' which may be translated as '(in general,) things are outcomes of sensuous delusion', and the other '(尋夫)物情 惑也' which may be translated as '(in general,) human understanding of things are delusive.' Either case is possible reading of the sentence, though the latter, it seems, is preferable in this context since this section deals mainly with the human discriminative leaning toward things rather than things themselves.

擧世無是. 我當云.何獨有是也? 同於自是. 則天下無非. 以無非故.
我何所非. 然惑者. 謂有是可是. 有非可非. 義乃不然故.不可也.

6) As to depending on being manifested or hidden. there is right or wrong: In general. human understanding of things are delusions. There is no exception in contending that self is right and everyone is equal in listing wrongs (of others). Being equally listed as wrong. no one in the world is right. Therefore. I dare to say. "how can there be right in itself?" Being equal in being right. there must be no one who is wrong in the world. There being no wrong. how then can I maintain wrong? Nevertheless. deluded people say that there are rights to be affirmed. and that there are wrongs to be denied. As truth is not so. it is not correct (to dispute over right and wrong.)

(NOTE) This section argues that the manifestation of right and wrong may be altered in accordance with the standpoint of a teller. That is to say: when one contends that he is right. one negates any possibility that one may be wrong: when one contends that the other is wrong. one does not even think about the possibility that the other may be right. In the case of the former. 'to be wrong' is hidden. while. in the latter case. 'to be right' is hidden. This is what is meant by 'depending on

being manifested or hidden, there is right or wrong.′

七性自相違者: 是則性自違非. 非乃性自害是. 以我獨欲立是定非. 是旣立已, 必爲多非非一是. 是多非非故, 一是那可是? 以是不可是故, 則非何所非? 無所非故, 非則自非矣. 自非則無非. 非是則無是. 惑者確, 欲以是定非,用非非是者, 未足然也.

7) As to the nature of things conflicting with one another: Right, by its nature, is different from wrong. And wrong, by its nature, impairs right. Therefore, if I myself establish right and prescribe wrong as right is established, it necessarily becomes a right (一是) negated (last 非 in 多非非) by many wrongs (多非) (of others). When a right is negated by many wrongs, how can we call this one right right? When we can not call right right, how can we call wrong wrong? Since there is nothing that is wrong, we are obliged to conclude that wrong should be wrong in itself (or self-asserted wrong.)[27] That there is self-asserted wrong (自非) means that there is no wrong (because you do not say you are wrong.) Being negated, right does not exist either. Deluded people, however, try to define wrong by

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27) what is wrong is (what is asserted to be) wrong by oneself.

using right and criticize wrong by using right. which cannot be the case.

八執情偏者: 夫物之偏也. 皆不見彼之所 見[28).唯自知其所知. 以自知其所知故. 因卽以爲是. 不見彼之所見故. 謂彼唯非. 若乃見彼所見. 謂之非者. 或容可爾[29). 旣不見彼所見. 而言彼非者. 彼何必非也? 若復自知其所知. 因以自是者. 此則是已私是. 若爲使他. 亦謂之是也. 以此過故. 無理可然[30).

8) As to contender's thought being biased: Things are viewed with a bias because they fail to see things from

28) The space between 所 and 見 should be eliminated.

29) 若乃見彼所見, 謂之非者, 或容可爾 An alternative translation for this of Prof. Whalen Lai goes like this; 'if he (has) seen what the other has seen and (then) says that the other is wrong, this perhaps is permissible.' Grammatically either way of translation is 'permissible'.

30) 若爲使他, 亦謂之是也. 以此過故. 無理可然也. The translation of this sentence by Prof. Whalen Lai, in his essay, goes as follows; "If (the person) intends to make the other person affirm it as (an objective) right then, it would be a mistake and (the person) is being irrational." [See Whalen W. Lai, *"T'an-ch'ien 曇遷 and the Early Ch'an Tradition: Translation and Analysis of The Essay 'Wang-shih-fei-lun' 亡是非論", Early Ch'an in China and Tibet,* Whalen Lai and Lewis R. Lancaster (ed.)] Here a problematic lies in the impersonal pronoun 之, according to the translation of which the whole meaning will change. In our translation, the 之 has been took to indicate 'what is known to oneself (所知)' in previous sentence.

viewpoint of others and know only what they know. Because they know only what is known to them, they judge right on that basis. They contend others are wrong because they do not see what others see. If they can see what others see, they may allow themselves to accept what they took to be wrong (謂之非者). Being unable to see what others see, they contend others are wrong. How can others necessarily be wrong? Again if you say you are right on the basis of what is known to you, this right is already personal right. If you ask others to judge, they will say that what they see (or what is known to them) is right. Judging from this, it is wrong and against reason (to dispute over right and wrong.)

九是非差別者: 然濡俗之輩. 以是爲是. 以非爲非. 此乃難免以是爲非.以非爲是者.顚倒失也. 然物外高趣. 以是非爲非. 用無是非爲是. 此亦免於是非之一失. 猶自存於一是一非. 是非雖同. 理趣胡越. 而惑者. 聞是則謂凡聖同是. 聞非復謂賢愚共非. 失理致此. 未足然也.

9) As to there being differences in the meaning of right and wrong: However, people who are bound up in worldly

values say right is right in itself and wrong is wrong in itself. In this case, they roughly avoided the fallacy of saying right as wrong and wrong as right. However, people who freed themselves from the material world and acquired high insight say that it is wrong to discriminate what is right and wrong. They also contend that it is right to say there is no right and wrong. Yet even though they avoided the fallacy of arguing over what is right and what is wrong, there still remain one right and one wrong. Here, the words, right and wrong, are the same, but their meanings are very different (from what was meant by from proposition one to eight.) Even so, deluded people, upon hearing the word 'right', say ordinary persons and sages share same 'right', and as they hear the word 'wrong', say ordinary persons and sages share the same 'wrong'. Fallacy has reached this point. But that can not be so.

(NOTE) So far the levels of cognition have been presented, which are: 1) The first grade in which people claim what is right to be right and claim what is wrong to be wrong. In this grade, they roughly avoid the fallacy of saying right as wrong and wrong as right. 2) The second

grade in which people say that it is *'wrong'* to discriminate right and wrong, and that it is *'right'* to transcend the dichotomy of right and wrong. Even in this stage, they still retain right and wrong, even the connotations of the concepts are different from those in the previous stage. 3) Third grade which is represented by no-mind will be dealt with in the following (the tenth) section.

十無是無非者: 若夫以是非爲非. 無是非爲是者. 彼且惡於是非. 猶不免是非累也. 而欲惡於其累.別更有所存者. 然其所上. 已存於心. 亦未免於累也. 將欲不累 莫若無心.以無心故.[31] 誰謂爲是非? 是非亡矣. 彼我隨喪. 彼我喪故. 得失亦無也. 不然於然. 不可於可. 爾乃任放無爲. 逍遙累外耳!

此又順性起[32]故 錄附之

10) As to there being no right and wrong: Those who

31) 莫若無心.以無心故 心 and 以 should be separated because they are belong to different sentences.

32) Chih-yen's note that this treatise (*Wang shih-fei lun*, 亡是非論) is appended because it reveals the tenet of *Hsing-ch'i* (性起) calls for our attentions. It shows that the tenet of *Hsing-ch'i* in Chih-yen's Hua-yen Buddhism goes along with that of *Wu-hsin* (無心).

maintain that it is wrong to argue about right and wrong. and that it is right to say there is no right or wrong. though despising the fallacy of right and wrong. are still not freed from the fallacy of right and wrong. They. despising the fallacy of right and wrong. may have something superior (to the dichotomy of right and wrong) in their minds. Retaining an admiration for something in one's mind. however. is itself an evidence of being not free from the fallacy of right and wrong. If one wishes to avoid the fallacy. there is no way other than that of being no-mind. There being no-mind. what in the world could raise the issue of right and wrong? Right and wrong accordingly will vanish. Consequently. other and self will also vanish. There will be neither gain nor loss. What had been so is no longer as such. What had been valid is no longer cogent. In this way. being free and not-actioning. may we wander about the realm beyond afflictions!

(As this treatise also is in accordance with the doctrine of *Hsing-ch'i* (Arising of the Nature). I quoted it to append here)

ANALYSIS

In translating this treatise, there has been some controversies, some of which may classified as follows:

1) The exact meaning of *shih* (是) and *fei* (非)

2) The grammatical functions of *shih* and *fei*

Those two questions can be answered simultaneously: Only precise translation of key passages will leave no room for doubts. Both of shih and fei are used as either noun or verb.

Propositions from one to eight, no matter how tedious they may be, deals with unattainability of right and wrong from various points of view. In short, the reason why right and wrong arise, it is claimed, depends on cognitive subject which is distorted by attachment to self and desire. It is the tendency of discriminative self and not the things and events themselves that is responsible for disputes on right and wrong.

Proposition nine deals with more exalted stage than foregoing ones in that it transcends duality of right and wrong. Nonetheless, this stage still sticks in the sphere of

cognitive subjectivity. In this sense, proposition nine also shares same problem as previous propositions. On the contrary, proposition ten shows the transcendental domain in which there is no subject-object dualism.[33] Only when one reaches the territory of Wu-hsin (無心), the fallacy of a biased attachment to right and wrong can be completely terminated. Consequently propositions one to nine may well be an auxiliary argument, while the proposition ten a main contention of this treatise.

The logical process of the proposition ten goes as follows:

1) To eliminate the fallacy of (the contention of) right and wrong, nothing is better than being *Wu-hsin*.

2) In the state of *Wu-hsin*, the duality of subject and object will disappear.

3) When the duality of subject and object disappears, being only the One as a whole, there will be no gain or loss.[34]

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33) Kuo Hsiang's own expression on this idea is 'merging with things (與物冥).' Here ming (冥) means boundless or traceless.

34) The One (一者) or the One Mind (一心), a totalitarian concept in Chinese philosophy, signifies either the whole universe in its concreteness or metaphysical entity beyond phenomenal world. Totality, by its definition, needs nothing to make it perfect, nor loses nothing as

4) As this transcends the domain of normal cognitive capacity, "what has been so will be no longer as it had been, and what had been valid will be no longer cogent.

5) In conclusion, one can roam about in the realm of no-actioning (無爲).[35]

T'an-ch'ien, in his conclusive remarks, without any hesitation, uses the terms, *Wu-wei* (無爲) and *Wu-hsin* (無心), which are major jargons used by Taoists.[36] The

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it embraces everything.

35) *Wu-wei* (無爲) and *Wu-hsin* (無心):
Wu-wei in Taoist philosophy means doing nothing with any ego-centered intention, while *Wu-hsin* indicates the state of mind where no discriminative conscious no more functions. Accordingly *Wu-wei* is an action that is done with *Wu-hsin*.

36) It is as early as +3rd Century that Wu-hsin was to used in the Chinese translation of the Buddhist scripture: *Fo-shuo hui-yin san-mei ching* (佛說海印三昧經, *Tathāgatajñānamudrasamādhi* has it:
'What is the characteristic of no-work? The characteristic is unobtainability. What is the characteristic of unobtainability?...What is the characteristic of immovability? The characteristic is the freedom from movability. What is the characteristic of freedom from movability? The characteristic is no-mind. What is the characteristic of no-mind? The characteristic is no-thought (*wu-nien*). What is the characteristic of no-thought? The characteristic is non-duality. What is the characteristic of non-duality? The characteristic is the sameness of things. [Yun-hua Jan's translation of T 15, p. 466c.]
He continues in his analysis; 'The statement contains a number of technical terms of Indian Buddhism which are clearly not of Chinese

tenets of 'non-duality' as well as 'the sameness of things' shows striking similarity with that of the commentary of the *Chuang-tzu* by Kuo Hsiang. By *Wu-hsin* Kuo Hsiang also means 'no deliberate mind of one's own'.[37] *Wu-hsin*, according to him, was not no-mind, but a state of mind in which one knows something through direct intuition that is embodiment of *Li* (理). Even if this exalted cognition transcends all conceptual thoughts, it is still some kind of thought (遺知而知). It is some sort of mystic experience where subject and object profoundly (玄) identical and things are subtlely converged one another (與物冥合).[38] He says in his commentary of 'The Great Master':

> How can one not forget? Having forgot the trace of things, and forgot what made things as they are, inwardly he forget his own body and outwardly he forget the universe. Then he throughly becomes one

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origin. Although the original Indian text of this work is no longer extant, some of these technical terms are identifiable from other works.' See Yun-hua Jan, JCP p. 55, note 4.

37) Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book, p. 791. Wu-hsin comprises not only intellectual activities but volitional and emotional activities. "Knowledge, as it is boundless, damages nature of beings. Mind, as it desires evil, exhausts truthfulness. (知以無涯傷性. 心以慾惡蕩眞.)"

38) Meng p'ei-yuan, p. 402.

entity with transformation itself, thereby leaves nothing that is not understood! (夫坐忘者, 奚所不忘哉! 旣忘其跡, 又忘其所以跡者, 內不覺其一身, 外不識有天地, 然後曠然與變化爲體, 而無不通也.)

Again, in his commentary on the '*Treatise on the Equality of Things*':

"This" and "that" oppose each other but the sage is in accord with both of them. Therefore he who embodies No-mind is silently harmonized with things and is never opposed to the world. This is the way to occupy the central position and to be in union with the profoundly mysterious ultimate in order to respond with things from any direction they may come.[39)]

On *Wu-wei* (無爲), Lao-tzu says:

Tao invariably takes no action, and yet there is nothing left undone.
If kings and barons can keep it, all things will transform spontaneously.
If, after transformation, they should desire to be active,
I would restrain them with simplicity, which has no name.
Simplicity, which has no name, is free of desires.
Being free of desires, it is tranquil.

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39) *Chuang-tzu chu*, ch. 2.

And the world will be at peace of its own accord.[40]

It is evident, therefore, that the concept of *wu-hsin* and *wu-wei* employed by T'an-ch'ien is nothing other than representation of the Taoist notion found in the *Lao-tzu* and *Chuang-tzu*.

40) *Lao-tzu*, ch. 37.

詳玄賦1)

仙城山釋慧命

HSIANG-HSUAN FO (STANZA ON THE ELABORATION OF THE PROFUNDITY)

by Hui-ming

惟一實之淵曠　　嗟萬相之繁雜

From the One Reality that is profound and spacious,

O, myriad forms are exuberantly produced!

[NOTE] It is evident that Hui-ming used the concept One Reality from the perspective of the Buddhist world-view. As will be clear in the following lines, however, the concept shows close affinity with the Taoist concept of Tao.

眞俗異而體同　　凡聖分而道合

Though distinctive are the supreme and conventional reality, they share the same substance.

Though the sacred and profane are divided, they

1) KHMC, vol. 29, T 52, p. 340.

converge in the realm of Tao.

〔NOTE〕 The metaphysical term of *t'i* (體) along with *ai* (涯, i.e., 相) and yung (用) is applied to describe One Reality. This methodology penetrates and constitute the framework of the three major Chinese philosophical tradition, Taoism, Buddhism and Confucianism.

承師友之遺訓　　藉經論之垂芳

(Therefore) succeeding the inherited teachings of masters and colleagues,

Relying on the transmitted fragrance of sūtras and śāstras,

罄塵膚之小織　　請興言於大方

With a tiny fabric that is woven with my banal capacity,

(Let me) propagate the teachings all over the world.

〔NOTE〕 The above are introductory remarks. The first two lines, which are quoted by Chih-yen, the second patriarch of the Hua-yen school, suggest the general

world-view of the author, Hui-ming. His clear statement that myriad things (萬相) are produced from One Reality (一實) inevitably reminds us of the Taoist central term Tao (道) and its relationship with the phenomenal world.[2)]

From now on, the substance (體) of the One Reality is elaborated, especially in regard to its ineffability and unfathomability. We hardly find any difference between the attributes of the concept of Tao and that of One Reality (一實, 一虛) that was set up by the author as a Buddhist term. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to say that the *ko-yi* (格義) in the early stage of the Buddhist introduction into China was never given up till at least the 6th century A. D.

何群類之蠢蠢　　處法界之茫茫

What a variety of wriggling creatures
Dwell in the boundless Dharma-dhātu!

性窮幽而彌曉　　理至寂而愈彰[3)]

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2) How do I know that the beginning of all things are so? Through this (Tao). [*Lao-tzu* ch. 21]

3) *Hsing* (性) and *Li* (理):
Hsing is *Li* of universe that is embodied in man, and *Li* is a principle

The deeper one explores the innermost depth, the brighter the inherent nature glows.

The more one's mind subsides, the more the Principle reveals itself.

既非空而非有　　又若存而若亡[4)]

'Neither empty nor existent' is (the essence of reality)

Namely, 'it seems to exist and not exist.'

[NOTE] The author deliberately juxtaposes the Buddhist and the Taoist ideas. It is noteworthy that the term *yu* (有) and *k'ung* (空) are understood as the existent and the non-existent. In other words, we see Hui-ming, a Buddhist of the 6th Century A. D., still identifies *k'ung* (空) and *wu* (無).

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that governs the whole universe. In other words, *Hsing* is subjective *Li*, and *Li* is objective *Hsing*. In the case of Kuo Hsiang, these two technical terms are interchangeable. Hui-ming, a Buddhist philosopher of +6th Century gives a hint of the appearance of Neo-confucianism in the Sung dynasty which is often called the Learning of *Hsing-Li* (性理學).

4) *Lao-tzu* ch. 41.

談秘密於慈氏[5]　歡窅冥於伯陽[6]

Praying secret words to Kuanyin (*Avalokiteśvara*).

(I also) rejoice at the cryptic profundity of Lao-tzu.

湛一虛而致極　總萬有而爲綱

By submerging in One Voidness, I approach the ultimate domain.

And by summing up myriad things, I find the guiding principle.

雖卽事而易迷　亦至近而難測

Whenever faced with each event, one is liable to be misled.

And, no matter how familiar it might be, it is hardly fathomed.

非名言之所顯　豈情智而能測

As it is not revealed by names and words,

How could It be measured by deluded cognizer?

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5) 慈氏; 觀世音菩薩 (Avalokiteśvara).

6) 伯陽; 老子 (Lao-tzu).

口欲辯而詞喪　　心將緣而慮息

(Therefore) whenever one tries to discuss it, the words fail.

Whenever one tries to grasp it with mind, the thread of speculation is lost.

故雖一音遍告之能[7]　　三轉窮微之力[8]

(Thus) even if one possess the capacity One Voice that pervades universally.

And with the ability of the Three Turnings of Doctrine that explores the subtleties (of the teaching).

莫不停八梵[9]於寂泊之門　輟四辯[10]於恬淡之域

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7) *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra* extols the eloquence of Tathāgāta by using a simile of rain through which all kinds of trees are benefited according to their capacity.

8) Three turnings of the Buddha's teaching. Until very recently, Chinese Buddhists had believed that Mahāyāna Sūtras were discoursed by Gotama Buddha himself. There are several versions as to what are those three. For instance, most popular one goes as follows: 1) Indicative (示轉); postulation and definition of the Four Noble Truths. 2) Hortative (勸轉); suffering should be diagnosed. 3) Evidential (證轉); I have overcome suffering.

9) 八梵; eight Brahmas or eight Māras (八魔): the māras of the passions (煩惱魔); the skandha-māras (陰魔); death-māra (死魔); the māra-king (他化自在魔). The above four are ordinarily termed the four

Obliged is one to desist from eight Brahmas in front of the gate of the stillness.

And compelled is one to cease the four eloquences in the sphere of the translucence.

尋其涯也

Allow me to investigate the periphery (of the Reality).

[NOTE] From now on, the mark (of the One Reality) is elaborated with respect to its formlessness - formlessness because it is beyond time and space.

豁乎無際　眇乎無窮

(It is) so vast without boundary.

And so far off as it is endless.

源乎無始　極乎無終

In regard to its source, it has no beginning.

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māras. The other four are the four Hīnayāna delusions of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas: impermanence (無常); joylessness (無樂); impersonality (無我); impurity (無淨).

10) 四辯; four analytical knowledges (*pratisaṃvid*, 四無礙辯): meaning (*artha*, 義); dharmas (法); languages (詞); ready speech (樂說).

In terms of extension, it has no ending.

〔NOTE〕 Former two lines are explained in terms of space, and latter two lines in terms of time.

解惑以之齊貫　　染淨於此俱融

It threads both understanding and delusion.

Both purity and impurity are harmonized by it.

該空有而閑寂　　括宇宙而通同

Embracing both emptiness and existense, it is serene.

Encompassing the whole universe, it is homogeneous.

論其用也

Let me discuss its functions:

〔NOTE〕 From now on, the function of the One Reality is elaborated with respect to its productivity of things and its potentiality for wisdom (*prajñā*) and delusion (*avidyā*).

一而能多　靜而能亂

It is one that has the potential be many.

While being serene, it is ready to be agitated.

〔NOTE〕 The question of One and many, which is eternal object of philosophical inquiry, is discussed here in the same manner as in the Neo-Taoist philosophy.

挺萬類之殊形　　吐群情之別觀

It produces distinctive forms of countless species.

And brings forth diverse appearances of numerous sentient beings.

結五住之盤根[11)]　起十纏之羈絆[12)]

It binds up the roots of five delusions.

And creates the bridle of ten *kleśas*.

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11) 五住之惑; Five categories of fundamental defilement. Fives sorts of illusion affecting all kinds of defilement, viz., false views (三界見惑), covetousness (欲界思惑), attachment to forms (色界思惑), desire for existence (無色界思惑), and ignorance (三界無明).

12) 十煩惱; ten fetters (saṃyojana 十使, 十惑): view of individuality (satkāyadṛṣṭi, 身見); contagion of mere rule and ritual (śīlavrataparāmarśa, 戒禁取見); doubts (vicikitsā, 疑); greed for sensuous passions (kāmacchanda, 貪慾); greed for the form-world (rūparāga, 色愛); greed for the formless-world (ārūpyarāga, 無色愛); ill-will (vyāpāda, 瞋恚); excitedness (auddhatya, 掉擧); conceit (māna, 慢); ignorance (avidyā, 無明, 癡).

隨迷悟而通塞　　逐昏明而集散

Corresponding to delusion or enlightenment, there follows blockage and passage.

In accordance with darkness or brightness, there emerge gathering or scattering.

四流[13]因之漂蕩　六道[14]以之悠漫

On account of it, four streams recklessly flow.

Owing to it, six gatis are sluggishly prolonged.

三賢[15]十聖[16]曖以聯綿　二智[17]五眼[18]曄而暉渙

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13) 四暴(瀑)流: The four outflows (āsrava, 四漏, 四暴流): sense-desire (kāma, 欲); becoming (bhava, 有); ignorance (avidyā, 無明); views (dṛṣṭi, 見).

14) 六道; the six destinies (*gati*) of transmigration of sentient beings: gods (*deva,* 天, 天上); men (*manuṣya,* 人, 人間); asura (*asura,* 修羅, 阿修羅); animals (*tiryagyoni,* 畜生, 傍生); ghosts (*preta,* 餓鬼); beings in the hells (*nārakeya,* 地獄).

15) 三玄; 1) abbreviation of the *San-hsuan-hsueh* (三玄學, the Three Profound Learning) which consists of the *Lao-tzu, Chuang-tzu,* and *I-ching*. 2) the Three Sages who are believed to have founded the three teachings of China, *Conze, Lao-tzu,* and the Buddha. Presumably, Hui-ming seems to have used it as the latter meaning.

16) 十地菩薩; Ten stages through which the practitioner advances the Buddhist practice. In the system of the fifty-two stages of bodhisattva

The teachings of three wisemen and ten sages are, though hazily, incessantly handed down.

Two wisdoms and five eyes are (still) luminous and brilliant.

渾升沈而共壑　　派違順以分岐

Ascension and descension mix up together in the same valley.

---

practice, they are viewed as the courty first though fiftieth stages. The ten stages (*bhūmi*, 十地) are as follows: the joyous stage (*pramuditā-bhūmi*, 歡喜地); the immaculate stage (*vimalā-bhūmi*, 離垢地); the light-giving stage (*prabhākarī-bhūmi*, 發光地); the brilliant stage (*arciṣmatī-bhūmi*, 焰慧地); the stage which is very difficult to conquer (*sudurjayā-bhūmi*, 難勝地); the stage which is face to face (*abhimukhī-bhūmi*, 現前地); the far-reaching stage (*dūraṃgamā-bhūmi*, 遠行地); the immovable stage (*acalā-bhūmi*, 不動地); the stage of unerringly effective intentions (*sādhumatī-bhūmi*, 善慧地); the stage of the cloud of dharma (*dharmameghā-bhūmi*, 法雲地).

17) The two kinds of wisdom, the fundamental wisdom (根本智) and the acquired wisdom (後得智). The former is so called because it is the source of all other types of wisdom and produces the latter. The acquired wisdom is also called the 'detailed or specific wisdom.' This concept is opposite of fundamental wisdom which grasps the truth or reality directly. On the other hand, the acquired wisdom discriminates all forms of existences.

18) the five eyes (*cakṣus*, 五眼): fleshly eye (*māṃsa-cakṣus*, 肉眼); heavenly eye (*divya-cakṣus*, 天眼); wisdom eye (*prajñā-cakṣus*, 慧眼); Dharma-eye (*dharma-cakṣus*, 法眼); Buddha-eye (*buddha-cakṣus*, 佛眼).

The favourable and unfavourable branch off at diverging points.

體無非而不是　　用無相而不爲

Its substance defies dissent or assent (to its existence).

Its function has no forms or intentional activity.

〔NOTE〕 Here again the Neo-Taoist categories, 體, 相, 用, are explained: The substance (體) of Reality defies dissent or assent because it is all embracing. The Reality has no mark (相) because it transcends our ordinary sensory perception. The Reality functions through no intentional activity, yet leaves nothing that is not done (無爲而無不爲). It reveals nothing but the Neo-Taoist way of thinking, especially developed by Wang Pi and Kuo Hsiang of Wei-Chin dynasties.

若純金不隔於環釧　等積水不憚於漣漪[19]

This is like pure gold not being different from the

19) 漣漪; ripples (細波), from the *Shih ching* (詩經); '...the stream water is pure and ripples... (河水淸且漣漪).'

bracelets.

And amassed water not worrying about ripples.

〔NOTE〕 These kinds of metaphors remind us of some Chinese Buddhist literatures: The former was represented by Fa-tsang (法藏) in his 'A Treatise on the Golden Lion (金師子章)', and the latter is a resurrection of the simile in the 'A Treatise on the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith (大乘起信論)' Both of them explain the Hua-yen tenet of Li-shih Wu-ai (理事無礙, Non-obstruction between Principle and phenomena.) These also represent the question of One and many. One symbolizes pure gold and amassed water, while many symbolize bracelets and ripples.

故令名用諠雜集起紛馳

Therefore, it puts names and functions into a chaotic turmoil, and makes the collective arisings run of their own accord.

事若萬軫殊轍　　理則千輪共規

Phenomena are like the many tracks left behind by

myriad chariots.

Principle is like the common structure that thousands of wheels are sharing.

[NOTE] This shows the relationship between *Li* and *shih*: *Li* is a law or a principle (or laws or principles[20]) that penetrates all phenomena, whereas *shih* represents the functional variety of myriad of things. This idea was handed down to the Hua-yen Buddhists.

觀無礙於緣起　　信難思於物性

One sees non-obstruction in causality.

One is convinced that it is truely difficult to conceive the nature of things.

猶寶殿之殊珠[21)]　若瑤臺之顯鏡

Like dazzling jewels in the palace of treasure.

Like a bright mirror of the gemmy pavillion.

---

20) *Li*, as was shown in the Neo-Taoist context, means either various principles of each things and events or a Principle that governs whole universe and things in it.

21) This undoubtedly refers to the jewel net of Indra's palace which plays pivotal role in the foundation of Hua-yen thought.

彼此異而相入　　紅紫分而交映

This and that are, though different, interpenetrative.

Red and purple are, though diverse, mutually reflective.

法無定於心境　　人靡隔於凡聖

Dharma is not determined in the sphere of mind.

There is no inherent difference between ordinary person and sage.

物不滯於自他　　事莫擁於邪正

Things do not suffer a dichotomy between self and others.

Events are not beset by duality of right and wrong.

何巨細之殊越　　遂參互而容持

However different the gross and minuscule may be.

They are finally mixed up to accept each other.

隣虛[22]含大千之界 刹那總三世之時

---

22) Literally means 'one's neighborhood.'

Close quarters include the Great Thousands of World.

Kṣaṇa comprehends the Three Periods of Time.

懼斯言之少信　　借帝網以除疑

Being afraid that few may trust this tenet.

I borrow Indra's jewel net to disperse doubts.

蓋普眠而能矚　　豈惑識以知之

How could one see (the Reality) in all embracing slumber!

How could one know it with deluded cognition!

覩九會之玄文[23]　覽萬聖之貽則

Looking up the profound scripture describing the nine meetings.

Behold the principles handed down by myriad sages.

瞻常啼於東市[24]　慕善財於南國

---

23) This refers to nine places where the meetings of the *Hua-yen ching* are held. *Hua-yen ching* is composed of fifty two meetings according to which chapters are divided.

24) This episode is found in the *Śatasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra* (十萬頌般若經). Bodhisattva Sadāprarudita, having heard Tathāgātha's voice in his dream, goes to the city in the East to attain enlightenment.

歷多城而進解　訪衆師而遣惑

始承命於文殊　終歸宗於妙德

雖遊形於法界　未動足於祇園

Pondering over Sadāprarudita in the Eastern city.

I pay adoration to Sūdana in the Southern country.

He who pilgrimaged many cities to advance his understanding.

He who visited various masters to eliminate delusion.

He who, in the first place, received a mission from Manjusri.

He who finally returned to the essential teaching through Miao-te.

Even though his figure roamed about dharma-dhātu,

He never stepped out of Jetavana (祇園精舍).[25]

〔NOTE〕 This is the outline of the *Gandhabūha* where Sūdana pilgrimages Southern country to cultivate wisdom.

歎一生之似虐　嗟五熱[26]之非香

---

25) Monastery in Śrāvastī (India), which the wealthy merchant, Anāthapindika, established for the historical Buddha.

26) 五熱; An alias of India.

What a torture the span of life is!

But India is not yet dark!

握手入和修之舍[27]彈指開阿逸之門[28]

When we enter the hall of the sage hand in hand.

The gate of grace will open in a snap of a finger.

聞理音之常韻　　覩極聖之恒存

The sound of Principle is always heard.

The great sages are seen to forever exist.

三九[29]於玆絶聽　二七[30]自此亡魂

Practitioners of the thirty-nine levels of practice, in this domain, gives up listening.

Sages of the twenty-seven stages, in this sphere, lose their spirits.

---

27) A transliteration of *Vāsuki*. A nine headed *Nāga* in Indian mythology.

28) A transliteration of Ajita which is a different name of Maitreya.

29) See Nakamura Hajime, p. 460.

30) Ibid., p. 1046.

斯甚深之境界　　亦何易而詳論

How could this profound and profound plane

Be easily elaborated in detail!

悼稟識之多迷　　慨群生之少慧

Deplorable is our inherited cognizance that is all but delusive!

Lamentable are the living creatures that have little wisdom!

保一異之四邪[31)]　起斷常之雙計[32)]

They hold four false views about oneness and difference.

They give rise to two erroneous views of permanence and annihilation.

怖夢虎於長眠　　翫空花於久翳[33)]

---

31) *tetralemma*

32) Two extreme views of permanence and annihilation.

33) The phenomena of the mundane world often metaphorized as an illusion made by a kind of chronic eye disease (一翳在眼 空花亂墜). It is also metaphorized as a long dream where sentient beings take what

They are frightened by a tiger while dreaming in prolonged sleep.

And enjoy flowery illusions sprouting from long-ill eyes.

縈結纏[34]而未解　任漂流而莫濟

Tied up by *kleśa*. they are not able to cut free.

Left at the mercy of drifting. they are not to be delivered.

背七覺[35]而逾昏　染六欲[36]而方滯

---

is unreal to be real.

34) Another name of *kleśa* (煩惱) as *kleśa* binds sentient beings just like a rope does.

35) Seven limbs of enlightenment (sanskrit. bodhyaṅga, chinese. 七覺支, or 七菩提分), which refers to mindfulness (smṛti, 念), investigation into dharmas (dharma-pravicaya, 擇法), vigor (vīrya, 精進), joyous zest (prīti, 喜), tranquility (praśrabdhi, 輕安), concentration (samādhi, 定), and evenmindedness (upekṣā, 捨).

36) There are, among varying usages, two relevant ones for this context; 1) The six sexual attractions arising from color (色), form (形貌), carriage (威儀姿態), voice (言語音聲), softness (細滑), and features (人相). 2) The six desires correspondent with six sense organs, i.e., eye (眼), ear (耳), nose (鼻), tongue (舌), body (身), mind (意).

Turning their backs on the seven limbs of enlightenment, they become more dimmed.

Defiled by six desires they are so easily hindered.

何理通而志隔　　既法是而情非

Why the Principle fare well, while the intellect begets conflict?

(Because) the dharma is right, while the ordinary mind is wrong.

忽伶姘而獨往　　久逃逝而亡歸

Unexpectedly being alone, they wander about in solitude.

For a long time in exile, they forget to return.

埋積寶於窮舍　　瘞明珠於弊衣

(Not knowing) that a heap of treasure is buried in a shedlike house,

Or brilliant jewels are concealed in shabby clothes.

抱一眞而不識　　縈萬惱以歔欷

Though embracing One Reality, they do not recognize

it.

Instead, bound up by myriad *kleśas*, they sigh in grief.

嗟余生於季俗[37] 惑己纏而命局

Alas, entrusting the rest of their lives to the last period of decline,

Delusion binds up their bodies and perils their lives.

藉五部[38]之流輝 蒙四依[39]之瞻錄

(You should) depend on the glittering splendor of five-fold Mahāyāna sūtras.

With help of four reliances, the writings of (sūtras) should be studied.

陟講肆以開愚 託禪林而遣欲

---

37) 季俗; the declining period of the Buddha's teaching.

38) Fivefold Mahāyāna Sūtras (五部大乘經). *Avataṃsaka Sūtra, Mahāsaṃghāta Sūtra, Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra, Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra.*

39) The four standards which the bhikṣus must observe: to follow the dharma, not to follow person; to follow the teachings of the sūtra which are regarded as complete and formal, not to follow the provisional teachings; to follow the meanings, not to follow the words; to follow prajñā, not to follow discriminative thinking.

(You should) step up to the hall of lecture to enlighten ignorance.

Consign yourself to the forest of meditation to eliminate greed.

猴著鎖而停躁　　蛇入筒而改曲

(For) monkeys put in fetters cease to make a fuss.

And snakes crawling a bamboo tube can straighten up.

涉曠海以戒舟　　曉重幽以慧燭

One may cross the vast sea in a boat of precept.

One may illuminate thick darkness with a candle of wisdom

絶諍論於封想　　息是非於妄情

One should quit disputes stemmed from adamant speculation.

And one should cease attaching to diluded ideas of right and wrong.

創斂緣於有覺　　終寂慮於無生

In the beginning, one should prepare oneself for

enlightenment.

In the end, one will realize non-arising in calm meditation.

顯眞宗之實相　　達世用之虛名

(And thereby), one may reveal the real marks of authentic teaching.

Also, thoroughly understand worldly functions of void names.

道莫遺於始行　　暗不拒於初明

Tao will not missed even at initial practice.

Darkness would not defy first light.

擬六賊[40]其方潰　冀十軍[41]之可平

Just as six robbers are annihilated,

May ten armed troops also be leveled to the ground!

---

40) six robbers refers to six senses or six pleasures of the six sense organs, i.e., forms and colors to eye, sounds to ear, smells to nose, tastes to tongue, touches to body, thoughts to mind.

41) Ten armies of Māra, which the Buddha destroys; they are desire, anxiety, hunger and thirst, longing, torpidity, fear, doubt, poison, gain, haughtiness.

辭曰

昏雲聚還散　　心河濁更淸

性海無增減　　行月有虧盈[42]

As dark clouds assemble and scatter,

So the stream of mind clears and muddies.

Though the sea of nature neither increases nor decreases,

The running moon either waxes or wanes.

疑兎足之致淺[43]　懼鴻毛之見輕[44]

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42) This verse is composed by two pair of coordinatives; dark clouds vs. stream of mind, the sea of inherent nature vs. the running moon. The latter pair shows contrast beween what is real and permanent and what is mutable and transient, the contrast between Li and Shih, the Transcendental and the worldlyness and so forth.

43) A rabbit, the most fearful animal for water, would not cross a river even if it manages to approach the shallowest point. This line can be translated in two different ways according to the implications of the letter '淺' which may be taken to refer either the 'short' leg of a rabbit or a 'shallow' point of a river. The above translation took the latter. If taken the former, the sentence in question can be translated as follows; 'It is doubtful that the feet of a rabbit may be considered to be too short (to ran away, or to cross a river. Either way is possible because, considering the context, this verse emphasizes self-confidence.

爲山託於始簣[45] 庶崑崙[46]之可成

Doubtful is that a rabbit's feet seek but shallow stream.

Fearful that feathers of a goose are ignored.

Making a mountain depends on the first basket of soil.

Thus, may the *Kun-lun* mountain be erected!

---

44) A feather of a goose is a typical simile to describe light weight; 'One takes his death as light as a feather of a goose.'

45) From the Chinese folklore, 'Mister Wu moves a Mountain (愚公移山)' "Mister Wu, with a small basket, was trying to move a big mountain in front of his house to clear traffic inconveniences. People in the village, making fun of him, asked, 'As an old man, how dare you move so big a mountain as that?' The old man answered, 'As long as I am alive, will I do this job which, after my demise, my son will take over, and which in turn my grandson will take over............until this mountain dissappears!"

46) The highest Mountain in the Chinese myth.

華嚴一乘十玄門[1]

釋智儼 撰

HUA-YEN I-CH'ENG SHIH-HSUAN MEN

by Chih-yen

明一乘緣起自體法界者，不同大乘二乘緣起，但能離執常斷諸過等.

此宗不爾，一卽一切無過不離，無法不同也.

今且就此華嚴一部經宗，通明法界緣起，不過自體因之與果.

所言因者，方便緣修體窮位滿，卽普賢是也.

所言果者，謂自體究竟寂滅圓果，十佛境界一卽一切.

謂十佛世界海及離世間品(*)[2]明十佛義，是也.

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1) *Shih-hsuan men*, T 45, pp. 514a-518c., The issues of the authorship of this treatise lend themselves to minor controversies. Nevertheless, though its inheritance from Tu-shun to Chih-yen is not fully convinced, the authorship of the latter draws general consensus among mordern scholars. See Kimura Kyotaka (木村清孝), *Shoki chugoku kegon shiso no kenkyu* (初期中國華嚴思想の硏究, *The Study of Early Chinese Hua-yen Thought*) p. 401-2., Takamine Ryoshu (高峯了州), *Kegon shiso shi* (華嚴思想史, *The History of Hua-yen Thought*) p. 160. Also see Ishihara Shinkei (石橋眞誠), "*Chigon no shisoteki keifu* (智儼の思想的系譜, *The Lineage of Thought of Chih-yen*)", JIBS vol. 24, Mar. (1976), pp. 767-770.

2) This mark (*) indicates points where my readings differ from the Taisho editors.

The way the One Vehicle clarifies causality in the one substance of the Dharma-realm is different from that of the two Mahāyāna schools, which only help to avoid such fallacies as the attachment to the view of permanence or cessation and other false views.

This is not the case in this school; for there is no fallacy that is not eliminated as One is identical with All and there is nothing that is not identical.

This school, which is based on the Hua-yen [Avataṁsaka] sūtra, thoroughly expounds the Dharma-realm causality to be none other than cause and effect of its own substance.

What is said to be cause refers to skill-in-means, the cultivation of conditions, which exhausts its substance and encompasses all the (bodhisattva) stages. This is represented by Samantabhadra.

What is said to be effect refers to perfect effect that is complete, calm cessation of its substance, and is the realm of the ten Buddhas in which One is identical with All. It also refers to the ocean of the realm of the ten Buddhas and to the conception of the ten Buddhas set forth in the chapter of 'Departing from the Worldliness.'

問; 文殊亦是因. 人何故但言普賢是其因人耶?

答; 雖復始起發於妙慧, 圓滿在於稱周. 是故隱於文殊, 獨言普賢也. 亦可文殊普賢據其始終, 通明緣起也. 今辨此因果二門者, 圓果絶於說相, 所以不可以言說而辨. 因卽明其方便緣修, 是故略辨也.

Question: Mañjuśrī may also be the cause. Why are you indicating only Samantabhadra as the cause?

Answer: Even though Mañjuśrī, in the beginning, raises himself from profound wisdom, because perfection needs pervasiveness (of wisdom), the meaning of cause is hidden in Mañjuśrī. That is the reason Samantabhadra alone is referred to. It is also possible for Mañjuśrī and Samantabhadra to be indicated as the beginning and ending (i.e., cause and effect) in order to thoroughly reveal causality. Now, in discussing two features of cause and effect, as perfect effect is beyond the mark of description, it can not be discussed in terms of words. Only the cause alone can be explained in terms of the cultivation of conditions which is skill-in-means. This is why it (the question of cause and effect) has been discussed briefly.

問; 不思議法品等, 亦明果德. 何故得於因門說耶?

答; 此等, 雖是果德, 對緣以辨果, 非是究竟圓寂之果. 是故與因同一會說也.

Question: The chapter of 'beyond conceptual thought' and others also explain the merits of the effect. Why are you discussing it (effect) within the discourse of the cause?

Answer: Even if the merits of effect are enumerated in those texts, they discuss the effects with reference to conditions. These are not complete, perfectly calm effects. So it has been discussed together with the cause.

今約敎就自體相. 辨緣起者於中有二: 一者擧譬辨成於法; 二者辨法會通於理. 所言擧譬辨者; 如夜摩天會菩薩雲集品說云, "譬如數十法增一至無量, 皆悉是本數智慧故差別也. 今擧此十數爲譬者, 復有二門: 一異體門; 二同體門. 就異體門中, 復有三: 一者, 一中多, 多中一. 如經云, "一中解無量, 無量中解一. 展轉生非實. 智者無所畏." 此約相說也; 二者, 一卽多, 多卽一. 如第七住經云, "一卽是多, 多卽一. 義味寂滅悉平等. 遠離一異顚倒相. 是名菩薩不退住. 此卽約理說也. 今約十數明, 一中多, 多中一者, 若順數從一至十向上去, 若逆數從十至一向下來, 如一者.(*) 一緣成故. 一中卽有十, 所以一成故. 若無十, 一卽不成 無性緣成故. 一中卽有十, 所以一成故. 二三四等一切皆成也. 若一住自性, 十卽不成.

十若不成，一亦不成也.

Now in explaining the mark of its own substance with doctrine, there are two ways to discuss causality: one is the use of metaphor to characterize dharma; the other is the thorough understanding of the principle (*li*) by characterizing dharma.

What is discussed by metaphor, as the chapter of 'the congregation of bodhisattvas in the Yama-devas' says, is reaching the immeasurable by adding one by one as if counting up to ten, for all distinctions depend on the knowledge of the fundamental number, i.e. one.

Now, if one considers the metaphor of counting ten, there are two ways: one is the way of different substance; the other, the way of identical substance.

In the way of different substance, there again are three subdivisions:

First, One includes Many 一中多 (hereafter OIM), Many includes One 多中一 (hereafter MIO). As noted in the sūtra, the immeasurable is understood through One, and One is understood through the immeasurable. What is produced by transformation (cause and condition) is not real. (So) the man of wisdom does not fear. This has

been set forth with respect to mark.

Second, One equal is equivalent to Many 一卽多 (hereafter OEM), Many is equivalent to One 多卽一 (hereafter MIO). As described in the seventh stage (or abode) of the sūtra, 'the meaning of 'One is identical with Many, Many is identical with One' is calm cessation and total equality, far away from the distorted mark of discriminations between unity and diversity. This is called 'the stage of bodhisattva where there is no falling back.' This has been set forth with reference to principle.

Now, with reference to the exposition of 'OIM, MIO' in counting ten, (there are two different ways); whether one counts ten in proper order, from one to ten, upwardly, or one counts ten in reverse order, from ten to one, downwardly.

Such a thing as one in either case is the one that is established conditionally. Therefore, (we could say) in one is ten, which again is the reason one is established. In other words, without ten, one cannot be established. Because conditions are formed without essence (own being), in one is ten. As one is already able to be established, two, three, four etc., up to everything, is able to be established. If one abides by inherent nature (own essence), then ten would not be established. If ten is not established, in the same token, then one would

not be established. Both are one. As one is made through conditions, in one there already is ten. As one is made as such, if there is no ten, one cannot be made. As (things) have no (inherent) nature and are made by conditions, in one there already is ten. As one is made as such, two, three, four...all are made. If there is a self-nature residing in one, ten cannot be made. If ten is not made, then one also cannot be made.

問; 旣其各各無性, 何得成其一多耶?

答; 此由法界實德緣起力用, 普賢境界相應, 所以一多相成, 不增不減也. 如維摩經云, "從無住, 本立一切法." 又論云, "以有空義故, 一切法得成也."

Question: If each unit, as you said, has no inherent nature, how can there be one and many?

Answer: That can be explained by the causal function of the true merit of the Dharma-realm which corresponds to the achievement of Samantabhadra, where one and many are reciprocally established without either increase or decrease.

As Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: "by way of no-abiding everything is fundamentally established."

And as the treatise says: "through the establishment of existence and emptiness, everything is established."

問; 此門攝法界, 爲盡爲不盡耶?

答; 亦有盡義, 亦無盡義. 何者? 十中一, 卽是盡. 一中十具說, 卽無盡也. 又復知, 一中等皆具盡不盡義也.

Question: Does this teaching encompass the Dharma-realm exhaustively or inexhaustively?

Answer: Either way is conceivable; it exhaustively encompasses on the one hand and inexhaustively on the other. Why? It is exhaustive in the case of 'Ten includes One 十中一 (hereafter TIO)', but inexhaustive when 'One includes Ten 一中十 (hereafter OIT)' comes into question.

Again it should be known that 'TIO', 'OIT' both hold both exhaustive and inexhaustive meanings.

次明一卽多, 多卽一者, 還同前門中向上去向下來也. 如似一卽十緣成故. 若一非十, 十不成也. 從上向下來, 亦如是. 十卽一, 緣成故. 若十非一, 一不成也.

Next, 'OEM' and 'MEO' will be explained. This is the same as the calculation of ten upwardly and downwardly as shown in the foregoing exposition.

In the same way, one is equivalent to ten (OET), because (both of them) are established by conditions. If one is not identical with ten, ten cannot be established. This is all the same when counted downwardly; ten is identical with one because they are conditionally established. If ten is not identical with one, one cannot be established.

問; 何但一不成, 十亦不成?

答; 如柱若非舍, 爾時卽無舍. 若有舍, 亦有柱. 卽以柱卽舍故, 有舍復有柱. 一卽十, 十卽一故, 成一復成十也.

Question: When one is not established, why is ten also not established?

Answer: It is analogous to this case: if a pillar is not a part of a house, there would be no house at all. When there exists a house a pillar accordingly can exist. In other words, only when a pillar is identical with a house, can there exist both a house and a pillar. Because one is iequivalent to many and many is equivalent to one, one

can be established and many can be established.

問; 若一卽十此乃無有十, 那得言一之與十, 乃言以卽故得成耶?

答; 一卽十, 卽非一者; 非是情謂一. 所謂緣成一. 緣成一者,
非是情謂一故. 故經云, "一亦不爲一. 爲欲破諸數. 淺智者, 著諸法, 見一, 以爲一也."

Question: If one is (in fact) equivalent to ten (OET), there would exist no ten. How can you posit both one and ten arguing that they are established by way of mutual identification?

Answer: The one in 'OET' is not quite one, it follows that it is not one affirmed by delusive cognition; it is what is called 'dependently (or conditionally) established one.'

Because the conditionally established one is not the same as the one affirmed by delusive cognition, the sūtra says: 'even though one is not contended to be one, it is employed to refute (the reality of) numerals.'

The man of humble wisdom, being attached to (the existence of) all things, holds one as (real) one.

問; 前明一中十. 此明一中十. 有何別耶?

答; 前明一中十者, 離一無有十, 而十非是一. 若此明一中十者, 離一無有十,(*) 而十卽是一,(*)緣成故.

Question: What is the difference between the previously demonstrated 'OIT' and the 'OIT' that is now being demonstrated?

Answer: The previously discussed 'OIT' signifies that ten cannot exist apart from one, however, ten is by no means one. On the other hand, the 'OIT' implies that ten cannot exist apart from one and that ten itself is one because they are conditionally established.

問; 若一多要待緣成者, 爲是同時爲是先後耶?

答; 緣成, 故常同時而先後. 所以然者; 一卽十, 十卽一, 故常同時. 而向上去向下來, 故有前後也.

Question: If one and many depend on each other to be conditionally established, are they established at the same time, or one after another?

Answer: Due to its conditional establishment, they are always established both at the same time and one after another (or in a sequence)

The reason is as follows: From the perspective of 'OET' and 'TEO',

they are established at the same time; From the perspective of the process of counting, e.g., downwardly or upwardly, they are established one after another.

問; 旣有明先後去來, 卽是有增減. 何名不動本相耶?

答; 雖先後去來, 而常不動故. 經云, "不來相, 而來也." 如一卽多, 而不動一相. 如此一相, 亦非情謂一. 多, 亦如是. 雖多, 卽一, 而不壞多相. 亦非情謂多.

Question: Once you assume both sequence and coming and going, it follows that there are increase and decrease. Being so, how can you maintain a fundamental mark without shift?

Answer: Being no sequence or coming and going, there always is no shift whatever. As a sūtra says: 'without a mark of coming, there is coming'. In the same manner, 'OEM' can be maintained without shifting a single mark.

The 'single mark' here again is not being asserted from the viewpoint of the delusive mind as numeral one. This is the same case as in many; even though 'MEO' is declared, the mark of many is not demolished because many is not uttered delusively.

問; 此之一多旣是緣成, 不動情謂者. 爲是本來有此一多, 爲是始有耶?

答; 今本有不有者, 爲欲就智辨本有. 爲自就一多體辨耶? 若自就一多體辨, 不論智者, 體卽息諸論.(*)道 同於究竟圓果離說相故. 今若辨一多者, 約智說也. 如經云, "智慧差別故." 又云,(*) "智者無所畏," 故約智說一多也.

Question: (You said that) both one and many are established conditionally and are not asserted delusively. Being so, do one and many, as you claimed, exist primordially (or inherently), or do they have any beginning?

Answer: As regards to inherent existence and non-inherent existence; when it comes to wisdom, inherent existence is assumed. How dare it be assumed arbitrarily?

If the substance of 'one and many 一多 (hereafter OM)' is assumed arbitrarily without taking into account wisdom, the discussion as to substance will cease.

Tao (here truth) is all the same in the name of foremost, perfect effect in the sense that it is apart from the mark of words. Distinction between one and many here is mentioned with reference to wisdom. As the sūtra says: 'due to the discrimination in wisdom' one and many

has been differentiated.

問; 若約智, 故其本有者, 以智照故本有耶?

答; 如室中空, 開門見時, 此空卽是本有. 如涅槃經, 見佛性已, 卽非三世攝.

Question: If there is inherent existence with reference to wisdom, does it owe its existence to illumination of wisdom?

Answer: It is analogous to the empty space of a room: when the door of the room is opened, the empty space found in it is inherently existent. As mentioned in the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, (the experience of) seeing Buddha nature is not involved in the three periods of time (future, present and future)

問; 亦得是始有, 以不?

答; 見時, 如言有. 不見, 不言有. 故亦名始有.

Question: Is it also conceivable that it (the substance) comes into existence, or not?

Answer: When seen, it is said to be existent. (To the contrary) when not seen, it cannot be said to exist. On this ground, it is also

said to come into existence.

問; 若一多之體由智照故, 卽通本有及本不有者, 此智照時, 得通有照不照, 以不?

答; 本有故, 智卽非照. 本不有故, 由之. 故照/明/知, 亦通照不照.
一切諸法例如此也.

Question: If it is the case that the substance of 'OM' could be either inherently existent or non-inherently existent on account of illumination of wisdom, when this wisdom illuminates, does it imply both illumination and non-illumination?

Answer: Because it already exists inherently, it does not depend on illumination of wisdom. While because it exists not inherently, it depends on illumination (of wisdom).

Therefore, it is clear that it (the substance of 'OM') implies both illumination and non-illumination.

All the dharmas are to be illustrated like that.

二明同體門者, 還如前門. 相似還明一中多, 多中一, 一卽多, 多卽一.

今就一中門說者, 還明向上去向下來, 其中逆順各具十門. 今略擧其始終, 約十一而說者, 如似一中十. 緣成故. 若無十, 一不成. 二三亦如是. 十卽一, 亦如是.

Secondly, the ways of identical substance are the same as the previous ones demonstrated by 'OIM', 'MIO', 'OEM' and 'MEO'. Now the discourse of implication again will be explained by the way of counting upwardly and downwardly and each implies ten ways. Here, in brief, the beginning (i.e. one) and ending (i.e. ten) will be taken into account.

When discussed with reference to one and ten, it is similar to 'OIT' because they are established by condition.

If there is no ten, one also cannot be established. Two, three, and so on fall in the same token.

It is the same in the case of 'TEO'.

問; 此同體門中, 與前異體門中, 有何別耶?

答; 前異門言, 一中十者; 以望後九, 故名一中十. 此門言, 一中十者; 卽一中有九, 故言一中十也.

Question: What is the difference of the tenet in this way of identical substance in comparison to the different substance that was explained previously?

Answer: The 'OIT' explained In the way of the different substance was mentioned as such expecting nine. Whereas the 'OIT' in this way is mentioned as such because one implies nine.

問; 若一中卽有九者, 此與前異體門一卽十, 有何別也?

答; 此中一有九者; 有於自體九, 而一不是九. 若前別體門說者; 一卽是彼異體(*)十等, 而十不離一.

Question: What is the difference between the statements that one includes nine and that OET asserted in the different substance?

Answer: The statement of 'one includes nine' in this context does not indicate that one is nine but that one is included in nine itself. Whereas the one mentioned in the foregoing different substance is a different entity; ten and so forth are not apart from one.

問; 一中旣自有九者, 應非緣成義.

答; 若非緣成, 豈得有九耶?

Question: If nine is included in one, it does not meet the establishment of causality.

Answer: Without the establishment of causality, how do we have nine?

問; 一體云何得有九?

答; 若無九, 卽無一.

Question: How does the entity of one contain nine?

Answer: If there is not nine, one would not exist.

次明同體門中一卽十者, 還言一者. 一緣成故, 一卽十. 何以故?(*) 若十非一, 一不成故. 一卽十旣爾, 一卽二三亦然. 逆順各十門亦然.

Next, we shall clarify OET in the teaching of different substance. Here again with reference to one, (we assert that) because one is established by causality, OET. Why? Because if ten is not one, one can not be established. As OIT as such, two and three and so on

would be the same as that. The same will be for each of the ten processes going forward as well as reverse.

問; 此中言自體一卽十者, 與前同(*)體一中十, 有何別耶?

答; 前明同體中有十, 而一非是十. 此明一卽十, 而一卽是十. 以爲異也.

Question: What is the difference between OET in its own substance mentioned here and OIT of identical substance?

Answer: In the identical substance, ten is included in one, however one is not ten. Whereas OIT asserted here means one is the same as ten, which is the difference.

問; 此明一體卽十, 爲攝法盡, 以不?

答; 隨智差別, 故亦盡亦不盡. 何者?(*) 如一若攝十, 卽名爲盡. 若具說, 卽無盡.

Question: Does the analogy that the entity of one is identical with ten encompass all things exhaustively or not?

Answer: Owing to the distinction of wisdom, it encompasses either exhaustively or inexhaustively. In the way that one encompasses ten,

we can say it inexhaustively encompasses. On the contrary, when we mention it altogether (simultaneously), it encompasses exhaustively.

問; 爲自門無盡, 爲攝餘門, 亦無盡耶?

答; 一無盡, 餘所(*亦?)無盡. 若餘不盡, 一亦不盡. 若成一, 一切卽成. 若不成一, 一切不成. 是故此攝法, 卽無盡(*) 復無盡, 成一之義. 於三四義, 由若虛空,(*) 卽是盡,(*)更不攝餘.(*) 故名無盡.(*)故亦攝盡不盡也.

Question: When this set is inexhaustive, are the other sets also inexhaustive?

Answer: If one is inexhaustive, the others are also inexhaustive; and if the others are inexhaustive, one is also inexhaustive.

If one is established, everything will be established; and if one is not established, everything will not be established.

Therefore, the encompassment of this set is inexhaustive and also has the meaning of encompassmemt of one by the inexhaustive.

The cases of two or three are, just like as to space, exhaustive; and again, as they do not encompass others, they are called the inexhaustive.

So (it) encompasses either exhaustively or inexhaustively.

問; 旣言一卽攝盡者, 爲只攝一中十, 亦攝他處十?

答; 攝他十亦有盡不盡義. 何以故?(*)離他無自故. 一攝他處, 卽無盡, 而成一之義. 他處十義如虛空, 故有盡.

Question: You already said the identification of one encompasses exhaustively. Then does it encompass only OIT, or ten in other formula?

Answer: The encompassment of ten in other formula also has the meaning of both exhaustive and inexhaustive. Why? Because apart from others (that) there can be no self (this).

As one encompasses other formula it is inexhaustive, and thereby establishes one. As the meaning of the ten in the other formula is like space, so it is (called) exhaustive.

上明, 擧十數爲譬說, 竟.

As shown above, the simile using the method of counting is finished.

此下明, 約法以會理者, 凡十門.

From now on the principle with reference to *dharma* which consists of ten teachings will be expounded.

一者, 同時具足相應門. 二者, 因陀羅網境界門. 三者, 秘密隱顯俱成門. 四者, 微細相容安立門. 五者, 十世隔法異成門. 六者, 諸藏純雜具德門. 七者, 一多相容不同門. 八者, 諸法相卽自在門. 九者, 唯心回轉善成門. 十者, 託事顯法生解門.

First, the simultaneous perfect accordance among dharmas

Second, the realm of Indra's jewel net

Third, the mysterious establishment of the hidden and revealed

Fourth, the mutual involvement and peaceful arrangement of the minuscule

Fifth, the distinct establishment of isolated *dharmas* in the ten periods of time

Sixth, the possession of the qualities of the pure and mixed within all *dharmas*

Seventh, the mutual involvement and difference of one and many

Eighth, the mutual identification and spontaneity of all dharmas

Ninth, the wonderful formation of all *dharmas* through the transformation of mind-only

Tenth, the understanding of *dharmas* revealed by the expedient of phenomena

就此十門, 亦一一之門皆復具十會, 成一百. 所言十者: 一者, 敎義; 二, 理事; 三, 解行; 四, 因果; 五, 人法; 六, 分齊境位; 七, 法智師弟; 八, 主伴依正; 九, 逆順體用; 十, 隨生根欲性.

Each tenet of the ten teachings has again ten (properties) which make 100 (doctrines). The title of the ten (properties) are as follows: the first is doctrine; the second is principle and things and events; the third is understanding and practice; the fourth is cause and effect; the fifth is self and *dharma*; the sixth is the hierarchy of the stages; the seventh is *dharma*, wisdom, master and disciple; the eighth is primary, subordinate, dependent and main; the ninth is adverse, favorable, substance and function; the tenth is the compliance with begetting, capacity, trend and nature.

所言敎義者; 敎卽是通相, 別相,(*)三乘, 五乘之敎.(*) 卽以別敎以論別義.

所以得理而忘敎. 若入此通宗而敎, 卽義以同時相應故也. 第二理事者;
若三乘敎, 辨卽異事顯異理. 如諸經擧異事喩異理. 若此宗, 卽事是理.
如入法界等經文, 是(*)體. 實卽是理, 相彰卽是事. 第三解行者; 如三乘說,
解而非行. 如說人名字, 而不識其人. 若通宗說者, 卽行卽解.
如看其面不說其名, 而自識也. 相顯爲行, 契窮後際爲解. 第四因果者;
修相爲因, 契窮爲果. 第五人法者; 文殊顯其妙慧. 普賢彰其稱周.
明人卽法也. 第六分齊境位者; 參而不雜各住分位, 卽分齊境位.
第七法智師弟者; 開發爲師相, 相成卽弟子. 第八主伴依正者; 擧一爲主,
餘卽爲伴. 主以爲正, 伴卽是依. 第九逆順體用者; 卽是成壞義也.
第十隨生根欲性者; 隨緣常應也. 如涅槃經云, "此方見滿, 餘方見半,
而月實無虛盈. 若此宗明者, 常增減而常無增減, 以同時相應.

(First), what is called doctrine is that of the universal mark and of the distinct mark. In the doctrine of the three vehicles and the five vehicles, the distinct doctrine deals with peculiar meaning because it advocates attaining the principle (essence) and neglecting (verbal) doctrine. When it comes to this universal doctrine, (the teaching) is spontaneously correspondent to (the principle)

Second, noumenon and phenomena: according to the classification of the three vehicles, distinct phenomena represent distinct noumenon as

varying *sūtras* employ peculiar phenomena to analogize the peculiar noumenon. To the contrary, in this school, phenomena are identical with noumenon as indicated in the passages of 'Entering *Dharma-dhātu*' or others; the verity of the substance denotes the noumenon, and the manifestation of the mark designates phenomena.

Third, understanding and practice: as is the case of the three vehicles, if one who has understanding does not practice, it is comparable to the situation of one only knowing someone's name, but not recognizing him. The school of universal doctrine expounds that understanding itself is identical with practice; one recognizes someone by looking at his or her face even without knowing his or her name. The appearance of a mark is regarded as a practice, and afterwards acquires understanding through profound speculation.

Fourth, cause and effect: the practice of a mark is considered as a cause, and profound speculation, an effect.

Fifth, self and *dharma*: Mañjuśrī reveals profound wisdom and Samantabhadra manifests pervasion, which set forth that self itself is *dharma*.

Sixth, the hierarchy of stages: being multiple but unmixed, each abides his or her own stage. It is called the hierarchy of stages.

Seventh, dharma, wisdom, master and disciple: one who inspires is a master, whereas the formation of a mark is a disciple.

Eighth, primary, subordinate, dependent and main: when one is taken as the primary, others are taken as the subordinate. The primary is considered as main, and the subordinate is regarded as the dependent.

Ninth: adverse, favorable, substance and function: It refers to the formation and destruction (of *dharma*).

Tenth, the compliance with begetting, capacity, trend, nature: *dharmas* function in compliance with conditions. As the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* puts it, people in this region see the round (moon), whereas people in the other region see the half (moon). However, the moon does not virtually gain or lose in its shape. What this school elucidates is that dharmas are always increasing and decreasing, yet there is never increase or decrease; they are simultaneously correspondent.

然此十門體無前後, 相應旣其具此十門. 餘因陀羅等九門, 亦皆具此十門. 何但此十門, 其中一一皆稱周法界. 所以擧十門者成其無盡義也.

Even so, the substance of these ten teachings do not have a fixed order. As (the first teaching of) the accordance is already endowed

with this ten teachings, the other nine teachings such as the realm of Indra's jewel net are also are endowed with the ten teachings. Each of them pervades the *dharma-dhātu,* accordingly, the reference of ten teachings secures the meaning of the inexhaustive.

今釋第一同時具足相應門者; 卽具明敎義理事等十門同時也.
何以得如此耶? 良由緣起實德法性海印三昧力用, 故得然. 非是方便緣修所成, 故得同時. 今且據因是(果?)同時者; 若小乘說因果者, 卽轉因以成果. 因滅始果成. 若據大乘因果亦得同時, 而不彰其無盡. 如似舍緣(椽?)以成舍. 因果同時成而不成餘物, 以因有親疎故, 所以成有盡. 若通宗明因果者, 擧疎緣以入親. 是故如舍成時, 一切法皆一時成. 若有一法不成者, 此舍亦不成. 如似初步若到, 一切步皆到. 若有一步非到者, 一切步皆非到. 故經云, "雖成等正覺, 不捨初發心." 又如大品經云, "非初不離初, 非後不離後, 而明菩提也."

Now let us interpret the first teaching-the simultaneous, perfect accordance which simultaneously, altogether clarifies the ten teachings such as doctrine, noumenon and phenomena etc.. How is it able to do so? It is able to do so owing to the functional power of the Ocean-seal meditation on the dharma-nature which is a virtual quality for

causality. It is not the establishment through the cultivation of causality in skill-in-means that enables the simultaneity.

With reference to the simultaneity of cause-effect: The cause-effect posited by *Hinãyãna* is the transformation of cause to form the effect; when the cause disappears the effect begins to emerge. Even the simultaneity of cause-effect in *Mahãyãna* does not bring out the inexhaustive. It is like the relationship of pillars to a house. Even though the cause and effect are established simultaneously, the rest of them does not established. Since the cause implies direct and indirect (condition), (its cause-effect) forms the exhaustive. The cause-effect defined by the school of universal doctrine enables the indirect condition to be the direct condition. In this case, when a house is formed, all *dharmas* are established at once. If any single *dharma* is not enacted, the house also is not constructed. Just like the first step does not reach, all steps do not reach. If a single step does not reach, all steps do not reach. Therefore the *sūtra* says: even though supreme enlightenment may be achieved, the initiative mind for enlightenment is not ignored. the *Prajñāparamitā Sūtra* also says; "what is not beginning is not apart from beginning, what is not ending is not apart from ending- that is the way to elucidate *bodhi.*"

問; 旣言一步卽到者, 何須用第二步耶?

答; 汝言一步卽到者, 爲多是卽一, 以否? (爲是多卽一以不?) 又言何用第二步者? 此第二步爲是一卽多, 以否? 若初步是多一, 第二步卽一多者. 云何乃言一步到不用第二步耶? 答若不一是多一, (一若不是多一?) 多亦不是一多者. 何但一步不能到? 雖行多步終是不到. 故知一步與多步常有到不到義. 因中尙爾者, 果中亦無果義. 故涅槃經云, "智者應當定說亦有亦無." 今據一步到者, 卽是法界緣起海印定力說到不到, 不同情謂說到不到. 故經云, "唯應度者乃能見之, 而復不失因果. 不墮斷常." 故經云, "深入緣起, 斷諸邪見." 斯之謂也.

Question: If, as you said, one step may reach, what is the use of the second step?

Answer: When you said one step reaches, do you mean it is the one in MEO or not? Again, when you said what the use of the second step is, do you mean it is the one in OEM or not? If the first step is MEO and the second step is OEM, how can you ask whether, when the first step already reaches, the second step is needed? If one (step) is not that of MEO or many (steps) are not those of OEM, no matter how many steps are taken, they by no means could reach. Consequently, it

should be known that both one step and many steps imply the meaning of both arrival and non-arrival. As the setting of cause is like that, that of effect also has the meaning of non-effect. Thus the *sūtra* says; the man of wisdom should assert both existence and non-existence. The arrival by one step that is shown above implies both meaning of arrival and non-arrival on account of the power of the Ocean-seal meditation on the causality in the *dharma-dhātu*. That is not the same as both arrival and non-arrival claimed by delusively. So the *sūtra* says; The one who crossed over necessarily is able to see and does not lose cause-effect or fall in the false views of permanence and cessation. Therefore, the *sūtra* says; This is called profound penetration into causality severing all false views.

問; 若因果同時卽因成果, 因卽成果. 那得言不失因果耶?

答; 如地論云, "依緣二種義, 示現二種時." 依因義者, 名爲因. 依果義者, 名爲果. 豈得失於因果耶? 又且旣言因果同時, 那得言失? 若其失者, 何名因果同時耶? 因果同時旣如此, 敎義理事等同時亦然.

Question: If cause and effect occur simultaneously, which means cause itself forms effect, cause is identical with effect. If so, how can

you say that cause and effect are not lost?

Answer: As the *Ti-lun* says; depending on the meaning of two kinds of conditions, two kinds of time are set forth. What depends on the meaning of cause are called cause; what depends on the meaning of effect are called effect. How can there be gain or lose with respect to cause-effect? Again, taking what you said, the simultaneity of cause and effect, into account, how could you say losing of them? If they are lost, how do you name the simultaneity of cause and effect? The simultaneity of cause-effect being like this, others such as doctrine, noumenon and phenomena, etc.,

問; 旣言同時相應者, 今據因果一事, 卽得具前敎義等十門, 以否?

答; 今但擧十門者, 欲成其無盡. 若論三種世間圓融, 可但一事具此十門. 亦具無盡無量法界虛空法門, 成其無盡復無盡. 若但就別事說不成無盡者, 只同大乘義也.

Question: Hitherto you spoke of simultaneous accordance. Then will this characteristics of cause-effect be endowed with ten teachings such as doctrine and so forth?

Answer: Here we referred to ten teachings to demonstrate the

inexhaustive. When discussing the perfect harmony of the three times and spaces, we rightly say that a phenomenon is endowed with this ten teachings and with *dharma* teachings of infinite, immeasurable space of dharma-dhātu as well to establish the inexhaustive. Yet a phenomenon in the distinctive doctrine cited above is just same as the meaning expounded in the *Mahāyāna*.

第二因陀羅網境界門; 此約法而明. 亦復具有敎義等十門. 如梵網經, 卽取梵宮羅網爲喩. 今言因陀羅網者, 卽以帝釋殿網爲喩. 帝釋殿網爲喩者, 須先識此帝網之相,(*) 以何*爲相.
猶如衆鏡相照衆鏡之影.(*)見一鏡中(*)如是影中, 復現衆影.
一一影中復現衆影, 卽重重現影, 成其無盡復無盡也.

The second is the realm of *Indra*'s jewel net: This is expounded with reference to *dharma* and implies ten gates such as doctrine and etc.. Just as in *Brahmajāla-sūtra*, this employs the analogy of jewel net draped over the palace of *Brahmā*. The *Indra*'s jewel net mentioned here indicates the metaphor of the net in the palace of the Sovereign *Śakra (Indra)*. To examine the Indra's jewel net, the pattern of it

should be understood in the first place. What then is the form? It is such that each one of numerous mirrors reflect one another so as to see the images of the other mirrors in an image of a single mirror. As such, numerous images are revealed in each image. Consequently, the images that is endlessly reproduced make the inexhaustively inexhaustive (images).

是故如第七地讚請經云, "於一微塵中, 各示那由他無量無邊佛, 於中而說法." 此卽智正覺(*)世間.(*) 又云, "於一微塵中現無量佛國須彌金剛圍, 世間不迫迮.(=窄)" 此卽據器世間. 又云, "於一微塵中, 現有三惡道, 天, 人, 阿修羅, 各各受業報." 此卽據衆生世間. 又云, "如一微塵所示現, 一切微塵亦如是." 故於微塵現國土, 國土微塵復示現. 所以成其無盡復無盡. 此卽是其法界緣起.

Hence the seventh stage-*sūtra*, the *sūtra* of extolling request, says; Within an infinitesimal particle, millions *(nayuta)* of innumerable, boundless Buddhas are manifested and discourse *dharma* which indicates the world of *Tathāgāta*. Again, within an infinitesimal particle, the iron mountains of the Sumeru centered in the immeasurable Buddha-lands manifest themselves without congestion, which is the

world of a vessel. Again, within an infinitesimal particle, beings in the three evil transmigrations, heavenly beings, human, and fighting ghosts*(asura)* are manifested and receive their karmic reward, which is the world of sentient beings. And again, as are reveal within an infinitesimal particle, so are within every infinitesimal particles. Therefore, within infinitesimal particles, the lands are manifested; within the lands, the infinitesimal particles are manifested. This is the reason the inexhaustibly inexhaustible (worlds) are established. Such is called the dependant co-arising of the *Dharma-dhātu.*

如智如理實德如此. 非卽變化對緣方便故說. 若是大乘宗所明, 卽言神力變化, 故大小得相入. 或云菩薩力, 故入. 又言不二, 故入. 不同一乘說.

These (kinds of trait of *Dharma-dhātu*) are due to virtual reality of such wisdom and of such principle (of the *Dharma-dhātu*). It is not expounded in terms of skill-in-means which enables transformation in accordance with conditions, which is what is resorted by the Mahāyāna schools; In other words, (they) say that due to the transformation exerted by supernatural power, the big and small may be mutually

interpenetrated, or by the power of bodhisattvas, or by non-duality they are mutually interpenetrated, which all are different from the tenet of the One vehicle.

問; 若此宗明相入, 不論神力, 乃言自體常如此者. 斯則渾無疆界, 無始無終. 何緣得辨因果敎義等耶?

Question: If this school, explaining mutual interpenetration, does not affirm supernatural power, it seems to mean that the self essence of (the *Dharma-dhātu*) is permanently as such. In this case, it (*Dharma-dhātu*) is so intermingled that there does not seem to be any boundary; Without beginning or ending, by what conditions can you verify the teachings such as the cause and effect and doctrine?

答; 以隨智差別, 故擧一爲主.(*) 餘則爲伴. 猶如帝網擧一珠爲首, 衆珠現中, 如一珠卽爾. 一切珠現亦如是. 是故, 前經擧, 一菩薩爲主, 一切菩薩圍繞. 一一菩薩皆悉如是. 又如諸方皆來證誠,(*)同其名號. 一切十方證誠皆亦如是. 所以成其無盡復無盡, 而不失因果先後次第, 而體無增減.(*) 故經云, "一切衆生盡成佛, 佛界亦不增, 衆生界亦不減. 若無一衆生成佛, 衆生界亦不增, 佛界亦不減也."

Answer: Owing to the difference with respect to wisdom, one holds the primary (position) and the others the subordinate one. It is the same case as in the Indra's jewel net in which when one jewel takes chief position, numerous other jewels are reflected in it; As in the case of the one jewel, so do all the other jewels. Thus, as put in previously quoted sūtra, when one bodhisattva holds the primary position, all the other bodhisattvas surround him. Each one of bodhisattvas follow suit. And like those who come from every direction to the master of verification with the same title as of those, all the masters of verification follow suit. As a result of that, the inexhaustively inexhaustive is established without losing the sequential order of the cause and effect, neither increasing or decreasing its substance. Hence the sūtra says; even if all sentient beings obtained the Buddhahood, the realm of the buddha would not increase, nor would the realm of sentient beings decrease. even if none of sentient being obtained the Buddhahood, the realm of sentient beings would not increase, nor would the realm of the buddha decrease.

第三秘密隱顯俱成門者; 此約緣起說也. 還具前敎義十門, 所言隱顯者.

如涅槃經半字及滿者. 昔說半字, 故半字卽顯, 滿字卽隱. 今日說滿字,

卽滿字卽顯, 半字卽隱. 此卽約緣而說隱顯. 又如月喩品云,

"此方見半(他方見滿), 而彼月性實無虧盈. 隨緣所見, 故有增減.

此卽是大乘宗中說. 若通宗辨者, 不待說與不說, 常半常滿隱顯無別時.

如彼月性常滿而常半, 半滿無異時. 是故如來於一念中, 八相成道.(*)

生時卽是滅時. 同時俱成故, 所以稱秘密. 如似十數, 一卽十, 一卽是顯,

二三四至十卽爲隱. 又眼根入正受, 卽是顯, 於色法中三昧起, 卽名隱.

而此隱顯體無前後, 故言秘密也.

The third is the mysterious establishment of the hidden and revealed. This is posited with respect to the dependent co-arising and also implies the previously mentioned ten gates such as doctrine and so forth. What is called the hidden and revealed are the same as the half letter (imperfect) and full letter (perfect) as illustrated in the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra*. When the half letter was discoursed in the ancient time, the half letter was revealed and the full letter was concealed. When the full letter is discoursed in the modern time, the full letter is revealed and the half letter is concealed. This shows that the hidden and revealed are discussed with reference to conditions. Again as illustrated in the chapter of the metaphor of the moon, the half moon is shown in

this place (and the full moon is shown in the other place). Yet there is in fact no waxing or waning in the nature of the moon. Because it is seen according to conditions, there are increase and decrease. This indeed is discoursed in respect to the teaching of the Mahāyāna. The distinction in the Common teaching require neither discourse nor non-discourse.(*) As it is always half and full, there is no distinctive time to be hidden or to be revealed. Just like the nature of the moon that is always full and half, being devoid of distinctive time to be full or half. Thus the Tathātāgata, within instant time, realize the eight aspects of the Buddha's life. (In doing so) the time to be born is that to be demise, since both of them achieved simultaneously. That is why this doctrine is called the Secret teaching. It is the same as such that, counting ten, when OET is ten, one is revealed, while two, three, four....up to ten are hidden. Again, visional organ, when stimulated (by objects), is revealed, while when, among forms, one cultivate samadhī, it (the visional organ) is hidden. Since the substance of the hidden and revealed has no sequential order, it is called the secret teaching.

第四微細相容安立門者; 此就相說. 如一微塵, 此卽是其小相. 無量佛國須彌金剛山等, 卽其大相. 直以緣起實德無礙自在, 致使相容.

非是天人所作, 故安立. 如似, 一微塵中有穢國土, 而卽於此微塵中具有.
不可說淨國, 在此微塵中, 而於彼穢國不相妨礙, 而此淨國之相仍亦不失. 乃至,
有諸國土, 尸羅分幢形三方, 及四維等國, 在此一微塵中常不相妨礙.
故普賢品云, "一切諸世界入於一微塵中, 世界不積聚, 亦復不離散." 故知,
若與普相應能於一微塵中見不可說國土, 而不雜亂不增不減. 豈可須彌納芥子,
將爲難事哉? 理事等十門, 安立相容, 亦如是.

The fourth is the mutual involvement and peaceful arrangement of the minuscule. This is expounded in respect to marks. The minuscule represents a small mark, Whereas the Diamond mountain of Submenu in the immeasurable Buddha land represents a big mark. (Even so) both of them are mutually comprehensive due to true quality of causality which is non-obstructive and spontaneous. It is not established through the fabrication of men or heavenly beings. Just like the single minuscule contains defiled lands, and, at the same time, it also contains purified land that defies expressions. Yet, the latter, being in the same minuscule, does not obstruct the defiled lands, nor lose the marks of the purified one. It is the same case as all the other lands that have various forms. The lands decorated chaste of vases and banners that extend three quaters and four directions are, being

contained in a single minuscule, always do not obstruct one another. The chapter of Samantabhadra, therefore, states; 'all the worlds enter into a single minuscule without being accumulated or being dispersed. It should be known that, within a single minuscule, one beholds, including the universal form, (numerous) lands beyond expressions, without being mixed up or being neither increase nor decrease. How is it ever difficult for the mountain Sumeru to enter into the seed of mustard. The mutual involvement and peaceful arrangement of those ten teaching such as facts and principle and others follow suit.

問; 此相容門與前因陀羅網門, 有何別耶?

答; 諸門隱映, 互相顯發, 重重(復重重成其無)盡者, 卽是因陀羅網門中攝. 若諸門一時具顯, 不相妨礙, 卽是相容門中攝.

Question) What is the deference between this teaching of mutual involvement and that of Indra's jewel net?

Answer) Every characteristics of mutual reflection and illumination, revealing reciprocally ad infinitum, is encompassed in the teaching of Indra's jewel net. Whereas every aspects of simultaneous manifestation without obstruction is included in this teaching of mutual involvement.

第五十世隔法異成門者; 此若三世說. 如離世間品說, "十世者, 過去說過去, 過去說未來, 過去說現在, 現在說現在, 現在說未來, 現在說過去, 未來說未來, 未來說過去, 未來說現在. 三世爲一念, 合前九, 爲十世也. 如是十世, 以緣起力, 故相卽復相入, 而不失三世. 如以五指爲拳, 不失指. 十世雖同時, 而不失十世. 故經云, "過去劫入未來, 現在劫入過去, 未來劫入現在." 又云, 長劫入短劫, 短劫入長劫, 有劫入無劫, 無劫入有劫." 又云, "過去是未來, 未來是過去, 現在是過去, 菩薩悉了知." 又云, 無盡無數劫, 能作一念頃. 非長亦非短. 解脫人所行如是." 十世相入復相卽, 而不失先後長短之'相'. 故云, "隔法異成, 敎義理事等十門, 相卽相入, 而不失先後差別之相." 故名異成也.

The fifth is the distinct establishment of isolated *dharmas* in the ten periods of time. This is discoursed in respect to three period of time. As is put in the chapter of leaving mundane world; 'ten periods of time refers to past mentioned in the past, future mentioned in the past, present mentioned in the past, present mentioned in the present, future mentioned in the present, past mentioned in the present, future mentioned in the future, past mentioned in the future, present mentioned in the future, three periods being within one instant thought, it makes, with previous nine periods, ten periods. This ten periods as

such are, owing to the capacity of causality, mutually identical as well as mutually interpenetrative without losing three periods. It is like that a fist is made without losing fingers. Even though ten periods are established simultaneously, they do not lose each of ten periods. Therefore the sūtra says; 'past kalpa enters into future, present kalpa enters into past, present kalpa enters into past, future kalpa enters into present. Furthermore, long kalpa enters into short kalpa, short kalpa enters into long kalpa, existent kalpa enters into non-existent kalpa, non-existent kalpa enters into existent kalpa. Again, past is future, future is past, present is past, in which bodhisattvas should be well versed. Also, inexhaustive, innumerable kalpas render one instant thought which is neither long nor short. Such is what is achieved by the liberated one. Though ten periods are mutually interpenetrative and identical, they do not lose the marks of sequential order, and of temporal extension. Therefore it is called the distinct establishment of isolated *dharmas.* Ten teachings such as doctrine, phenomena and noumenon and etc. are also mutually identical and interpenetrative without losing the marks of sequential order, and of temporal extension. Therefore it is called the distinct establishment.

第六諸藏純雜具德門者; 此約諸度門說. 何者?(*)如似就一施門說者, 一切萬法皆悉名施, 所以名純. 而此施門卽具諸度等行, 故名爲雜. 如是純之與雜不相妨礙, 故名具德. 如大品經一念品明, "從始至終, 不出一念, 卽名爲純. 而此一念之中具於萬行, 卽名爲雜." 雖爾, 而與此中純雜義別. 何者?(*) 如彼經一念者, 同時無得相應, 不明緣起德用. 若此明純者, 若約施門, 一切皆施. 若說忍門, 一切皆忍. 說忍門者, 諸行如虛空, 卽名爲純. 而此忍門具足諸門, 卽名爲雜. 純雜不相亂, 故名具德. 故不同彼念品.

The sixth is the possession of the qualities of the pure and mixed with all *dharmas* This is discoursed in respect to (six) pāramitās. Why? It is just like that when being explicated in terms of charity, every myriad dharmas may be called charity. This is why it is called pure. As this practice of charity is granted with all other practices, it is called mixed. As such, because the characteristics of pure and the mixed are not impeded each other, it is called the possession of the qualities. As the chapter of one instant thought in the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra* says; As one, from the beginning to the end, does not evade from one instant thought, it is called pure. Still as one, within this one instant thought, is granted with myriad of practice, it is called mixed.

Even so, the meanings of the pure and mixed are distinctive. Why? The instant thought expounded in the sūtra does not represent mutual correspondence which is without gaining, thereby may not clarify the functional quality of causality. To the contrary, the pure that is clarified here refers that everything is charity only if it is referred to in respect to charity, and that everything is patience only if it is expounded with reference to patience. Setting forth the teaching of patience is nothing but saying that every practice is like void space, which is called 'pure.' This teaching of patience also is granted with all the other teachings, which is call 'mixed.' As the pure and mixed are not mutually disturbing each other, it is called the possession of the qualities. Consequently, it is not the same the teaching of the chapter of one instant thought.

又問; 此與六度相攝義, 有何別耶?

答; 六道相攝義者, 如似以施攝諸度, 而諸度非是施. 若此明者, 以施攝諸門, 無門不是施. 以緣起力, 故不同六度相攝. 故一攝於九十, 而九十等皆是一. 是故, 名爲純. 而一內卽九十等, 是故復名雜. 故知, 不同相攝義.

Question) What is the difference between this teaching and the six pāramitā as to mutual subsumption?

Answer) Mutual subsumption of the six pāramitā is such that; while charity subsumes the other pāramitās, the others are not charity. (However), clarifying that of this teaching, as charity subsumes the other pāramitā, there is nothing that is not charity. Due to the capacity of causality, it is different from the mutual subsumption of the six pāramitā. Therefore, one subsumes nine and ten, nine and ten and so on subsume one. This is the reason it is called pure. And one, within itself, is granted nine and ten and so on, which is the reason it is called mixed. So it should be known that there is difference in the meaning of mutual subsumption.

問; 此與大品相資義, 復有何別耶? 彼中資者, 闕一, 卽不成. 此中十數, 闕一, 亦不成. 彼此二未審, 有何別耶?

答; 彼言相資者, 而能非是所. 今言十成一, 而一卽是十. 所以不同資義.

Question) What is the difference between this teaching and the Prajñāpāramitā sūtra in terms of mutual supplement? The supplement of that (sūtra), when devoid of one, is not achieve. In the same token,

counting ten of this teaching, when devoid of one, is not established. It is not clear whether there is any difference between this and that.

Answer) Although that (sūtra) also mentions mutual supplement, subject is not same as object. In this statement that ten establishes one, one is equivalent to ten (OET). This is why there is distinction in respect to the meaning of mutual supplement.

第七一多相容不同門者; 此約理說. 以一入多, 多入一, 故名相容. 卽體無先後, 而不失一多之相. 故曰, 不同. 此卽緣起實德, 非天人所修. 故經云, "以一佛土, 滿十方. 十方入一, 亦無餘. 世界本相亦不壞. 自在願力, 故能爾. 又如普賢品云, "一切衆生身入一衆生身, 一衆生身入一切衆生身." 又云, "一切諸世界令入一塵中, 世界不積聚, 亦復不雜亂." 須彌入芥子. 此卽不說也.

The seventh is the mutual involvement and difference of one and many (OM). This is expounded in respect to principle. Because one penetrate into many and many penetrate one, it is called mutual involvement. With reference to substance, as there is no sequential order without losing the marks of OM, it is mentioned to be different. It is so due not to the practice of human or heavenly beings but to the

actual quality of causality. So the sūtra says; 'one Buddha land pervades ten directions. And ten directions penetrate into one (Buddha land) leaving nothing over. In doing so, the original mark of the world is not devastated. This can be done due to the capacity of spontaneous vow. And the chapter of Samantabhadra says; 'The bodies of all sentient beings penetrate into the body of a sentient being. One body of a sentient being penetrate into the bodies of all sentient beings. Again, 'letting all worlds enter into one minuscule without accumulating the worlds, or mixed up one another. That the mountain Sumeru enters into the seed of mustard, though, is not mentioned here.

第八諸法相卽自在門者; 此約用說. 還就約敎義理事等十門. 取其三種世間, 圓融無礙自在, 故一卽攝一切. 成其無盡復無盡. 以其無盡故, 相卽復相入. 此約用以說.

The eighth is the mutual identification and spontaneity of all dharmas. This is discoursed in respect to function. To an extent, this is also discoursed in respect to ten teachings such as doctrine, noumenon and phenomena, and so forth. As three kinds of worlds are perfectly harmonious and spontaneously non-obstructive, one subsumes

all. (Otherly put,) they make inexhaustive and inexhaustive. Being inexhaustive, they are mutually identical and interpenetrative, which is mentioned in respect to function.

問; 此明其無盡復無盡, 相卽復相入, 與前因陀羅網, (*)及微細相容門, 有何差別耶?

答; 如譬說同體門中說者. 若就隱映相應, 互相顯發, 重重復重重, 成其無盡者, 卽是因陀羅網門攝. 若諸門一時具顯, 不相妨礙者, 是相容門攝. 若就三世圓融, 無礙自在, 相卽復相入, 成其無盡復無盡者, 卽是此門攝.

Question) This teaching elucidates the inexhaustive and inexhaustive, mutual identity and interpenetration. What is the difference between those of this teaching and those of Indra's jewel net as well as of the mutual involvement and peaceful arrangement of the minuscule?

Answer) It is analogous to what is mentioned in the common teaching. When it comes to the tenet that what is hidden and reflected are mutually correspondent manifesting each other, and thereby repeatedly and repeatedly forming the inexhaustive, it is embraced in the teaching of Indra's jewel net. When it comes to the tenet that all factors are spontaneously manifested without obstructing one another,

this is encompassed in teaching of the mutual involvement and peaceful arrangement of the minuscules. When it comes to the tenet that three periods are perfectly harmonious and spontaneously non-obstructive, thereby mutually identical and interpenetrative making inexhaustive and inexhaustive, this is included in this teaching.

問; 若如是相卽卽(*)復相入, 成其無盡復無盡者, 此乃渾無疆界. 何始何終, 何因何果耶?

答; 此據法界緣起體性, 成其無盡復無盡. 故先後因果不失. 雖不失先後, 而先後相卽復相入. 故成其無盡. 以先後相卽復相入. 故初發心是便成正覺. 如前章門, 一卽一切, 無盡亦復無盡, 二三亦復爾. 故此經歎初發心功德云, "彼一念功德, 深廣無邊際. 如來分別說窮劫不可盡." 此卽明其一卽一切, 成其一切無盡. 又云, "何況於無量無數無邊劫, 具足修諸度諸地功德行." 此卽是從二三至九十, 皆成無盡. 以是故, 從十信終心(*)至十住十行, 及十回向地等, 皆悉明成佛者. 良由始終相卽復相入, 成無盡故.

Question) What is mutually identical and interpenetrative making inexhaustive and inexhaustive as such means that they are intermingled without any boundary. What beginning, ending, cause and effect are ever there?

Answer) It refers to tha causality of Dharma-dhātu that makes the inexhaustive and inexhaustive, so dose not lose sequential order and cause and effect. Even though not losing sequential order, beginning and ending are mutually identical and interpenetrative. Thus the inexhaustive is made. Because beginning and ending are mutually identical and interpenetrative, initiative yearning toward bodhi makes ultimate enlightenment. Like previous teaching, as one is identical to all inexhaustively and inexhaustively, two and three follow suit. Therefore the sūtra, extolling the virtue of initiative yearning toward bodhi, says; 'That virtue of instant thought is extremely profound without boundary, which tathāgāta distinctively discoursed endlessly spending kalpas. These are clarifying one is identical all making the inexhaustive. Again, 'why should one necessarily practice for the whole span of immeasurable, innumerable, boundless kalpas all pāramitās and the qualities of all stages? This is referring to that, from two and three to nine and ten, all makes the inexhaustive. Therefore, from the tip of ten stages of faith to ten stages of dwelling, ten stages of practice, ten sages of transferring merits, each stage elucidates the perfect Buddhahood. This is because the beginning and ending mutually identical and interpenetrative making the inexhaustive.

問; 如前明, 果德絶於說相. 云何十信終心卽具佛果德用耶?
若十信同果德者, 卽果德是可說之相. 何不可說耶?

答; 因位菩薩有果德者, 欲彰果德, 是不可說. 是故, 歎德文云,
"菩薩在此一地, 普攝一切諸地功德."

Question) Being apart from the mark of wording is the merit of effect, how the tip of ten stages of faith are equipped with meritorious function of the Buddhahood? If ten stages of faith are identical to the merit of effect, which means that the merits of effect have expressable mark. why did you mention that it was unexpressable?

Answer) Even though the bodhisattvas in the stage of cause who have the merits of effect have desire to describe the merits of effect, they are unexpressable. Therefore the passages of extolling merits run; bodhisattvas who stay in any stage universally comprise the merits of all the stages.

問; 若一地卽攝一切諸地功德, 一卽一切, 初卽攝後者, 一門卽具.
何用餘門也?

答; 若無餘門, 一門卽不成故. 如一升卽攝一斗. 若無一升, 此斗卽不成.

Question) If (bodhisattvas who stay in) any stages comprise the merits of all stages in the manner that one is identical to all enabling the first to comprise the last, one factor (i.e., a teaching of any stage) would suffice. What is the use of the other factors?

Answer) Because, without the other factors, one factor cannot be established. Just like a pint comprise a gallon. But for a pint, a gallon cannot established.

問; 若無升卽無斗者, 今擧一升卽得一斗, 以不? 若一升不得一斗, 一行不得具一切行.

答; 十升合成一斗, 卽無其升時, 將何作斗? 故知, 無升卽無斗. 有升卽有斗. 今擧升卽斗, 斗升之外, 無別升斗. 如龜毛兎角不可得. 初心卽成佛, 成外無別修. 其相如虛空. 是故言初心成佛者, 非謂不具諸功德. 如經說, "普莊嚴童子一生具見佛聞法, 卽得三昧, 卽至後際見佛, 滅度後復得三昧." 如經一生得見聞, 若熏習二生, 成其解行, 三生得入果海. 同一緣起大樹, 而此三生只在一念. 猶如遠行到在初步. 然此初步之到, 非謂無於後步. 明此童子得入果海, 非不久植善根.

Question) If you mentioned that without a pint, there would not be a

gallon, doesn't it mean that a gallon is to be gained by a pint? If a pint cannot make a gallon, in the same manner, the practice of a stage cannot contain the practices of all stages.

Answer) Ten pint make a gallon. When there is no pint, how is a gallon made? So it should be known that when without a pint, there would be no gallon, and owing to a pint, there would be a gallon. That the pint is the very gallon mentioned here means that, apart from the pint of the gallon, there would be no other gallon of the pint. It is like the hair of turtle or the horn of rabbit that are not to be found. The initiative mind for bodhi is the very attainment of the Buddhahood, (for) apart from attainment, there is no other cultivation. The mark (of attainment of the Buddhahood) is like void space. Therefore when it is mentioned that the initiative mind for bodhi is the very attainment of the Buddhahood, it does not refer to the fact that all the merits are not possessed of. As set forth in the sūtra; The Jewel-Decorated One who, in his lifetime, has been honored by both seeing Buddhas and listening dharma, experiences subsequently seeing Buddhas after attaining samadhī. After achieving nirvāṇa, he obtains samadhī once again. If one sees Buddhas and hears dharma for his lifetime, and cultivate them for the second lifetime thereby achieving understanding

and practice, finally he is to enter into the sea of effect. As it is the same great tree of causality, those three periods of time lies in a single instant thought. It is like that when making an expedition, the arrival is achieved by the first step. However, that the first step makes the arrival dose not means that the other steps are not required. (In the same manner) it is clear that though that one is to enter into the sea of effect, it dose not mean that wholesome roots need not be cultivated.

問; 旣言, 久修始得者. 云何言一念得耶?

答; 言久修行善根者, 卽在三乘敎攝. 從三乘入一乘, 卽是一念始終具足. 故經云,(*)"初發心是便成正覺, 乃至具足慧身不由他悟." 譬衆流入海, 纔入一滴, 卽稱周大海, 無始無終. 若餘江河水之深, 不及入大海一滴. 故卽用三乘中修. 三乘多劫, 不及與一乘中一念. 故下明善財從文殊所, 發心求善知識, 經歷一百一十城已, 而不如一念得見普賢菩薩. 故知, 得入此緣起大海, 一念豈不成佛耶? 至如初坐用心之徒, 但取靜心, 卽言成佛者, 此亦謂(*)佛成在, 而不得是圓極之成. 如諸江河亦得是水, 未得同於大海之水. 此中通辨一念成佛義者, 若小乘說要三大阿僧祇劫.(*)滿百劫修行相好業, 始得成佛. 行若滿意欲,(*)不成佛. 亦不得故, 無一念成佛義. 若大乘明一念成佛義者, 凡有二種: 一者, 會緣以入實性, 無多少. 故明一念成佛義. 如大品經一念品義, 是也; 二者, 行行旣滿, 取最後念,

名爲成佛. 如人遠行, 以後步爲到. 此亦分用緣起. 而明三僧祇劫修道.
地前是一僧祇. 初地至七地, 是二僧祇. 八地至十地, 是三僧祇. 然亦不定,
由有一念成佛. 故明知不定. 若一乘明一念成佛, 如大乘取最後一念成佛,
卽入一乘, 以後望初初念卽是成. 何故? 以因果相卽, 同時應. 故欲論其成者,
成復成, 成復成. 衆生欲在後成佛者, 在後, 復在後, 在後, 復在後.
故不思議品云, "諸佛如來非不先覺. 爲衆生故, 於念念中, 新新斷結.
亦不住學地, 而成正覺. 故今擧一念成者, 卽與佛同時位, 未見究竟.
故復有淺深之殊. 如人始出門, 及與久遊他土, 雖同在空中, 而遠近有別. 是故,
信住等位, 各各言成佛者, 而復辨其淺深. 此須善思之.

Question) You previously mentioned that extensive cultivation makes the attainment (Buddhahood). Even so, how dare you speak of the attainment in a single instant thought?

Answer) What I spoke of extensive cultivation of the wholesome roots is encompassed in the territory of the teaching of the Three Vehicles. As it has been discussed in the manner that one enters into the One Vehicle through the Three Vehicle, I mentioned that one instant thought is equipped with (all the cultivation of the Wholesome roots) from the beginning to the ending. Therefore the sūtra says that the initiative yearning for the bodhi is the very attainment of the

Buddhahood, and that as the body of wisdom is already possessed of, one does not require the other enlightenment.

Let us employ a metaphor; when numerous rivers flow into the sea, as soon as a drop (of the rivers) enters (into the sea), it is labeled as the sea that has no beginning or ending. No matter how deep the other rivers may be, they do not compete with this one single drop of water for depth. Therefore though the Three Vehicles employ (extensive) cultivation, the cultivation of myriad kalpas in the Three Vehicles is not tantamount to an instant thought in the One Vehicle. So (the sūtra) explicates the expedition of Sudana who arouse himself to aspiration for bodhi at the Mañjuśrī's abode, and is searching for virtuous masters passing one hundred and ten cities. However, this long expedition is not tantamount to one single thought when he is to see bodhisattva Samantabhadra. So it is known to us what is it like that one enters into the great sea of causality. How doesn't one instant thought make the Buddhahood? In the case of those who, in their initiative sitting, foster their mind, mind-calming may be taken to make the Buddhahood. It can also be considered as the attainment of the Buddhahood though, the attainment is far from foremost perfect. It is like that even though rivers consist of water, the water is not equal to that of the great sea.

So far, the meaning of 'attaining the Buddhahood within an instant thought' has generally been explained. According to the Hīnayāna, the cultivation of larger and smaller marks of (Buddhas) for three Maha-asamkya kalpas that makes one hundred kalpas are required to achieve the Buddhahood. If the practice dose not meet the desired plane, the attainment of the Buddhahood is not to be perfected. Accordingly, the Hīnayāna has no tenet of 'attaining the Buddhahood within an instant thought.'

There are two kinds of meaning of the 'attaining the Buddhahood within an instant thought' set forth by the Mahāyāna; One is drafting causality into the true nature of reality which is beyond measurement. As such the meaning of 'attaining of the Buddhahood within an instant thought' is set up. This is the same as the meaning exposited by the chapter of one instant thought in the Prajñāpāramitā sūtra. The other means the attainment of the Buddhahood by the last thought that is achieved after having fulfilled every facet of practices. It is analogous to that when one makes long journey, the last step is to be taken as arrival. This is also the causality of distributive function by which practices for the span of three asamkya kalpas are explicated. According to the tenet of (the causality of distributive function), the

stages before Daśabhūmi are assigned to the first asamkya. The stages from the first stage of the Daśabhūmi to the seventh are assigned to the second asamkya. The stages from the eighth stage of the Daśabhūmi to the tenth are assigned to the third asamkya. Yet there is also the indeterminative owing to the attainment of the Buddhahood within an instant thought. So it is clear that the indeterminative is equivalent to the 'attainment of the Buddhahood within an instant thought' of the One Vehicle. The tenet of the Mahāyāna that the last thought is to be taken as the attainment of the Buddhahood means that, after entering the One Vehicle, one retrospects and takes his initiative thought to be (final) achievement. Why? Because cause and effect are mutually identical and simultaneously correspondent. Therefore to take achievement into account, one should regard the achievement as being achieved and achieved, again achieved and achieved. Sentient beings who wish to achieve the Buddhahood afterwards, would achieve (the Buddhahood) afterwards and afterwards, and afterwards and afterwards. Therefore the chapter of beyond conceptual thought says; 'Though no Buddha Tathāgāta failed to achieve the earliest enlightenment, for the benefit of sentient beings, they anew sever the entangled (i.e., kleśa) in their every thought.

Staying not in the stage of learning, they achieve supreme enlightenment. Therefore, though the 'attainment the Buddhahood within an instant thought' cited right above may have been achieved at the same time as the buddhas, its stage hardly sees the supreme plane, which means that there is distinction between deep and shallow. It is analogous to that, when a man is about to leave doorway and the other far away land, both of them share same space while each of them occupy different spot, distant and near. Therefore even though each of the stages such as of faith and so forth equally speak of attainment of the Buddhahood, there distinction between deep and shallow. This point should be well taken into consideration.

第九唯心廻轉善成門者; 此約心說. 所言唯心廻轉者, 前諸義教門等, 竝是如來藏性淸淨眞心之所建立. 若善若惡隨心所轉, 故云廻轉善成. 心外無別境, 言唯心. 若順轉, 卽名涅槃. 故經云,(*)"心造諸如來." 若逆轉, 卽是生死. 故云, "三界虛妄, 唯一心作. 生死涅槃, 皆不出心." 是故, 不得定說,(*)性是淨及與不淨. 故涅槃云, "佛性非淨, 亦非不淨." 淨與不淨, 皆唯心. 故離心, 更無別法. 故楞伽經云, "心外無境界, 無塵虛妄見."

The ninth is the wonderful formation of all *dharmas* through the

transformation of mind-only. This is posited in regard of mind. So called the transformation of mind-only refers to, along with previously mentioned all teachings such as doctrine and so forth, what is established by the nature of the Tathāgatagarbha that is pure, true mind. As either the good or evil is produced according to the mind, it is called the wonderful formation of all dharmas through the transformation. Because there is no other objective world apart from mind, it is called mind-only. When (the mind is) favorably transformed, it is called nirvāṇa. So the sūtra says; mind creates all tathāgatas. If (the mind is) unfavorably transformed, it is called (the transmigration of) birth and death. So (the sūtra) says; Untruthful is the Three World that is produced by mind only. Neither the transmigration of birth and death or nirvāṇa is apart from mind. There is, therefore, nothing definite. The nature (of mind, or reality) possesses the attribute of both pure and impure. therefore the nirvāṇa sūtra says; The Buddha-nature is neither pure nor impure. Both the pure and impure are dependent on mind only. So apart from mind, there is no other dharmas whatsoever. Thus the *Laṇkāvatāra Sūtra* says: Apart from mind there is no objective world, nor objects or false views.

問; 若心外更無別境, 有無皆由心成者. 如人先見障外有物, 別有人去物時, 心由謂有. 爾時物實無. 何名由心成耶?

答; 若隨虛妄心中轉者, 此障外物, 亦隨心之有無. 此亦心隨, 去物不去物而轉. 若論如來藏性眞實淨心說者, 此物不動本處. 體應十方. 性(*)恒常轉縱, 移到他方, 而常不動本處. 此卽緣起自在力. 然非是變化幻術所爲. 是故雖復七處九會, 而不離寂滅道場. 維摩云, "文殊師利, 不來相而來, 不見相而見." 此之謂也.

Question) If, as you said, apart from mind there is no external world, it follows that both of existence and non-existence are established through mind. If it is so, suppose that a man sees an external object in the first hand, and that another man remove the object. In that case the mind of the former will still imagine the object to exist there. Under whatever basis is this object established by the mind?

Answer) For those who shift (their mind) according to delusive mind, the external objects are either existent or non-existent in accordance with the (delusive) mind. (In this case) the mind will shift according as either the objects are removed or not removed. Under the light of the nature of Tathāgātagarbha that is true, pure mind, the

object does not move out of original site. Its substance is correspondent to ten directions. Whereas the nature (of the object) perpetually permeates different site, it never move out of original site, which is not made of magical transformation but by spontaneous capacity of causality. Therefore there are nine congregations at seven places (in the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra*), they never move out of the hall of quiescence. What the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra* means by 'Bodhisattva Mañjuśri comes without the mark of coming, and sees without the mark of seeing' is nothing other than this.

第十託事顯法生解門者; 此約智說. 言託事者, 如經, 擧金色世界之事. 卽顯始起於實際之法. 一切幢一切蓋等事, 是行體也. 又如法界品云, "開樓觀門, 相見彌勒菩薩所行因事, 至菩提道場." 以樓觀, 則菩提相. 所以言顯法主解也. 若大乘宗中所明, 亦託事以顯法. 卽以異事, 顯於異理法. 此中以事卽法, 故隨擧一事攝法無盡. 故前擧旛幢等, 皆言一切. 所以不同大乘說也. 此中明因果者, 如一乘說也.

The tenth is the understanding of *dharmas* revealed by the expedient of phenomena. This is posited in regard of wisdom. What is meant by the expedient of phenomena refers to, as the phenomena of

the world of golden color in the sūtra, initial manifestation of the dharma of reality. All phenomena, that is, all the banners and canopies, are the substance of activity. As is in the chapter of the Gaṇḍavūha, On opening the viewing door of the pavilion, (he) sees the cause practiced by bodhisattva Maitreya as well as bodhi seminary. Seen from the pavilion symbolize the mark of bodhi. This is to manifest dharma through words to centralize understanding. What is explained by the Mahāyāna schools is also the dharmas revealed by the expedient of phenomena. Yet, in those schools, distinct phenomena reveals distinct principle. However, in this school, since phenomena are the very dharmas, each phenomenon infinitely subsumes dharmas. So previously mentioned banners and so forth represent everything. This is the point that is different from the tenet of the Mahāyāna. Cause and effect clarified here is the tenet of the One Vehicle.

華嚴大敎, 闡揚十玄門者, 此爲鼻祖, 賢首, 仍之載於敎義章內. 大義相同, 而文有祥略. 及作探玄記, 改易二名. 用一華葉, 演說爲淸涼懸談張本. 後人不知, 以爲淸涼十玄與賢首, 有異者. 蓋未見探玄記也. 今敎義章與懸談並行於世. 而復刻此卷, 欲令人知其本源耳.

-楊文會記

The Ten Profundities (十玄) posited by the great teaching of Hua-yen has been also set forth by the primal patriarch, Fa-tsang, in the *Wu-chiao chang*. Even if the general idea of the two is identical, there are differences between them in terms of elaborations. Furthermore, in the *Tan-hsuan chih*, he altered two titles of the ten characteristics of dharma-realm. Using a petal of a flower, he explained the Ten Profundities to Ching-liang who later recorded it in the edition of the *Hsien-t'an*. Future generations, not knowing this situation, are liable to regard that those two versions of the Ten Profundities by Ching-liang and Fa-tsang are different. This misconception would arise only when they do not read the *Tan-hsuan chih*. Nowadays both the *Wu-chiao chang* and the *Hsien-t'an* version are being circulated in the world. The reason that we publish this version is to make people know the original version.

(*Yang-wen hui-chih*)

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE TEXT

I. 擧譬辨成於法 (The use of metaphor to characterize dharma)

1. 異體門 (The way of different substance)

a. 一中多, 多中一. [約相] (One includes many, many include One) [with respect to mark]

b. 一卽多, 多卽一. [約理] (One is equivalent to many, many are equivalent to One) [with respect to principle]

c. 一多之本有與不有. [約智] (The inherent existence or non-inherent existence of One and many) [with respect to wisdom]

2. 同體門 (The way of identical substance)

a. 一中多, 多中一. [約相] (One includes many, many include One) [with respect to mark]

b. 一卽多, 多卽一. [約理] (One is equivalent to many, many are equivalent to One) [with respect to principle]

c. 一多之本有與不有. [約智] (The inherent existence or non-inherent existence of One and many) [with respect to wisdom]

II. 辨法會通於理 (Thorough understanding of the Principle by characterizing dharma)

1. 同時具足相應門 (The simultaneous perfect accordance among dharmas)

2. 因陀羅網境界門 (The realm of Indra's jewel net)

3. 秘密隱顯俱成門 (The mysterious establishment of the hidden and revealed)

4. 微細相容安立門 (The mutual involvement and peaceful arrangement of the minuscule)

5. 十世隔法異成門 (The distinct establishment of isolated *dharmas* in the ten periods of time)

6. 諸藏純雜具德門 (The possession of the qualities of the pure and mixed within all dharmas)

7. 一多相容不同門 (The mutual involvement and difference of One and many)

8. 諸法相卽自在門 (The mutual identification and spontaneity of all dharmas)

9. 唯心回轉善成門 (The wonderful formation of all *dharmas* through the transformation of mind-only)

10. 託事顯法生解門 (The understanding of *dharmas* revealed by the expedient of phenomena)

ABBREVIATIONS

CC Journal of Chinese Culture

HCCC *Hua-yen ching ch'uan-chi*
華嚴經傳記 T 11, pp. 153-172.

FTC *Fo-tsu t'ung-chi*
佛祖通記 T 19, pp. 129-476.

HKSC *Hsu kao-seng chuan*
續高僧傳 T 50, pp. 425-708.

HMC *Hung-ming chi*
弘明集 T 52, pp. 1-96.

Hua-yen ching *Ta fang-kuang fo hua-yen ching*
大方光佛華嚴經 (60 vols.) T 9, p. 395- .

JCP Journal of Chinese Philosophy

JIBS Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies.
印度學佛教學研究, Tokyo.

KHMC *Kuang-hung-ming chi*,
廣弘明集 T 52, pp. 97-362.

KSC *Kao-seng chuan*
高僧傳 T 50, pp.322-424.

Kuan-men *Hua-yen fa-chieh kuan-men*
華嚴法界觀門 T 45, pp. 672-682, 683-691.

K'ung-mu chang *Hua-yen ching-nei chang-men-teng tsa k'ung*
華嚴經內章門等雜孔目章 T 45, pp. 477-508.

LSC *Li-tai san-pao chi*
歷代三寶記 T 49. pp. 22-128.

PEW Philosophy East and West.

She-lun *She ta-ch'eng lun*
攝大乘論 T 31. 132-151.

Shih-hsuan-men *Hua-yen i-ch'eng shih-hsuan-men*
華嚴一乘十玄門 T 45. pp. 514-518.

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